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ABSTRACT 
 
John Diefenbaker’s Latin American policy was based on his vision of Canada’s 
national interest, which placed a strong emphasis on the achievement of greater 
autonomy in foreign policy for Canada vis-à-vis the US and the expansion of Canadian 
exports to the region. For Diefenbaker, an enhanced relationship with Latin America had 
the potential to lessen Canada’s dependency on the US, while giving Latin American 
countries an outlet for their trade, commercial and financial relations other than the US. 
This new approach implied that Canada would formulate and implement policy that 
focused more on Canadian political interests and goals. It was not a matter of charting a 
totally independent policy for Canada in Latin America –– true policy independence was 
impossible to achieve.  Nor was it the case that Canada would necessarily set itself in 
opposition to the US when it disagreed with its policies. For Diefenbaker the goal was to 
pursue a foreign policy that was aligned with, but not subservient to, the US. 
Ultimately, Diefenbaker’s policies towards countries such as Cuba, Mexico, the 
Federation of the West Indies, Argentina and Brazil were somewhat successful in 
expanding Canadian trade and commercial activity beyond the United States, and in 
establishing a stronger political relationship between Canada and the Latin American 
region.  The policies were remarkably consistent, reflecting Diefenbaker’s desire to 
increase Canada’s autonomy, and differentiated by his personal involvement in initiating 
policy at the Cabinet level and in building and cultivating relationships with Latin 
American leaders; the goal was to further Canadian economic and political interests in 
the region. Though there were possibilities for greater expansion and connections with 
Latin America that were missed, Diefenbaker’s Latin American policy would be built 
upon and continued by successive Liberal and Conservative governments once he left 
office. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 A Populist in Foreign Affairs, Rogue Tory and Renegade in Power are but a few 
of the titles of books that purport to examine the life and career of John G. Diefenbaker, 
the thirteenth Prime Minister of Canada.1  The inference in the titles is that this was a 
man who refused to follow convention and was not afraid to move in radically new 
policy directions –– a rogue, a renegade, a populist.  Diefenbaker’s policy towards Latin 
America, while a subject given little attention by historians and writers, provides a useful 
example of Diefenbaker’s embrace of the idea of Canada pursuing new directions in 
international affairs.  
When it came to foreign affairs, Diefenbaker consistently applied the same 
criterion to his policy deliberations. He asked himself whether a particular policy was in 
Canada’s national interest.  The term “national interest” is a contested one but for the 
purposes of this study Steven Kendall Holloway’s interpretation of the term will be used.2  
Holloway argues that there are five general principles that govern a state’s national 
interest.  A state seeks to survive and be secure from attack; be as autonomous as 
possible; maintain its domestic unity or cohesion; be as economically prosperous as 
possible; and have principled self-justification and prestige in the international system.3  
Each leader places different emphasis on the five principles and for Diefenbaker, the 
primary principle was the promotion of Canadian autonomy. 
                                                 
1 H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1989); Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker.  (Toronto: 
Macfarlane, Walter and Ross, 1995); Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years 
(Toronto: MacClelland and Stewart, 1963). 
2 See Steven Kendall Holloway, Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest. (Peterborough: 
Broadview Press, 2006).  Note that it is Holloway’s theoretical framework of the National Interest 
Perspective which is being used and not his interpretation of Diefenbaker’s record. 
3 Ibid., 14. 
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For Diefenbaker, autonomy meant freedom of choice.  It did not mean that he 
wanted to pursue neutrality or a position of non-alignment; Canada was clearly aligned 
with the US and other member-nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).  Rather Diefenbaker simply believed that Canada needed to be free to choose 
which actions would best serve its interests.  He rejected the proposition, embraced by the 
previous Liberal government under Louis St. Laurent that Canada’s interests were best 
served by maintaining a close relationship with the US and mirroring, in many cases, US 
policy. Such an approach, he believed, would mean sacrificing Canadian freedom of 
action. 
Keeping a respectful distance from the US lay at the heart of the Diefenbaker 
government’s position towards Latin America. The goal of promoting Canadian trade and 
commerce in the region was carried forward from the St. Laurent years. But Diefenbaker 
went further than St. Laurent and William Lyon Mackenzie King (St. Laurent’s 
predecessor), by taking steps to develop a relationship with individual countries in Latin 
America and with the region’s multilateral organization, the Organization of American 
States (OAS), recognizing that the US Administration had reservations about the growth 
of communism in such a nearby region. 
 One of most striking things about Diefenbaker’s approach towards developing the 
Canada-Latin America relationship was his tendency to insert himself personally in the 
processes by which his government formulated and implemented policy towards the 
region. The record shows that Diefenbaker supported, and involved himself in the 
implementation of, succeeding initiatives with select Latin American countries – for the 
larger purpose of developing Canada’s interests in the region.  He did this on a consistent 
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basis, facilitating policy implementation by establishing a personal relationship with 
specific Latin American leaders who had the power and influence to make important 
decisions.  Generally speaking, he had little patience for utilizing the formal diplomatic 
structures and processes to develop Canada’s relationships with other countries, or for 
drawn out negotiations with them.4  He liked to use a more personal style of diplomacy to 
build strong relationships –– in Latin America with leaders such as Adolfo López Mateos 
of Mexico, Sir Grantley Adams of the Federation of the West Indies, Dr. Arturo Frondizi 
of Argentina, as well as with officials from Brazil. 
 There were a number of international pressures that helped shape Diefenbaker’s 
policies towards Latin America.  Pressure from the US but, as importantly, from the 
various Latin American nations themselves, played an important role in determining 
policies towards the region. It was a shared view among the leaders of countries such as 
Mexico, Argentine, Brazil, the Federal of the West Indies, and Cuba that Canada’s 
presence in the region could help, in certain instances, to moderate or dilute the strong 
influence of the US in the region. They actively courted Diefenbaker, who then saw an 
opportunity to expand Canadian economic and political interests in the region. The 
personal relationships that Diefenbaker was able to establish with some of these leaders 
would be instrumental in developing trade and other linkages.  
 Domestic influences also played a role in shaping Canadian policy. Diefenbaker’s 
Latin American policies were deeply influenced by his Cabinet.  He believed that the 
Cabinet should occupy a central place in the government’s decision-making on all policy 
matters, including even the smallest issues such as credit insurance on exports. His desire 
to expand Canada’s presence in Latin America was supported in Cabinet by ministers 
                                                 
4 Robinson, 35. 
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such as Howard Green, George Hees, Gordon Churchill, Pierre Sevigny and Sidney 
Smith.  With the exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was a consensus in Cabinet 
about Canada’s Latin American policies.  
 Diefenbaker was somewhat successful in his efforts to promote Canadian trade 
and other interests in Latin America.  He was the first Canadian Prime Minister to visit 
the region, and he subsequently sent Canada’s first foreign ministers there. In nearly 
every Latin America country in which Diefenbaker took an active interest, trade 
increased, and it was under his government that Canada finally established embassies in 
every Latin American nation.5  With each country that either he visited or from which 
Canada received a visit by a Latin American head of state or head of government, trade 
levels as measured by export and imports increased.   
 Despite such successes, there is little historical record of them.  There have been 
no books or articles written that examine Diefenbaker’s Latin American policies in their 
entirety.  In fact, with the singular exception of Cuba, there are virtually no works that 
deal with Diefenbaker and countries in Latin America.  There are a few books that have a 
page or two that deal with some aspect of his government’s position towards Latin 
America but there is none that focuses on Diefenbaker specifically.6  The works that 
discuss Diefenbaker’s Latin American policies do so as part of some larger topic, such as 
his foreign policy more generally or the man himself.  The exception, of course, is Cuba 
and more specifically the Cuban Missile Crisis  –– a case, however, which reflects the 
definitive attribute of Diefenbaker’s approach to the Latin American region –– his 
                                                 
5 Statistics are provided in later chapters, however, in each of the nations mentioned trade in terms of 
exports to and imports from Canada increased between 1957 and 1963.   
6 For example, Peter McKenna discusses Diefenbaker’s decision to not join the O.A.S. in less than 3pages 
in his work, Canada and the O.A.S.: From Dilettante to Full Partner (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 
1995).   
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tendency to approach the issues in a personal way based on a consistent application of his 
beliefs.  
It was this tendency to personalize Canada’s relations with Latin America, 
however, that created limits to what the Diefenbaker government would be able to 
achieve in the trade and other policy fields. As much as Diefenbaker was inclined to want 
to expand Canada’s relationship with the Latin American region, viewing it as a signature 
way of building Canada’s foreign policy outward beyond North America, the connections 
that he was able to establish with individual countries were hampered by their 
dependence on the short-term personal connections that he was able to establish with 
their leaders. When they lost power or were forced from office, the connections that he 
had been able to make were effectively lost. 
 The historical view of Diefenbaker has been shaped by his government’s place in 
the Canadian political narrative.  The Diefenbaker government was preceded by the so-
called “Golden Age” of Canadian foreign policy (1945-57), which included the last years 
of the government of William Lyon Mackenzie King and that of Louis St. Laurent.7  
Pearson, who as St. Laurent’s External Affairs Minister won the Nobel Peace Prize for 
his efforts in the Suez Crisis, is often linked to, and compared with Diefenbaker because 
the two men dominated Canadian politics between 1957 and 1967.8  These comparisons 
often cast Diefenbaker in an unfavorable light.9 
The theory of the Golden Age of Canadian foreign policy argued that during the 
period immediately following the Second World War, Europe and Japan were devastated. 
                                                 
7 For a detailed account of the “Golden Age” theory see Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We 
Lost Our Place in the World (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2004) 5-20. 
8 For example, see Jack Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986). 
9 Ibid. 
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Canada, spared the destruction visited on much of the rest of the developed world, thus 
wielded economic, military and diplomatic influence in world affairs that was out of 
proportion to its size.10  Furthermore, between 1945 and 1957, the Canadian government 
benefited from having a number of highly capable individuals in the Department of 
External Affairs.  The government, led first by King and then St. Laurent, allowed the 
Department to take the lead in establishing a reputation for Canada in the post-war 
international system.  The combination of capable men and a favorable geo-political 
climate led to the Golden Age in Canadian foreign policy. 
The theory unfortunately creates a problem for those who seriously want to 
understand Diefenbaker’s foreign policy.  The unspoken corollary of any theory that 
argues for a golden age is that the period which immediately follows is diminished by 
comparison.  In other words, a golden age is not followed by an even better period but by 
a worse one.  Thus, the acceptance of the idea of a golden age in Canadian foreign policy 
creates a starting point for the study of the Diefenbaker government’s foreign policies, in 
which the assumption is that Canada suffered an immediate decline in its international 
influence. 
The fact is that Canada’s international influence did not go into a free-fall with the 
arrival of the Diefenbaker government. What is true is that as Europe and Japan 
recovered from the ravages of the Second World War, Canada’s economic position 
declined in relation to these countries. But Diefenbaker’s detractors point instead to 
erroneous economic and social policies pursued by a government headed by a prairie 
lawyer who suffered from serious character flaws. This was a Prime Minister who was 
                                                 
10 Cohen, 4-20. 
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not in the same league as his predecessors King and St. Laurent and his successor 
Pearson. 
Pearson not only won the Noble Peace Prize in 1957 but he is also credited with 
redefining Canada’s international role as a middle power that could best exercise 
influence by working with other nations, including the US, in multilateral organizations.11  
Despite Pearson’s electoral failings (he is the only Liberal Prime Minister in the 20th 
century, aside from John Turner, who did not win at least one majority government) he 
continues to be viewed as one of Canada’s greatest Prime Ministers, both by academics 
and by the general public.  In 2004, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) held a 
contest to see who was “The Greatest Canadian,” Pearson finished 6th and  Diefenbaker 
47th.12  In 1997, Maclean’s magazine asked 25 historians to rank Canada’s Prime 
Ministers and once again Pearson was ranked 6th while Diefenbaker was 13th.13 
From a diplomatic perspective, the greatest difference between Pearson and 
Diefenbaker was their respective views on Canada’s most important international 
relationship, the one with the US.  Where Diefenbaker sought greater autonomy from the 
US, Pearson, like St. Laurent, believed in maintaining a close relationship with 
Washington. Pearson’s US policies were supported by some of Canada’s most pre-
eminent diplomatic historians and foreign policy experts who viewed an amicable 
relationship with the United States as one of the most important keys to Canadian 
prosperity.14 
                                                 
11 John Holmes, “Most safely in the middle” International Journal 39, no. 2, 367-368. 
12 The Greatest Canadian. Producer, Mark Starowicz.  CBC. November 29th, 2004. 
13 Norman Hillmer, Jack Granatstein, “Historians Rank the Best and Worst Canadian Prime Ministers,” 
Maclean’s, April 21st, 1997.  
14 Amongst them are historians John Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1976) and Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967. 
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 These historians believe that their interpretation is well supported by the fact the 
Canadian-US relationship, which was strained by the personal conflicts between 
Diefenbaker and US President John F. Kennedy, improved immediately with Pearson’s 
victory in the 1963 election.  Yet little mention is made of Pearson’s decision to continue 
two of Diefenbaker’s main Latin American policies: maintaining diplomatic and trade 
relations with Cuba and remaining outside the OAS. Instead the discussion of Canadian 
foreign policy in the post-war years has focused on the accomplishments of Pearson’s 
middle-power internationalism.  Thus the Diefenbaker era has occupied a dubious space 
in foreign policy literature, viewed by many as a transitional phase between the Golden 
Age and the Trudeau era.  Historians have written extensively about the King and St. 
Laurent period as well as the Pearson and Trudeau years but few have written about 
Diefenbaker. 
 An example of the minimal attention given to Diefenbaker’s foreign policy was a 
speech delivered by Frederic H. Soward, Professor Emeritus at the University of British 
Columbia to the Royal Society of Canada in 1966 –– three years after Diefenbaker left 
the office of Prime Minister.15  The title of Soward’s presentation was “Some Aspects of 
Canadian Foreign Policy in the Last Quarter Century.” No mention was made of 
Diefenbaker, and Soward discussed Howard Green in one paragraph, before ending with 
a discussion of Pearson and the current issues involving Canada and NATO.16 
 In fact there are a limited number of books dedicated solely to the study of 
Diefenbaker’s foreign policy. Most of them proceed from the restrictive premise that 
Diefenbaker is to be judged from the standpoint of the state of Canada-US relations 
                                                 
15 F. H. Soward, “Some Aspects of Canadian Foreign Policy in the Last Quarter Century” Transactions of 
the Royal Society of Canada (Vol. IV, Series IV, June 1966), 139-153. 
16 Ibid., 152. 
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during his tenure. There are two main views, the first of which is that Diefenbaker’s 
attempt to create greater autonomy for Canadian foreign policy by distancing Canada 
from the US was a mistake –– a mistake that was basically caused by flaws in 
Diefenbaker’s character and leadership.  The second view is that Diefenbaker’s emphasis 
on Canadian autonomy in foreign policy was necessary and desirable, and his failures, 
like those of Pearson, were caused by forces and issues that were beyond his control.  
 The proponents of the first view argue that Canada can best exercise influence in  
the world by cultivating and maintaining a strong relationship with the United States.  
This close relationship allows the Canadian government to influence US policy, albeit in 
a rather minimal way, because the US government would be willing to entertain and at 
times accept Canadian recommendations out of respect for the support that Canada 
continues to offer to US initiatives.  Thus, the Canadian government should offer full 
support to US initiatives regardless of how they benefit Canada because, in the long run, 
this policy will allow the Canadian government to influence US policies.   
 This support of the US must not be limited to verbal or political backing for their 
initiatives but must include tangible military support for US foreign adventures, even 
those that do not enjoy popular support in Canada.  Thus, supporters of this view such as 
Peyton Lyon and J.L. Granatstein have argued that Canada’s decision not to offer 
military support to the US during the Vietnam War and the Second Iraq War were 
substantial policy errors.17 
 In addition to recommending that the Canadian government support US initiatives 
in the hopes of receiving future considerations, Lyon and others have also argued that US 
                                                 
17 Peyton Lyon, “Quiet Diplomacy Revisited” in An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, (ed.) Stephen 
Clarkson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), 38-39.  For Granastein’s views see the February 20, 
2003, editorial in the National Post. 
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leadership of the West was necessary and as such, should be accepted by Canada.18  
Furthermore, supporting the US is inevitable because it represents the preponderance of 
military power in the western world. As historian John Holmes has put it, “a realistic 
defense policy for Canada must assume that the final say rests in the hands of the power 
with decisive force [the United States].”19 Thus, Diefenbaker’s insistence that the 
Canadian government make its own foreign policy decisions and pursue greater 
autonomy in international affairs is considered fatally flawed because it will inevitably, at 
some point, set Canada in opposition to the US  ––  the classic case being the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. 
Supporters of a US-centered foreign policy for Canada usually argue that 
Diefenbaker’s decision to choose a new path focusing on creating a more autonomous 
role for Canada in international affairs was not a strategic policy choice but rather the 
result of his numerous character flaws, the chief of which was a strong anti-Americanism.  
Many of the authors who share this view also have strong personal feelings about 
Diefenbaker, which are evident in both the titles of their works and their word choices 
therein.  For example, the title of an early article that Lyon wrote for Maclean’s was 
“Diefenbaker’s first speech to the United Nations was a disaster: now he promises to 
make matters worse by delivering a second one”, and Patrick Nicholson titled his 
unauthorized biography of Diefenbaker Vision and Indecision.20 Nicholson’s view was 
that, through his actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Diefenbaker embarrassed his friends 
                                                 
18 Lyon, “Quiet Diplomacy Revisited,” 38-39. 
19 Peyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs 1961-63 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 67. 
20 Peyton Lyon, “Diefenbaker's first UN speech was a disaster: now he promises to make matters worse by 
delivering a second one” Maclean’s July 28th, 1962, 3-4; Patrick Nicholson, Vision and Indecision (Don 
Mills: Longmans Canada, 1968). 
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and brought disgrace to his country.21  Jamie Glazov, author of Canadian Policy toward 
Khrushchev’s Soviet Union and a former student of Granatstein, also left little doubt 
about how he felt about Diefenbaker when he labeled the latter’s Soviet policy, including 
his handling of Communist Cuba, a “pathetic failure.”22   
Pursuing a policy which was a “pathetic failure” is hardly a surprising charge, 
considering the long list of character flaws that Diefenbaker’s detractors have attributed 
to him.  Peter C. Newman, the best-selling author of Renegade in Power, a biography of 
Diefenbaker published in 1963, stated that Diefenbaker had “an almost morbid reluctance 
to make decisions” and that he could be “insatiably vain.”23  Newman described 
Diefenbaker’s response to the Cuban Missile Crisis as “lackadaisical” and implied, 
incorrectly, that Canada offered less support to the US government than other western 
allies.24  Newman was, and continues to be, one of the best selling and influential authors 
of Canadian history.  During the late 1950s and early 1960s he was editor of Maclean’s 
magazine and his editorials included often biting criticisms of the Diefenbaker 
government.  What effect this had in creating and shaping the historical Diefenbaker 
could be the subject of another dissertation but it was and is certainly considerable. 
Another author who took a similar view of Diefenbaker’s character was Knowlton 
Nash, the author of Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended 
Border.25  Nash, a journalist, had close contact with both men and described their 
relationship as one of mutual antagonism.  According to Nash, Diefenbaker felt that 
                                                 
21 Nicholson, 168. 
22 Jamie Glazov, Canadian Policy toward Khrushchev’s Soviet Union (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2002), 169. 
23 Newman, 3. 
24 Ibid., 338. 
25 Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1990). 
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Kennedy was a “spoiled boy” while Kennedy in turn, is reported to have characterized 
Diefenbaker as one of only two men he truly hated (the other being Sukarno, the dictator 
of Indonesia).26  Diefenbaker, however, came out looking the worst of the two leaders.  
Nash attacked Diefenbaker’s character numerous times, calling him “weak and 
indecisive” and accusing him of having “a fantasy life that spilled into paranoia.” 27 
But there is another view of Diefenbaker’s foreign policy. This view argues that 
Diefenbaker’s attempt to chart a different foreign policy for Canada was necessary, 
justified and often effective. Diefenbaker pursued this new direction because of his 
particular view of Canada’s national interest –– and not because of a strong anti-
American sentiment. His fate was to come to power at a time of a daunting, shift in the 
geo-political climate of the post-war world. This, together with a strong bias against him 
in influential quarters within Canada, greatly hindered his policy initiatives. 
A number of authors have discussed the effectiveness of Diefenbaker’s new 
direction in foreign affairs.  George Grant, in Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of 
Canadian Nationalism, maintained that while the Diefenbaker government was in power, 
“Canada played a more independent role internationally than ever before in its history.”28  
Richard A. Preston, author of Canada in World Affairs 1959-1961, viewed 1959-61 as 
years of great opportunity for Canada when Canadian policy was consistent and 
effective.29  Preston contended that the death of US Secretary of State, John Foster 
Dulles, removed one of the impediments to the lessening of tensions during the Cold 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 11-12. 
27 Ibid., 12-13. 
28 George Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto: McClelland and 
Steward, 1965), 28. 
29 Richard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs 1959-1961 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), 4-7, 
281-289. 
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War.  Meanwhile the emergence of the Third World and the non-aligned movement and 
the recovery in Western Europe meant that the geo-political system was changing and so 
was Canada’s role in it. 
Supporters of Diefenbaker’s new direction in foreign policy also argue that the 
move towards greater autonomy from the US was not motivated by anti-Americanism.  
Grant noted that Diefenbaker “never implied any criticism of America’s world role” and 
was motivated instead by his sense of Canadian nationalism.30 Trevor Lloyd, in his work 
Canada in World Affairs 1957 to 1959, attributed Diefenbaker’s desire to increase 
Canada’s role in the world as also stemming from his determination to compete for public 
recognition with Lester Pearson.31 
While those who supported Diefenbaker’s attempt to pursue a different kind of 
foreign policy were largely agreed that this was desirable and justifiable, they were 
divided over the cause of Diefenbaker’s failure to effect a long-term change in Canada’s 
international role.  Lloyd believed that the Diefenbaker government was hindered by the 
fact that, “the two years between June 21st, 1957 and June 4th 1959 saw the beginning of a 
natural and probably unavoidable decline in Canada’s influence on world affairs.”32 
Grant argued that Diefenbaker was betrayed  by the “economically powerful” in Canada, 
or by those who had no interest in being Canadian nationalists.33  In his work The United 
States and Canada, Gerald M. Craig argued that a singular influence that limited 
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Diefenbaker’s foreign policy options was the enormous popularity in Canada of John 
Kennedy, to whom he was often unfavourably compared.34   
 One of the weaknesses of the criticism of Diefenbaker’s foreign policy is its 
undue concentration on the state of Canada-US relations while he was Prime Minister. 
The judgment of his failings in international affairs seems most often to come back to his 
government’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The verdict rendered by many is that 
Diefenbaker’s decision to delay giving full support to the Kennedy Administration in 
confronting Khruschev over Cuba was an error.  
The authors holding this view are the same ones who were critical of 
Diefenbaker’s attempt to pursue new directions in Canadian foreign policy. Peyton Lyon, 
for example, argued that, in the circumstances of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Diefenbaker 
had little reason to expect consultation from Kennedy, and that other Western leaders 
readily followed the US.35 An intransigent Diefenbaker, Lyon maintained, did not 
recognize that he was a follower in the western alliance, not a leader.36 “In the strategy of 
nuclear deterrence the delay of a few hours, perhaps even minutes can prove 
catastrophic,” he argued, it was unacceptable that Canada should resist the US request for 
full, unconditional, support at a time of need. 37  More recently, John Kirk and Peter 
McKenna have echoed Lyon’s conclusions in Canada and Cuba Relations: The Other 
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Good Neighbour Policy , arguing that the western allies were in fact obliged to offer their 
support to the US, and that in this test of loyalty, Diefenbaker failed miserably.38   
Supporters of this view argue that it was more than just logic that should have 
convinced Diefenbaker to support the US from the beginning; he should have recognized 
that the failure to act was an unacceptable violation of Canada’s obligations to the US. 39  
J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer take this sense of obligation further, going so far as 
to defend the extraordinary and questionable action taken by Defence Minister Douglas 
Harkness in placing Canada’s armed forces on alert without the Prime Minister’s 
authorization.40 
Diefenbaker’s decisions during the Cuban crisis are usually seen as reflecting a 
failure of leadership.  Peter Haydon, a former Naval Commander, agrees with 
Granatstein, Hillmer, and others that Diefenbaker failed to show decisive leadership 
during the crisis when it counted the most. 41 In Newman’s account, Kennedy was 
decisive and in control during the Cuban crisis, while Diefenbaker vacillated; his actions 
were “indecisive” and resulted in Canada being “isolated from the Western family of 
nations.”42    
 Yet there is another view of Diefenbaker’s actions during the Cuban crisis –– one 
that argues that his government’s delay in supporting Kennedy was understandable, in 
fact very much in keeping with Canada’s tradition of working to decrease international 
tensions, and insisting that Canadian autonomy in foreign policy be respected. Historian 
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Jocelyn Maynard Ghent has argued that a “non-military response would have fit in with 
existing [Canadian] attitudes and interests”; moreover, the Diefenbaker government was 
understandably anxious about a situation over which it obviously had no control.43  The 
way in which Kennedy handled the crisis meant that Canadians “found themselves on the 
brink, without consent and helpless to influence events in which they were inextricably 
involved.”44  Arthur Andrew has stated similarly in The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power: 
Canadian Diplomacy from King to Mulroney, that “Diefenbaker’s reluctance to act 
swiftly or automatically on a matter of such importance was awkward but … it was also 
understandable.”45  By the 1960s, Andrew argued, Canada was no longer in a position 
where it should be expected to fall into line without consultation and if there was to be 
another war then Canada should have a say in it.46 
 With the release of One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. 
Diefenbaker,47  Diefenbaker provided his own account of Canada’s relations with Latin 
America during his time, particularly as they were affected by Canada-US relations. He 
pointed out that he had initially contemplated joining the OAS but had changed his mind 
partly because of the manner in which the issue was raised by Kennedy.48 In private, 
Kennedy had pressed Diefenbaker to take a greater interest in Latin America which he 
viewed as “more dangerous than any other place in the world.”49  The implication was 
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that Canada had an obligation to undertake such an initiative –– as Diefenbaker would 
later put it with characteristic scorn: “Canada owed so great a debt to the United States 
that nothing but continuing servitude could repay it.”50  So offended was Diefenbaker by 
Kennedy’s suggestion that he reminded the President that Canada had lost more men than 
the United States in the First World War and an equivalent number in the Second.51 
 As the Cuban Missile Crisis began, Diefenbaker was actually more worried about 
Kennedy than Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.  He feared Kennedy “was perfectly 
capable of taking the world to the brink of thermal-nuclear destruction to prove himself a 
man of our times.”52  His account of the crisis shows that he deeply resented the lack of 
consultation by the United States, which he believed should have occurred.53  For 
Diefenbaker, it was critical that Canada not take any action that would make the crisis 
worse: “Certainly we wanted the missiles removed from Cuba but not, if there was an 
alternative, at the price of global destruction.”54 
 The real threat to Canada was not so much a nuclear war, which Diefenbaker 
would do everything in his capacity to prevent, but rather the loss of freedom of action 
that would come from automatically following a directive from Washington when 
Canada had a different view. Diefenbaker’s critics would later charge that he made the 
wrong decision because he allowed his personal feelings towards Kennedy to influence 
his judgment. From Diefenbaker’s perspective, Kennedy was the one who had let his 
personal feelings affect his decision-making, bearing a grudge against the Canadian 
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Prime Minister who he did not like. The lack of consultation had been a deliberate slight 
based on personal animosity.55  
Diefenbaker’s account is interesting and controversial, and is supported, for the 
most part, by the evidence.  It does, however, gloss over the influence that Diefenbaker’s 
own emotions had on his decision-making at the time. While he was acting very much 
within the Canadian tradition of attempting to do everything in his capacity to prevent the 
crisis from becoming worse, his delay in supporting the US position may be attributed, at 
least in part, to his own anger about the way the Canadian government was being treated. 
Viewing Diefenbaker’s new directions in foreign policy solely through the prism 
of Canadian-US relations or judging them by his actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
is restrictive and limiting.  Only one book has been published that attempts to present a 
more encompassing view of Diefenbaker’s approach to foreign affairs.  In fact the only 
work devoted exclusively to the study of Diefenbaker’s foreign policy is H. Basil 
Robinson’s semi-biographical Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs.56  
Robinson served as special advisor to Diefenbaker on foreign affairs and he acted as a 
liaison between the Prime Minister and the Department of External Affairs.  He was one 
of the few men Diefenbaker trusted and who enjoyed his confidence. 
In Robinson’s view, Diefenbaker suffered from the characteristics typical of a 
populist leader.  These included a fear and mistrust of experts, too strong a belief in his 
personal intuition, and an inability to view international relations dispassionately.  
Robinson felt that Diefenbaker faced many problems that were beyond his control and 
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that he struggled in dealing with the new dynamics that grew out of Canada’s evolving 
relationship with the rest of the world. 
According to Robinson, Kennedy was to blame for many of the difficulties that 
arose between the two countries –- issues which interestingly had not been evident during 
the Eisenhower years. For example, following a trip to Mexico in early 1960 Diefenbaker 
contemplated membership in the OAS, thanks to the very warm reception he had received 
there.57 But a short time later when Eisenhower’s successor, John Kennedy, pressured 
him on the issue, he changed his mind, refusing in the end to even commit to sending a 
representative as an observer.58 Likewise, Robinson argued, Kennedy was the problem 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. “The Canadian government had been denied the 
opportunity to reach timely military and political conclusions.”59  The truth was that 
Canada had rendered considerable assistance to the United States during the crisis –– 
assistance which apparently was insufficient for Kennedy.60   
 There are two recent publications that touch on Diefenbaker’s foreign policy and 
that go beyond the critics’ standard preoccupation with the Canadian-US relationship. 
These are John Hilliker and Donald Barry’s Canada’s Department of External Affairs 
Volume 2: Coming of Age, 1946-1968 and Costas Melakopides’s Pragmatic Idealism: 
Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1995.61  Hilliker and Barry explore an often overlooked 
aspect of Diefenbaker’s foreign policies –– his relationship with the foreign affairs 
bureaucracy.  They demonstrate that Diefenbaker’s concerns over the loyalty of the 
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members of the Department of External Affairs were unfounded. Diefenbaker called 
External’s bureaucrats “Pearsonalities” because he believed they continued to be loyal to 
Lester Pearson who was the External Affairs Minister under Louis St. Laurent and the 
Leader of the Opposition during Diefenbaker’s years as Prime Minister.  Hilliker and 
Barry show that the members of the Department in fact tried their best to work with their 
new boss and provide Diefenbaker with the advice and information that he needed.62  The 
problem was that Diefenbaker had a different style of leadership from St. Laurent, 
remaining careful to ensure that Cabinet, and not senior bureaucrats, determined 
government policy.  
Costas Melakopides has offered a distinctive interpretation of Canadian 
diplomatic history, viewing Diefenbaker’s position on foreign affairs as consistent with 
the balanced and successful approach followed by Canadian Prime Ministers from the 
end of the Second World War to 1995. It was an idealistic foreign policy based on values 
representative of Canada’s mainstream culture such as moderation, communication, 
mediation and cooperation,63  while reflecting a pragmatism that displayed neither 
“romantic naïveté nor groundless utopianism.”64  Melakopides argues that the “Golden 
Age” of Canadian foreign policy did not end in 1957 but rather continued on through the 
Diefenbaker period and into the decades that followed.65 
In Melakopides’s judgment, “he [Diefenbaker] and his government performed 
with clear motives and, overall, achieved successful results.”66  While it is arguable that 
Diefenbaker allowed his personal feelings towards Kennedy to influence his position on 
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the Cuban Missile Crisis, a better explanation of his government’s handling of the crisis 
is found in the paralysis that seized his Cabinet, together with the influence of anti-
American sentiment in Canada.67 
Melakopides’ argument challenges the interpretation advanced by many writers 
that Diefenbaker’s foreign policy was a departure from the successful Liberal approach 
that went before it. He questions whether the foreign policy pursued by previous Liberal 
governments under St. Laurent was any more successful or even very different from that 
pursued by Diefenbaker. What this study of Diefenbaker and Latin America shows is that 
in its broadest contours, his government’s Latin American policy was not that different 
from the policy of the previous administration. It remained focused, to a large degree, on 
expanding trade and commerce between Canada and Latin America. Yet there was a 
different vision with Diefenbaker, entailing the active pursuit of specific Latin American 
initiatives that would further Canadian interests, including the interest of achieving 
greater autonomy for Canada from the US. In initiating and implementing policy, 
Diefenbaker would have a personal role, reflecting a key feature of his distinctive 
approach to leadership in foreign affairs. 
This study attempts to go beyond old debates about the Golden Age of Canadian 
diplomacy and examines Diefenbaker’s policies and actions in light of the influences and 
pressures that shaped them.  It focuses on those Latin American and Caribbean states, 
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, the Federation of the British West and Cuba, upon which 
Diefenbaker took a personal interest.  Chapter One begins by examining Diefenbaker’s 
formative years, including the influences in his youth and adulthood that shaped his 
approach to political life. Diefenbaker’s life on the Prairies, his career as a criminal 
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lawyer, and his family life all played important roles in shaping the personal attributes 
that would in turn influence his approach to political and policy questions while in 
government.  
 Chapter Two examines the geo-political context that shaped Canadian foreign 
policies towards Latin America following the Second World War as well as the policies 
of the Liberal governments of William Lyon Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent upon 
which Diefenbaker often built.  Canada’s changing relationship with Great Britain, the 
growing predominance of the US, as well as the progress of the Cold War all played 
important roles in influencing how various Canadian governments in the post-war world 
conceptualized their Latin American policies.   
 Chapter Three focuses on Diefenbaker’s policies towards the Federation of the 
West Indies.  The Federation was born in 1958 and looked to Canada as a model to 
follow in terms of bridging geographic and cultural differences in a nation.  Its leader, Sir 
Grantly Adams, formed a strong personal bond with Diefenbaker. Diefenbaker approved 
a $10 million aid package to the new nation, evidently feeling a sentimental attachment to 
the islands and leading him to try and assist the newly born federation whenever possible. 
 Chapter Four shifts the focus to Mexico, a nation that shared with Canada the 
unique experience of bordering the United States.  The Mexican government actively 
sought to increase the country’s ties to Canada and Diefenbaker made the first Prime 
Ministerial visit to a Latin American nation when he visited Mexico in 1960.  He left 
with the strong belief that Canada was missing opportunities for the expansion of trade 
and political influence in Latin America.  His visit also led him to decide to actively 
explore joining the Organization of American States. 
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 Chapter Five explores how Diefenbaker came very close to bringing Canada into 
the OAS.  In this organization he saw a potential vehicle for the pursuit of Canadian 
interests in Latin America.  He also felt that if Canada joined the organization, it could 
act as a bridge between Europe and Latin America.  There was pressure from numerous 
Latin American nations, most prominently Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, for Canada to 
join, but in the end Diefenbaker’s deteriorating relationship with US President John F. 
Kennedy led him to decide that the risks of membership ultimately outweighed the 
benefits. 
 Chapter Six looks at Diefenbaker’s policies towards the two largest nations of 
South America: Brazil and Argentina.  In both nations there was an active attempt to 
bring about closer relations with Canada.  Diefenbaker was receptive to strengthening the 
Canadian relationship with both countries and developed a strong personal relationship 
with the presidents of both.  However, when the leadership in Argentina and Brazil 
changed, the primary connection with Diefenbaker was lost and the positive momentum 
that pushed the nations closer disappeared. 
 The last two chapters focus on Cuba.  Chapter Seven examines Diefenbaker’s 
reaction to and policies towards the Cuban Revolution.  As US-Cuban tensions increased 
in response to the Revolution, the United States decided to implement an economic 
embargo and asked Canada to join it.  Despite his excellent relationship with then 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Diefenbaker refused.  Canada had little reason to join 
the boycott as the Cuban government did not nationalize or appropriate Canadian 
companies.  Furthermore, Diefenbaker believed that since Canada maintained economic 
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relations with other communist states there was little justification in joining the embargo 
based on Cuba’s adoption of a communist system of government. 
 Chapter Eight takes a closer look at one of Diefenbaker’s most controversial 
foreign policy decisions –– his two-day hesitation in authorizing the Canadian military to 
raise the alert status for Canada’s NORAD forces during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The 
decision reflected both his insistence that Canada achieve greater autonomy in foreign 
affairs vis-à-vis the US and his inclination to personally intervene in the decision-making 
process to guide Canadian policy. Canada, he believed, needed to make its own choice on 
when or whether to offer full support to the US.  The timing of his decision-making was 
influenced by his personal relationship with Kennedy and his beliefs concerning the 
origins of the crisis and the nature of the threat.  
 Diefenbaker’s policies towards Latin America reflected his view that Canada’s 
national interest was best served by pursing a foreign policy that achieved greater 
autonomy from the US than under previous Canadian governments.  The St. Laurent 
government had operated from the presupposition that Canada’s national interest was 
best served by maintaining a close relationship with the United States and broadly 
supporting American foreign policy.  Diefenbaker’s Latin American policy was driven 
and implemented by strong personal leadership, and was based on his particular 
perception of Canada’s national interest.  This did not mean that his policies marked a 
complete departure from those of the previous Liberal government; rather, in many 
instances, they built upon them.   
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CHAPTER 1 
THE FORMATIVE YEARS 
 
Diefenbaker attempted to implement his Latin American policy largely through 
the use of personal intervention and involvement on specific policy issues.  His tendency 
to intervene personally in matters was principally the result of the formative 
circumstances of his upbringing and his political career prior to his election as Prime 
Minister in 1957.  Diefenbaker was used to working and making decisions alone; his 
strength, he believed, was in taking decisive action not engaging in extensive consultation 
or delegation.  He followed this belief throughout both his legal and early political 
careers and his successes therein only served to reinforce his tendencies in this regard.  It 
was this emphasis on self-reliance that contributed to the fact that Canada’s Latin 
America policy under Diefenbaker often reflected his own ideas, convictions and 
vision.68   
Diefenbaker’s decision-making was shaped by a number of his personal 
characteristics, including his self-reliance, and it was underscored by a strong sense of 
personal freedom.  Diefenbaker valued the freedom to follow one’s own convictions and 
to act autonomously.  He projected this value into the international arena and felt that 
Canada needed to act in a similar manner in foreign affairs.  Canada needed to be able to 
follow a more autonomous path that reflected Canadian values and interests.  Thus, he 
rejected continentalism and lessened the emphasis on keeping close to the US on foreign 
policy issues. This desire to chart a new course was buttressed by a strong single- 
mindedness, a tendency to ultimately make decisions alone and a supreme confidence in 
his own decisions.  Diefenbaker liked to rely on numerous sources of information and 
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refused to accept that any source should predominate, yet, paradoxically, this did not lead 
him to develop his skills as a conciliator as the flow of information was almost always in 
one direction, from the source to Diefenbaker. 
 Diefenbaker’s Latin American policy was directly influenced by a number of 
these personal qualities and beliefs.  These were developed and honed by a life-time 
spent on the wind-swept Prairies, struggling for political success and arguing in the 
defense of those accused of criminal action before crowded court rooms.  They were also 
deeply influenced by his family, particularly the trinity of women who dominated his 
personal life: his mother Mary, his first wife Edna and his second wife Olive. 
 Although on the surface, the Canadian Prairies and Latin America would appear 
to have had little in common, Diefenbaker perceived a warmth and sense of community 
in Latin America that reminded him of his upbringing on the Prairies.  For a young John 
Diefenbaker the Prairies were filled with people to whom class and ethnicity were of 
minor importance.  He found a warmth and sense of community there that were in stark 
contrast to his experiences in Toronto, where he had frequently visited with his father 
while the family lived in Ontario.69  In his memoirs Diefenbaker recalled journeying with 
his father out West to claim land for homesteading.  The two ran out of food and stopped 
by a small hospice that was home to a Swedish bachelor.  The latter provided the two 
with supper and Diefenbaker remembered, though the food was awful, it was the best the 
man had and he gave of it willingly and without complaint.  “It was” he wrote “a typical 
example of Prairie hospitality.”70   It was in this experience and others similar to it - like 
the many times that his family entertained Mennonites, Doukobors, and Ukrainians in 
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their small schoolhouse - that Diefenbaker developed a deep fondness for overt displays 
of personal affection.71   
 Diefenbaker would consistently encounter similar displays while he attempted to 
implement his Latin American policy.  He came across these demonstrations when he 
traveled to Mexico and when he received leaders from Argentina and the West Indies.  
As well, the reports of various Canadian dignitaries who were sent to represent the 
Canadian government to Brazil, Mexico and Argentina were filled with comparable acts 
of affection towards the Canadians and often Diefenbaker himself.  Whether it was 
Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek informing Diefenbaker that they were both the 
sons of immigrants or Argentine President Dr. Arturo Frondizi telling Diefenbaker that 
his visit to Canada left him with the best possible impression, Diefenbaker was 
consistently and deeply moved by these types of comments and gestures.72   
It was during the many times that his family entertained guests that Diefenbaker 
developed his own personal touch, his ability to influence people through the force of his 
personality.  It was an attribute that he used to devastating effect during his election 
campaigns.  In all three of his major electoral breakthroughs, his victory in Prince Albert 
in 1953, his election as Progressive Conservative Party leader in 1956 and his 
dethronement of the Liberals in 1957, Diefenbaker ran on populist platforms that focused 
on himself rather than on the political party with which he was affiliated.  Yet this 
personal approach proved to be a double-edged sword, at once a great strength and a 
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great weakness as it also meant that Diefenbaker was acutely susceptible to personal 
charms/overtures.   
Diefenbaker’s conceptualization of the Canadian identity was also shaped by the 
Prairies.  This identity was formed in response to both the acceptance he felt on the 
Prairies and to the occasional attacks that called into question his “Canadianness”.  These 
attacks were often directed at his last name, for example when political opponents in the 
1925 federal election called him a “Hun” to emphasize his Germanic sounding name.73  
Diefenbaker responded by stating that “if there is no hope for me to be a Canadian then 
who is there hope for?”74  He made it a common theme throughout his political career to 
reshape the prevailing concept of what constitutes a “Canadian” with his own, non-
ethnic, non-hyphenated view which focused on contemporary citizenship. He felt that the 
contemporary Canadian identity was based on, and privileged, those who could trace 
their lineage back to England or France.  This left out the hundreds of thousands of 
Canadians who came from other nations.  Thus he sought to replace the French-Canadian 
or English Canadian identities with a Canadian one that included all Canadians and was 
based not on ethnic origins but on Canadian citizenship.  This was the origin of 
Diefenbaker’s idea of  “One Canada” and this new definition included, of course, 
Diefenbaker himself.  Diefenbaker rejected the traditional ethnic poles of political power 
of English and French Canadians –– which helps to explain his limited interest in Quebec 
while in national politics.  There was no room for special treatment of any kinds of 
Canadians.   
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An interesting aspect of Diefenbaker’s idea of “One Canada” was its similarity to 
the notion of the American “melting pot” and the manner in which Diefenbaker’s 
upbringing on the Prairies helped shape his view of the influence of the American other.  
The Prairies, in many aspects, were more deeply influenced by American society than 
other regions in Canada.  Both the proximity to the US and the familiarity of the 
American homesteader across the border contributed to this.  Many ideas that appealed to 
Diefenbaker had their origins in the US.  For example, R. B. Bennett’s New Deal, of 
which Diefenbaker was a strong supporter, was modeled after Franklin Roosevelt’s.75  As 
well, American expressions of patriotism and independence struck a chord with him as 
they echoed his own strong feelings for Canada.   
Diefenbaker, and many other Canadians, admired and feared the power of the US.  
Yet he was not anti-American in the sense that he rejected everything American; rather, 
he was concerned about the loss of Canadian autonomy that he saw as the inevitable 
result of the close association between the two countries.  It was, ironically, the very 
autonomy which US administrations had always insisted on preserving in international 
affairs that Diefenbaker cherished for Canada. Thus the US played an important role in 
shaping the attitudes and ideas of a young Diefenbaker. 
In addition to his years on the Prairies, many aspects of Diefenbaker’s Latin 
American policy were also influenced by his early political career and his rather 
unconventional rise to the office of Prime Minister.  His decision to join the Conservative 
Party of Canada rather than the Liberal Party allowed him the freedom to pursue a more 
personal political agenda.  Furthermore, the opposition that he often encountered from the 
core of the Conservative Party during his rise through its ranks encouraged him to pursue 
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a personal approach to policy formation and implementation.  This had the effect of 
making him less reliant, for good or for ill, on the resources available to him once he 
became Prime Minister.   
Diefenbaker’s embrace of new directions in Canadian foreign policy was based 
on a political career where he often rejected political convention.  The reason he was able 
to do this and still succeed in politics can be traced back to the decision to join the 
Conservative Party in 1925.  It was a decision that can partly be attributed to geography, 
as the Prairies bequeathed to him the political circumstance that he exploited to succeed 
politically on his own terms, namely a weak Conservative Party.  Diefenbaker was hardly 
a life-long Tory devotee.  His father had been a strong Liberal supporter and Diefenbaker 
was deeply impressed by Sir Wilfrid Laurier when they had met by chance in 1910.  
Laurier bought a newspaper from the fifteen year old Diefenbaker and the latter recalled 
that he “had the awed feeling that he was in the presence of greatness.”76   
Diefenbaker also reportedly supported Liberal candidate T. C. Davis in the 
Saskatchewan Provincial election of 1925.77  Three weeks after Davis was victorious 
Diefenbaker was nominated as the federal Conservative candidate for the riding of Prince 
Albert.  He accepted and would thereafter remain a member of the Conservative Party 
until his death in 1979.  Why the sudden switch?  The answer to that question reveals 
much about the strength of Diefenbaker’s political ambitions and ideals as well as the 
nature of the Liberal and Conservative Parties at the turn of the century.   
One major difference between the Liberal and Conservative Parties during the 
early decades of the twentieth century was in their handling of foreign affairs.  The 
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Liberals drifted towards continentalism after their first attempts at reciprocity during the 
late 19th century.  The Conservatives sought to maintain and strengthen the British 
connection.  For Diefenbaker, continentalism was an attack on the essential British 
connection that formed the foundation of the Canadian identity.  He believed that, “Our 
institutional heritage and Commonwealth citizenship gave Canada a uniqueness in North 
America that was vital to our preservation as a nation.”78  This rejection of continentalism 
was an essential aspect of Diefenbaker’s Latin American policy.  He sought closer ties 
with Latin America in part to lessen Canada’s dependence on the US and as a way of 
distinguishing Canada’s policy towards the region from US policy.   
Domestically, however, Diefenbaker was closer to the post-Great Depression 
Liberal Party which had embraced welfare liberalism.79  He believed that it was important 
for the government to provide social services and to guarantee a minimum standard of 
living for its citizens.  These beliefs were reflected in his legislative agenda as Prime 
Minister, for example his promotion of unemployment insurance and old age pensions.  
In many ways Diefenbaker defied easy categorization as a Liberal or as a Conservative.80   
George Grant argued that Diefenbaker (and other politicians who shared his ideological 
views) belonged to a uniquely Canadian ideology, Red Toryism.  The term originated 
from political scientist Gad Horowitz who coined it in 1966 following Diefenbaker’s 
defeat.81  Red Tories emphasized traditional conservative values, such as deep respect for 
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government, together with more welfare liberal ideas of government intervention in 
society to address social ills.  Red Tories tended to fit with either the Liberal or 
Conservative Parties, although until 2003 they were almost all members of the 
Progressive Conservatives.  (Their ability to fit into either party was demonstrated by the 
movement of a number of Red Tories, such as John Herron and Scott Brison, from the 
Conservative Party to the Liberal Party following the former’s creation at the merger of 
the Progressive Conservative Party and the Canadian Alliance in 2003.)   
Ideological considerations thus only partly explained Diefenbaker’s choice of 
political party; another factor in his decision was practicality.  At the turn of the 
nineteenth century the Conservative Party in Saskatchewan was a pale shadow of its 
powerful counterpart in Ontario.  Between 1905 and 1944, the Liberals dominated 
Saskatchewan politics, winning every provincial election (except 1929) and they had a 
powerful, effective organization that steamrolled the opposition.  The Liberals also 
dominated Saskatchewan at the federal level.  Between 1908 and 1940, the Conservative 
Party was shut out of the province in five elections and in three elections managed to win 
only a single seat each time.  Diefenbaker, whose single-minded pursuit of political 
success had begun at a young age, saw little room for rapid advancement as part of the 
Liberals; there were simply too many people waiting ahead of him in the queue.  The 
Conservatives offered an opportunity for a quick progression in both position and 
prestige.  Indeed, with the Conservatives’ fortunes so low, victory was not a necessity; a 
good showing was considered a success.82  Thus there was a pragmatic quality to 
Diefenbaker’s decision to join the Conservative Party. 
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 If Diefenbaker had joined the Liberals he would have been forced to conform to 
the Party’s policies or else be quickly shunted aside.  As a Conservative candidate in 
Saskatchewan there were far less constraints on the expression of his personal views.  
This was fortunate, since Diefenbaker’s “Red Tory” ideals were not shared by a majority 
of Conservative Party members during the early part of the twentieth century.  Freed 
from the constraints of conforming to a centralized, traditional party platform, 
Diefenbaker often ran personal campaigns that bore little resemblance to the national 
Conservative Party platform.  For example, during the 1925 federal campaign when 
Conservative leader Arthur Meighen expressed his opposition to the construction of the 
Hudson’s Bay Railway, Diefenbaker publicly announced that if elected he would resign 
if construction on the railway had not begun within two years.83 
Diefenbaker’s problems with his party’s centre continued throughout his political 
career.  The Conservative Party, he once stated, was a party that needed “to be dragged 
kicking and screaming into the 20th century.”84  At one time he complained that the 
official Conservative campaign forced him to try to “explain matters that were 
unexplainable” to his constituents during a campaign.85   He lost that particular election, 
as he lost the first five elections that he contested.  When he finally emerged victorious in 
the 1940 federal election, he won by running on a populist platform that focused on 
himself rather than the Conservative Party.  Thus he felt that he owed little to the Party’s 
leadership and he begrudged them the many handicaps that he perceived were placed on 
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his earlier campaigns by them. It was an antagonism that continued throughout his 
political career.   
Diefenbaker’s early conflicted relationship with the Conservative Party and his 
lack of trust in its policy choices led him to rely on his own intuition and ideas.  As far as 
he was concerned, the Party’s centre had proven unfit stewards for the Conservative 
tradition.  This refusal or inability to deal with a large bureaucracy in an effective manner 
also hurt his relationship with it and was typical of Diefenbaker.   
This translated directly to difficulties in his relationship with the Department of 
External Affairs.  Prior to his 1957 election victory, the Department of External Affairs 
had grown quite used to having a strong voice in the shaping of foreign policy and it 
enjoyed enormous influence in this role under Louis St. Laurent.  Diefenbaker, however, 
wanted the Department to provide him with the information that he sought to shape 
policy not provide policy for him to shape.  Its inability to conform to his wishes 
contributed to his intense distrust of its senior officials as well as his belief that they were 
secretly loyal to former Secretary of State for External Affairs and new Liberal Party 
leader, Lester Pearson.86 
Historians John Hilliker and Basil Robinson have argued that for the most part the 
Department’s members did their jobs without allowing political bias to enter into their 
work.87  Both authors pointed out the difficulties of working with Diefenbaker, a leader 
who was looking to articulate firmly held opinions to the public not discuss the 
Department’s (often) differing views on the matter. 
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Hilliker and Robinson’s arguments imply that the bureaucracy was not in fact 
biased against Diefenbaker.  But there is hardly unanimous agreement on this point.  
There are numerous people who have argued that the civil service believed, as former 
civil servant and latter Liberal MP Jack Pickersgill did, that the non-Liberal governments 
were nothing more than short term aberrations, small breaks before the natural governing 
party was returned to power.88    
Regardless of the accuracy of Diefenbaker’s beliefs on the attitude of the civil 
service there certainly was a problem of communication between himself and the 
Department of External Affairs.  Believing that he could not rely exclusively on its 
advice he often turned to other, non-Departmental sources of information, such as 
academics, friends, members of the press and other world leaders (British Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillian being a prominent example).89  He also tended to put great value on 
the information garnered and agreements that he made, for example, while meeting 
personally with Latin American leaders. 
If Diefenbaker’s early political career sowed the seeds that spawned a particular 
approach to decision-making which was reflected in his policies toward Latin America, 
his latter successes - assuming leadership of the Party and then leading the Conservatives 
to their first federal electoral triumph in 27 years - represented the harvest.  He achieved 
these successes by pursuing a political agenda focused on himself and his personal policy 
positions.   
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   At the 1948 Conservative Party Leadership Convention he was overlooked by 
the Party in favour of former Ontario leader George Drew and he felt the sting of that 
rejection keenly. 90  He viewed it as engineered by the Party’s centre and recalled that 
during his visit to congratulate Drew at the latter’s hotel room he was made to feel by 
those Party leaders present, “as if an animal not customarily admitted to homes had 
suddenly entered into the place.” 91  In many respects, he turned his back on the Party and 
relied on a purely populist platform for his two subsequent crucial election victories prior 
to1957, the contest for the riding of Prince Albert in 1953 and the struggle for the 
Progressive Conservative Leadership in 1956.  His success in both contests reinforced his 
belief in the importance of charting his own course. 
Prior to the federal election of 1953, the Liberal government abolished 
Diefenbaker’s riding of Lake Centre during the redistribution of seats following the 1951 
census.  This forced him to find another riding in which to run for the 1953 election.  He 
felt that this was a deliberate attempt by the Liberals to get rid of him.92  He had been 
contemplating retirement but with the perceived attack on him by the Liberal Party he 
decided to “show the Liberal government that they could not do this to me.”93  After 
much thought, he ran in the riding of Prince Albert.  Diefenbaker clubs quickly sprang up 
throughout the riding and his campaign posters made no mention of the new 
Conservative leader, George Drew or Drew’s policies.94  Instead, Diefenbaker rode his 
own image to victory.  It was a telling moment.  On five previous occasions he had run 
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for office in Prince Albert, as a mayoral, provincial and federal candidate but lost on each 
occasion.  
Diefenbaker was acutely aware that the riding of Prince Albert had twice elected 
the Prime Minister of Canada, with both Wilfrid Laurier and William Lyon Mackenzie 
King having previously held the seat.  In 1925, he contested the riding of Prince Albert 
against King and was defeated.  In 1953, his popularity and influence had so grown that 
he took the supposedly safe Liberal seat for his own.   
With that victory, the Prime Minister’s office was now in sight.  For Diefenbaker 
it was his personal approach which had provided the key to unlocking the door to his own 
success.  He would use that same key to open the door to the leadership of the party that 
had long been denied him.  Following his defeat at the 1948 Leadership Convention his 
sense of inevitable victory was rekindled when George Drew proved unable to break the 
Liberal stranglehold on power, despite two elections and the retirement of Mackenzie 
King.  It was with more than a little satisfaction that he watched as the Liberals, under 
King’s successor, Louis St. Laurent, actually made up ground in Drew’s home province 
of Ontario.  Finally, in 1956, worn out by his years in politics, Drew was forced to retire 
due to ill health, although he likely would not have been able to avoid questions of his 
leadership even if he had retained his strength. 
 The 1956 Progressive-Conservative Leadership Convention served to illustrate 
both Diefenbaker’s tendency to focus on the personal and his alienation from the 
traditional poles of English and French Canada.  He correctly believed that the party 
establishment would be unable to prevent his victory.95  He once again ran on a populist 
platform and this time he finally captured the leadership.  His posters were everywhere 
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and though many of the establishment did not support him, the rank and file members 
certainly did.96  He was the people’s champion and he believed that the righteousness of 
his cause was clearly demonstrated by his victory against the elite whom he viewed as 
having conspired against him.  
Diefenbaker’s victory, however, was underscored by controversy involving his 
distaste for the traditional division of Canada into English and French sections.  It was a 
tradition that one of the two formal nominations of the leadership candidate should be 
from the Quebec delegation.97  Diefenbaker, however, chose George Pearkes from British 
Columbia and Hugh John Flemming from New Brunswick to represent Western and 
Eastern Canada, rather than a francophone from Quebec.  The choice caused a minor stir 
at the convention.  Pierre Sevigny, who was a Diefenbaker supporter and later became 
Associate Minister of National Defence in the Diefenbaker cabinet, viewed it as a major 
mistake.98  Léon Balcer, the nominal leader of the Quebec delegation, actively 
campaigned against Diefenbaker and several members of the delegation left the 
convention after Diefenbaker was announced as the new leader.99 
Diefenbaker’s choice to alienate an important and influential wing of the party at 
the 1956 leadership convention was short-sighted and, unfortunately for Diefenbaker, all 
too common.  He lacked that crucial ability to work with those who did not share his 
views and those who felt that they were entitled to something that is indispensable to 
political life and diplomacy.  He was not inclined to want to build consensus, nor was he 
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a man who could see the various shades of grey in any given situation; rather, he all too 
often saw decisions as clear cut: black or white.  The people involved in those situations 
were often faced with a stark choice, either be with Diefenbaker or against him.  He did 
not fear burning bridges and in the end he would burn too many. 
This inability to work with those who did not share his views and/or those who 
had a sense of entitlement ultimately had a strong, negative effect on his Latin American 
policies.  When Argentine President Frondizi was overthrown by military coup 
Diefenbaker made little attempt to continue to strengthen Canadian-Argentine relations 
with the new government and all the work he previously committed to that object was 
lost.  More damaging was the fact that these character traits all but doomed Diefenbaker’s 
relationship with John Kennedy, who not only had a different geo-political world view 
than Diefenbaker but also carried with him a strong sense of entitlement. 
 Diefenbaker’s personal attention to his Latin American policy initiatives can also 
be understood as partially a result of his career path prior to his assumption of Canada’s 
highest political office.  His political and legal careers did not train Diefenbaker in the 
ability to effectively manage a bureaucracy, to implement policies with long-range goals 
or to delegate responsibility.  Thus, when he formulated his Latin American policy, he 
relied on himself rather than the bureaucracy of the Department of External Affairs.  
 During most of his early political career he sat in the opposition benches (from the 
time of his first electoral victory in 1940 until 1957).  He was never a member of his 
party’s centre and never had the opportunity to formulate policy.  When he finally 
assumed a leadership position in 1956, he had less then a year to grow accustomed to a 
situation of authority with which he had little experience.  Before his election as 
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Conservative Party leader his successes appeared to be in attacking the legislation and 
records of his opponents.  The skills required to succeed in this venue had been honed 
during his long legal career. 
 Diefenbaker’s legal career left a deep impression on him.  Though the majority of 
his law work was in the area of civil law, it was as a criminal lawyer that he excelled and 
made a name for himself.100  His strength did not lie in diligent research but in cross 
examination.  There were a number of cases where he did not submit any evidence to the 
court, relying exclusively on his ability to poke holes in the prosecution’s case through a 
thorough cross-examination.101  An effective cross examination relies on the personality 
and skills of the lawyer delivering it.  The lawyer responds to the witness, rather than 
presenting a carefully scripted case to the judge or jury.  Thus, Diefenbaker developed 
those skills which benefited him in the personal aspect of diplomacy, such as his many 
meetings with Latin American leaders, but neglected those that built on the bridges that 
these meetings had established. 
This propensity for favouring the personal focused cross-examination rather than 
constructing his own case was most evident in Diefenbaker’s defence of John Harms, an 
American who had travelled to the Saskatchewan North to hunt and trap.  While there, 
Harms took on a partner, a young man named John Anthony, who originally hailed from 
Alberta.  On November 23rd, 1935, the two men argued and in a drunken stupor Harms 
shot and killed Anthony.102  Upon his arrest he confessed to the crime and hired 
Diefenbaker to conduct his defence.  During both the trial and the subsequent retrial 
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Diefenbaker did not call any witnesses or introduce any evidence, rather he cross-
examined the prosecution’s witnesses and successfully (in the re-trial) argued that the 
most that Harms was guilty of was manslaughter.103  Many of Diefenbaker’s other cases 
followed a similar pattern.104    
The case of Isobel Emele is also instructive in this regard.  Emele was charged 
with murdering her husband and the evidence gave the prosecution what appeared, at 
least on the surface, to be an airtight case.105  Her husband, however, had been a member 
of the pro-Nazi Bund, and in 1940, Canada was at war with Germany and the Nazis.  
Diefenbaker attacked the dead man’s character, painting him as “an autocratic, miserly 
bully who gloried in the conquests of Adolf Hitler.”106  Perhaps most tellingly, at the end 
of the case Diefenbaker explained to the jury his role as defence consul.  “It is not the 
duty of the defence to prove anything in this case – nothing.  The onus is on the Crown to 
prove murder.”107 
Diefenbaker took on many non-criminal cases as a lawyer but never to any great 
success and he deliberately cultivated the image of himself as criminal lawyer, finding 
that it meshed well with the image of a fiery orator that emerged from his early forays 
into politics. 108  It was an identity that proved both self-fulfilling and self-limiting.  He 
was never a great conciliator or as a policy expert and, perhaps most importantly, did not 
see this as a significant weakness.   
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In addition to his political career, Diefenbaker’s family also played an important 
role in shaping his person.  His mother Mary instilled in him a strong sense of self-belief 
and self-reliance.  His first wife Edna provided invaluable aid and support for his early 
forays into politics and his second wife, Olive, served to reinforce his own personal 
values and ideas. 
Diefenbaker acknowledged his debt to his mother early in his memoirs, “mother 
gave me drive” he says in what was surely an understatement.109  He remained very close 
to her until her death.  His first wife Edna once stated that, “John has three loves: his 
mother, politics and me – in that order.”110  Mary would constantly urge him on, never 
wavering in her belief that he would achieve great things.  She focused on her eldest son 
because her husband had so obviously lacked the drive to achieve what she considered 
success. 
Mary Diefenbaker also had a firm self-belief in the correctness of her decisions 
and this, too, she passed on to her son.  She believed, as did Diefenbaker, that time would 
eventually prove that her choices were the correct ones.  Her husband appeared to accept 
that this was the case and once told Diefenbaker that “Mary is always right.  Sometimes I 
don’t think so at the time but it always turns out to be the proper course to take.”111  
When the family was moving from Ontario to Saskatchewan and Diefenbaker’s father 
began to have serious doubts as to the wisdom of the decision, Mary forced them to 
continue on.  Diefenbaker recalled: 
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At Fort William he [William Diefenbaker] proposed we 
turn back.  Mother said “We started out and we’re going 
on.”  Father was quite set and replied that no matter what, 
he was returning.  Mother would have none of this.  She 
told him, “If you do, the rest of us will carry on and you’ll 
come out sooner or later.”112 
 
They carried on and the incident left little doubt as to who ran the family.   
Diefenbaker’s father William had a very different mindset than his wife.  William 
passed on his love of Parliament and the British connection to his son.  This love of 
Parliament was a fixture of Diefenbaker’s political career.  It was evident, for example, in 
his sharp criticisms of the Mackenzie King government’s handling of Canada’s 
participation in the Second World War.  He felt that the King government was stripping 
away power and authority from Parliament.113  In the House of Commons he argued that 
“This Parliament represents the people of Canada; it is a repository and trustee of their 
hopes and survival.”114  It was this respect for Parliament and its institutions, including 
the power of the Cabinet, that played an important role in Diefenbaker’s Latin American 
policy.  He frequently used Cabinet to advance individual policies towards specific 
American nations such as Mexico and the Federation of the West Indies.  His strong 
desire to achieve cabinet unanimity also proved to be an important factor in how he 
handled the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
 The driven Mary Diefenbaker and the laid back William Diefenbaker were able to 
reconcile their different outlooks in the bonds of marriage. Their son, however, often 
found that the ideas that he inherited from his parents were frequently at odds with each 
other.  His drive to achieve victory and his supreme confidence in his own decisions 
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were, in some respects, difficult to reconcile with his reverence for Canada’s 
parliamentary system of government.  Rather than centralize power in the Prime 
Minister’s Office like later Prime Ministers Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Paul Martin or Stephen 
Harper, he continued to put major decisions before Parliament.  This opened them up for 
debate and slowed the passage of legislation.   
 When Diefenbaker formulated and attempted to implement his Latin American 
policy, he asserted a large measure of confidence and self-belief.  However, these 
attributes often masked a need for support, or at least affirmation, of his policy choices.  
As Prime Minister, Diefenbaker sought this support from the general public and in 
Cabinet.  For example, as public opinion turned against Canadian membership in the 
OAS Diefenbaker felt that this supported his decision to remain outside of it.   Before he 
had achieved political success, however, support for his decisions was provided for him 
first by his mother and then, upon his marriage to Edna Brower, by his wife.   
An outgoing and personable woman, Edna proved to be a valuable political asset, 
not only during social functions but also as a source of advice; he frequently phoned her 
from his office and asked for her opinions.115  It is ironic that the man who became 
famous for charting his own path privately sought validation for his decisions from his 
wife.  She was an integral part of both his careers and provided unwavering support.   
This dichotomy between the public and private Diefenbaker, the man who was 
sure of his decisions and the man who sought advice, was focused on Edna.  In 1945 she 
suffered a nervous breakdown and he could no longer rely on her as a sounding board for 
his opinions particularly after she entered the Homewood Sanatorium in Guelph.  He 
grew more independent in his thinking and retreated into himself when it came to 
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planning policy and decisions.  In many ways Edna moderated her husband’s intense 
emotions and smoothed his inter-personal relationships.  When Diefenbaker’s brother 
Elmer crashed his car, a relatively frequent occurrence, he turned to Edna to soften the 
verbal blow he knew was forthcoming from his brother.116 
 Diefenbaker’s devotion to her and her influence on him are perhaps best 
demonstrated by his acceptance of the Jack Atherton murder case.  Atherton was a native 
of Saskatoon who was charged with manslaughter in relation to a railway accident in 
1951.  Diefenbaker was dealing with Edna’s illness, was devoted to attending Parliament, 
and refused to take the case.  Atherton appealed to Edna.  On her death bed she pleaded 
with her husband to take the case because she believed Atherton was innocent.117  
Diefenbaker could not refuse her.  He took the case and won. 
Despite Diefenbaker’s devotion to Edna, their marriage was centred around and 
subordinate to his political career and though she would plead with her husband to 
forsake politics, he could not.118  Yet upon learning of her illness from advanced 
untreatable leukemia he turned his back on Parliament and spent the last six weeks of her 
life at her bedside. Such was his grief upon her death in 1951 that it left him temporarily 
unbalanced.119     
Diefenbaker’s next marriage was devoid of the need to balance his personal and 
public lives and did not provide the moderating influence that Edna had.  Diefenbaker 
wed Olive Freeman Palmer in 1953.  She was just as devoted to him as Edna but much 
more suited to politics.  Where Edna had seen Diefenbaker’s political career as 
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overtaking her life, Olive saw it as her life.120  She was single-minded in her 
determination to assist her husband and her devout loyalty and belief in him served to 
enforce these same traits in him.  She was an excellent politician’s wife but did not act as 
a counter-balance to his intense nature and strong beliefs. Thus, Diefenbaker entered the 
Prime Minister’s Office with his personal and public lives finally united on the task of 
leading Canada.  He entered office and set to formulating government policy without a 
private sounding board and moderating influence.   
With his victory in 1957 and his accession to position of Prime Minister, 
Diefenbaker was now in a position to shape the course of Canada’s foreign policy.  His 
policy towards the various Latin American nations was reflective of his own personal 
ideas.  He was sure of the importance of the region, saw it as a means to mitigate the 
influence of the United States on Canada and he attempted to develop ties to its nations 
based on the strong personal relationships that he developed with their leaders.  His 
desire to be personally involved in issues had grown out of his family influences, his life 
in Saskatchewan, and his careers in law and in politics. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A GROWING AWARENESS 
 
Though Diefenbaker’s Latin American policy emphasized a more autonomous 
role for Canada and focused on a personal style of diplomacy, it did not constitute a 
complete break with the policies of the previous Liberal governments.  In fact, it was 
influenced by the same geo-political factors that affected his predecessors.  Furthermore, 
in many cases, while the overall policy goals had changed, Diefenbaker continued and 
built upon Liberal initiatives in Latin America.  Thus, the Liberal policies provide an 
important background, indeed in many cases they were the foundation, for Diefenbaker’s 
various Latin American policy initiatives.       
 The policies of Canada’s post-war governments, headed by William Lyon 
Mackenzie King, Louis St. Laurent and John Diefenbaker respectively, toward Latin 
America were shaped by the geo-political realities of the Second World War and, 
following it, the Cold War.  In this context, they were deeply influenced by Canada’s 
relationship with the US, by the increasing desire of many Latin American nations for 
Canada to increase its presence in the region, by domestic pressures within Canada, and 
by a desire by Canadians to expand economically into the region. 
 The Second World War radically reshaped Canada’s foreign policy priorities and 
led to an increased interest in Latin America.  Though Canada formally gained 
independence from Britain in matters of foreign policy in 1931, there had been little 
impetus to expand Canadian representation and by extension Canada’s political interests 
in Latin America, because of the Great Depression and Canada’s strong ties to Europe.121  
At the beginning of the Second World War Canada had only six small trade missions in 
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the region and all its official diplomatic relations with Latin America were handled by 
Britain.122  Yet, by 1957, when Diefenbaker led the Conservatives to electoral victory, 
Canada had 11 embassies and consulates in the region; by 1963, when the Liberals 
returned to government, there were Canadian delegations in every Latin American 
country.123 
 This growth began during the Second World War.  As the war consumed Europe, 
Canada re-armed its military with the help of a domestic industrial sector that was spared 
the shells and bombs that devastated Britain’s.  Canada’s manufacturing capacity and 
Gross Domestic Product more than tripled before the war’s end.  But, thanks to the swift 
and near total German victory on the continent during the course of the war, Canada was 
deprived of Europe’s markets and resources.  Alternatives were needed and Latin 
America appeared to offer just such a choice.124 
 Here is a theme that is repeated throughout much of Canada’s developing 
relationship with Latin America under both the Liberal and Conservative governments of 
the twentieth century –– the hope and belief that the region offered an alternative, both 
politically and economically, to Europe and to the United States.  Yet it would prove to 
be a mirage, a largely illusionary opportunity.  By 1990, 45 years after the end of the 
Second World War, Latin America as a market accounted for only 1.6% of Canada’s total 
exports, a decrease of .2% from 1945.125 
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 The hope of increased Canadian involvement in Latin America was not limited to 
Canadians.  Many of the region’s nations did, over the same period, call upon Canada to 
become more involved with the area in the hope that Canada, in some way, would 
mitigate the powerful influence of the US.126  This proved to be just as unrealistic as the 
hope that Latin America would provide a credible alternative market for Canadians to the 
US. Still, despite the ultimate failure to diversify Canadian trade to Latin America, post-
war Prime Ministers made the attempt.     
 Canadian attempts to expand into Latin America were complicated by the 
presence of Britain and the US in the region.  Since the various nations of the region 
achieved independence from Spain in the early 19th century, first the British, and then the 
US, established themselves as regional hegemons.  Of the three early post-war Canadian 
Prime Ministers (King, St, Laurent and Diefenbaker) only King expressed deep concern 
about the potential problems Canada could face in the region because of the presence of 
the US.  Thus, under King, Canada’s first diplomatic forays into the region during the 
Second World War were highly tentative.  Despite the enthusiasm of O. D. Skelton, the 
Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, who saw Latin America as a region 
growing in importance, King was against any rapid expansion of the Canadian presence 
there.127  King was traditionally cautious when it came to the expansion of Canada’s 
world involvement; he feared that formal Canadian participation in international bodies 
would limit Canada’s autonomy.  When these cautionary tendencies were reinforced by 
King’s concern that developing relations with the Americas might complicate Canada’s 
relations with Britain and the US, he turned way from the region.  He told Skelton that, 
                                                 
126 McKenna, 72. 
127 O. D. Skelton, “Memorandum to Prime Minister” in Documents on Canadian External Relations, 1939-
1941 Part I (ed.) David R. Murray (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1974), 51-52. 
 50
“South America will be a trouble zone while the war continues.”128  Thus, during the 
latter King years, there was only modest expansion of Canada’s relations with Latin 
American countries, such as the creation of consulates, but not embassies in Argentina 
and Brazil.129 
 King’s premonition about the region proved accurate, both in the short and long 
term.  In the short term, the case of Argentina is instructive.  When the US entered the 
Second World War, it exerted tremendous pressure on Latin American countries to join 
the allied cause against the Axis powers.  Most did. Argentina, however, because of its 
long history of close relations with Germany, initially refused to do so.  The US 
Administration began to press Argentina to sever those relations and moved to isolate it 
internationally.130  In light of British support for the US actions, in 1944, the Canadian 
government agreed to suspend official relations with Argentina.131 But the situation with 
Argentina did not last, as the Argentine government quickly cut off relations with the 
Axis powers, and when the US and Britain restored diplomatic recognition, Canada 
quickly followed suit.132 King’s premonition was borne out in the longer term when 
nearly twenty years later the Diefenbaker government faced pressure from the US to have 
Canada join the OAS. As shall be shown in chapter five, Diefenbaker refused to 
acquiesce to the US pressure and this led to a strain in the Canada-US relationship.  
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 Examining the differing responses to US pressure by King and Diefenbaker helps 
one gain a better understanding of the latter’s Latin American policy.   While both leaders 
were concerned about Canada falling into the US orbit when Canadian and US interests 
did conflict in Latin America, King most often saw little gain in refusing to acquiesce to 
US requests; thus, he usually agreed to follow US policy suggestions.  Diefenbaker, on 
the other hand, believed that the cost to Canada of opposing US requests was less than 
the cost to Canada’s freedom of action of not doing so. Thus, when a conflict arose 
between Canadian and US interests in the region, Diefenbaker was prepared to refuse to 
go along with the US government. 
 The Argentine incident is also illustrative of the various problems that 
consistently plagued Canada’s relationship with Latin America.  First, Canadian policies 
towards the region were often influenced by events outside it.  In this case, the necessity 
of defeating the Axis led to actions that were counter-productive to the creation of an 
influential Canadian presence there.  Later, during the Diefenbaker years, it was the 
necessity of confronting and defeating communism that led to Canada’s refusal to fill the 
gap in trade that the US embargo created in Cuba.   Second, any Canadian policy in the 
region had to contend with the powerful influence exerted by the US.  The fear of being 
caught between Latin American interests on one side and US interests on the other was a 
serious consideration with which the governments of King, St. Laurent and Diefenbaker 
all had to contend.  Third, there were often disagreements within the Department of 
External Affairs over the conduct of Canada’s Latin American policies.  Canadian 
officials located in Latin America sometimes disagreed with Department policies shaped 
in Ottawa but implemented in Latin America.  In the case of relations with Argentina 
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during the Second World War, Hugh Keenleyside, the Assistant Under Secretary of State 
for External Affairs and future Ambassador to Mexico, saw US efforts to coerce 
Argentina as counter-productive, having the effect of strengthening the very government 
that they did not support.133  Compounding his frustration, he was informed by the 
Brazilian embassy that his sentiment was shared by many in the region.134  In this way 
Canada ended up supporting policies that had little support in the region, thus hindering 
efforts to strengthen its relationship with the region.  
External events indeed created serious problems for Canada in its attempts to 
build a stronger relationship with Latin America. In the post-war world Canada had to 
contend with a very different dynamic, both in terms of its capabilities and the context of 
international relations, than existed prior to the war.  These dynamics often shaped 
Canada’s Latin American policy. 
The end of the Second World War saw Canada utterly transformed; so was its 
relationship with Latin America.  From a nation that carried little weight in the 
international arena, Canada emerged with the world’s third largest navy, the fourth 
largest air force and with over one million men and women having served in its armed 
forces.135  Perhaps an even greater influence was the growing strength of the Canadian 
economy.  Before the war Canada had been on par, in terms of attracting external capital, 
with Latin America.  Following the war, Canada far surpassed the region.136   
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 Not only was Canada’s relationship with Latin America transformed by Canada’s 
newfound economic and military strength but the Canadian-Latin American relationship 
was affected by Canada’s new position in the world.  The Second World War had torn 
apart the European Great Power system that had existed since the Treaty of Westphalia.  
In place of this multi-power world there emerged a bi-polar one.  Two nations, the Soviet 
Union and the US, were predominant in terms of geo-political power.  Canada was 
geographically in the middle of the two great powers but there was little doubt as to 
where its allegiance lay.  In the struggle between the US and the Soviet Union, Canada 
was firmly on the side of the west. 
 The importance of this new reality to Canada’s relationship with Latin America is 
difficult to overstate. Britain, which for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
had dominated Latin America both economically and politically, had a diminished 
presence in the region. Canada, which had only gained independence in its foreign policy 
less than a decade before the war began with the Statute of Westminster, was no longer 
subservient to Britain but rather a member of equal standing in the new Commonwealth 
that had replaced the rapidly shrinking British Empire.  Canada could chart a course in its 
relationship with Latin America that was independent of Britain.   
 But this did not result in Canada being able to chart its own course in Latin 
America. Its relationship with the region was complicated by its relationship with the US, 
the leader of the western alliance. Canada now had to develop its relationship with Latin 
America in the context of the Cold War and the US attempt to contain communism. 
Another factor in the post-war world order which affected Canada’s Latin 
American policy was the expansion of the Department of External Affairs.  No longer 
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willing to rely on the British to act as an intermediary on its behalf, the Canadian 
government began to extend diplomatic recognition to numerous countries, including 
those in Latin America.  Money and men of talent flowed into Canada’s Department of 
External Affairs and its size increased correspondingly. This increase in size, however, 
did little to increase the influence that the various members of the Department stationed 
in Latin America wielded in shaping the Latin American policies of the various post-war 
Canadian governments.  The Canadian relationship with Argentina is once again 
instructive as it illustrated the distance between Department officials stationed in Latin 
America and the government in Ottawa. 
Throughout the early post-war years, King refused to normalize Canadian-
Argentine relations.  This policy was made forcefully clear in response to a request by 
General Andrew McNaughton to visit Argentina in 1946.  McNaughton, Canada’s 
highest ranking general during the Second World War, was to attend a ceremony in 
Brazil, representing the Canadian government at the inauguration of President Eurico 
Dutra.137  He had hoped to visit Argentina at the end of his trip to Brazil.138  The motives 
for the visit can only be guessed at, though Undersecretary of State for External Affairs 
Norman Robertson called them “mischievous.”139  King, however, was not amused and 
ordered McNaughton to stay away from Argentina, particularly as his visit could be 
misunderstood by the United States.140   
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The decision to overrule McNaughton was done over the objections of Canadian 
diplomats in Latin America.  Following the decision, Canada’s Ambassador there, 
Warwick Chipman, who had previously served as Canadian Ambassador to Chile, sent a 
strongly worded rebuke to his superiors in Ottawa.  He suggested that in regard to 
Argentina, Canada should, “have a policy of our own, uncompromised by the oscillations 
of Washington and unaffected by the bias that seems to prevail in so much United States 
thinking, official and unofficial, when directed to this quarter.”141  He went on to say that 
Canada should allow the Argentine government to act before prejudging it, particularly in 
light of the fact that it was democratically elected.  He ended with a direct attack on the 
Department’s decision to forbid McNaughton from traveling to Argentina, stating, “we 
should in future not distinguish in treatment between Argentina and other countries of the 
continent.”142 
 The Department’s response was both equivocal and not surprising.  Responding to 
Chipman’s pleas for an independent policy towards Argentina, Acting Undersecretary of 
State Hume Wrong stated that “our policy towards Argentina has been our own and will 
continue to remain so.”143  Yet in the same paragraph he explained why Canada must 
follow the US lead: “our economic stake in the cooperation of the United States and 
Canada is so much greater than our interest in cooperation with any other country of this 
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hemisphere that we cannot remain indifferent to the views of the United States when 
strongly expressed.”144 
The Department of External Affairs was often at odds with the King government 
over its Latin American policy.  It argued that a more consistent and independent 
Canadian trade policy towards Latin America was desirable.  In 1946, Norman Robertson 
used a request for confirmation of Canada’s arms sale policy to Latin American countries 
as an opportunity to outline three potential positions that Canada could take –– a 
continued refusal to sell arms to Latin American countries; the adoption of a policy that 
always paralleled that of the US, or the sale of arms freely to all countries.145  Robertson 
recommended the first option, as the second option assumed that Canadian and US 
interests in Latin America were identical and he believed that they were not.146  
King ignored Robertson’s recommendation and directed Pearson, then Canadian 
Ambassador to the US, to inquire of the US State Department if an informal 
understanding could be reached between Canada and the US whereby the two countries 
would pursue parallel policies with regard to arms sales to Latin America.147  The State 
Department thereafter agreed to keep the Canadian government informally up to date on 
its policies in order to better facilitate policy co-ordination between the two nations.148 
 Robertson was a career bureaucrat in the Department of External Affairs and 
served as Undersecretary to the Liberals and then to the Progressive Conservatives under 
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Diefenbaker.  Although Diefenbaker would initially have reservations concerning 
Robertson, both of Diefenbaker’s Secretaries of State for External Affairs, Sidney Smith 
and Howard Green, trusted him and he would prove to be a source of continuity in the 
Department linking the Liberal and Conservative policies.149  Ironically, considering 
Diefenbaker’s long held fears that Department officials would remain loyal to the 
Liberals, Robertson’s views on the importance of US influence on Canadian foreign 
policy were more in line with Diefenbaker’s than with King’s or St. Laurent’s.  In fact, 
the Department generally supported Diefenbaker’s Latin American policy. 
Not least among the new dynamics of the post-war world that Canadian 
governments had to take into account while creating their Latin American policies was 
the status of the US as the predominant western power.  The US government had long felt 
that Latin America fell under its “sphere of influence.”  Dating back to the declaration of 
the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 when it affirmed that the Western Hemisphere was the 
exclusive zone of influence of the US, it often opposed external influences in the region 
and reserved the right to act unilaterally.  Furthermore, as the US assumed the role of the 
leading western power, its geographic and historical closeness to Canada meant that, by 
extension, its influence on Canadian policy towards Latin America correspondingly 
increased. 
 Throughout much of the 20th century the US often adopted a schizophrenic 
approach to Canadian participation in inter-American affairs.  In 1933, it objected to 
Canada’s joining the Pan-American Union, the precursor to the OAS, using the 
procedural excuse that it was for American republics only and Canada was a 
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constitutional monarchy.150  However, when the question of Canadian membership came 
up in 1936 and 1938 the US indicated that it would in fact welcome Canadian 
membership.151  The US government changed its position again in 1942 refusing to 
support a referendum question that invited Canada to join.152   
 This early schizophrenic reaction from the US government was based on a 
conflicted view of Canada’s place in the inter-American system.  On one hand, Canadian 
participation was highly valued.  It lent legitimacy to US positions because it was 
believed that Latin American nations would place more trust in a smaller nation with no 
designs on hemispheric domination.153  On the other hand, there was a view that Canada 
was still firmly in the British orbit.154  Though the US emerged from the war with a 
special relationship with Britain, US President Harry Truman remained suspicious of the 
British Empire and Britain’s determination to sustain it. 
 US suspicion of British motives was prevalent in Washington’s refusal to support 
Canadian membership in the Pan-American Union in 1942.  King, who had no desire to 
create problems with the allies and was cautious by nature, immediately backed away 
from the idea of joining the organization.  He felt that “until the attitude of all members 
of the Union becomes more clearly determined … I do not believe that it would be 
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advisable for Canada to take any initiative in relation to membership.”155  Canadian 
expansion towards the region would instead be limited to opening new delegations in 
various countries. 
 The Canadian-US relationship continued to complicate Canada’s relationship with 
Latin America even after the Second World War when Canada essentially planned its 
foreign policy independent of Britain.  In the postwar period, the US wanted the 
Canadian government to support it policies and initiatives in Latin America, regardless of 
what Canadian interests in the region might be. This pressure was applied to both Liberal 
and Conservative governments, although the reaction of these governments differed.  
An immediate example of the Liberal reaction related to the 1946 Argentine 
Presidential elections. The US had hardly been mollified by Argentina’s sudden 
allegiance to the allied cause during the Second World War and the US government 
maintained export controls to that country.  When Juan Péron won the 1946 Presidential 
elections, the US State Department was determined to make its displeasure felt and 
continued the economic actions against Argentina.156  Such economic measures, to be 
effective, needed the support of other nations, including Canada. 
 At this time, the Department of External Affairs was under new management, as 
King had decided to separate the External Affairs portfolio from the Prime Minister and 
appointed Louis St. Laurent as the first Secretary of State for External Affairs.157 St. 
Laurent differed from King in his belief that Canada needed to be more engaged in the 
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world, not less.  Thus, the Department proposed relaxing export controls to Argentina, 
particularly of non-strategic commodities.  This would not have increased trade to 
Argentina in any meaningful way but would have greatly simplified the bureaucratic 
process for Canadian exporters.158  The Department felt that this was a reasonable policy, 
particularly in light of the fact that it believed that, “the United States was not 
accomplishing its political objectives vis-à-vis Argentina by means of economic 
restrictions.”159 
 But this was not the feeling in the US State Department where officials “could not 
over-emphasize the importance attached to the maintenance of present Canadian controls 
over exports to Argentina.”160  Lester B. Pearson, the current Canadian Ambassador to 
the US and future Secretary of State for External Affairs, reported to St. Laurent that with 
regard to this issue “there is no doubt in my mind that a refusal on our part to do so would 
be taken with very bad grace.”161  Neither Mackenzie King nor Louis St. Laurent wanted 
to fall into the bad graces of the US, particularly over Argentina, and so Canada 
maintained its export controls.162  Though these controls were reluctantly enforced, the 
government made sure that, for appearance’s sake, Canadian policy closely mirrored US 
policy.   
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The Liberal government continued to impose limitations on Canadian exports to 
Argentina, again in conjunction with the United States, even after the normalization of 
Canadian-Argentine relations.  In June of 1946, it forbade the Canadian Power Boat 
Company of Montreal from selling motor torpedo boats to the Argentine navy.163  This 
matter was not referred to Cabinet, a normal procedure when Canadian companies 
request the sale of arms or require permission to export military goods, reflecting the 
unanimity of opinion regarding the limits on normal relations with Argentina.164 
 The example of Argentina demonstrates certain similarities between the Liberal 
and Conservative governments.  The Liberal willingness to follow the US lead in terms 
of trading potential military goods did not transfer over into non-strategic goods and six 
months after the averted purchase of torpedo boats the Canadian government gave its 
approval to the sale of Canadian Army trucks to the Argentine government.  This time the 
purchase was referred to Cabinet where it was deemed that the trucks were “surplus.”165  
The government therefore approved the sale of 850 trucks to the Argentine government.
 This decision was very similar to the decision by the Diefenbaker government 
some 13 years later to allow non-strategic sales to revolutionary Cuba.  Once again, in 
response to US pressure, Canada controlled the sale of strategic goods but continued to 
maintain trade relations in the area of non-strategic ones.   
 The primary difference in how the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker governments dealt 
with the US related to the relative importance placed by each on the Canadian-American 
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relationship. St. Laurent, like King, accepted Canada’s geo-political orbit around the US 
and deduced that this required a special relationship between Ottawa and Washington.  
Thus the influence of the US acted as a pull factor, dragging Canada along with it on 
major foreign policy issues.  A quick economic calculation was done by the Liberal 
government and its formula revealed that co-operation was in Canada’s national interest.  
For Diefenbaker, that formula was flawed, as Canada’s national interest lay not in 
necessarily following the path chosen by the US.  Though in many instances the interests 
of the US and Canada overlapped, at times they did not and at other times they were in 
opposition.  In these latter moments the US government exerted pressure on the Canadian 
government to accommodate itself to the American position.  The result of this pressure 
on the Conservative government was very different than on the previous Liberal one.  
The more pressure the US government exerted in the face of Canadian opposition, the 
greater Diefenbaker’s desire to resist it.  This led to new tensions between Washington 
and Ottawa over Latin America. 
For example, it was thanks in part to US pressure to join the OAS that 
Diefenbaker ultimately rejected the idea of Canadian membership in the organization.  
US pressure to join the economic embargo on Cuba following the latter’s revolution only 
strengthened Diefenbaker’s desire to stay the course and maintain political and economic 
relations with that country.  With regard to post-war Argentina, it would not be difficult 
to imagine a Diefenbaker government allowing McNaughton to visit. 
 The Liberal government also continued to mirror US policy with regard to the 
sale of arms to various Latin American countries.  A number of Latin American nations 
saw in Canada an opportunity to circumvent the US decision not to sell arms to nations in 
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the region.  Unfortunately for them, their hopes that Canada would take a different 
position from the US were soon dashed.  In short order, not just Argentina, but Mexico, 
the Dominican Republic and Chile all requested arms from Canada and their requests 
were all subsequently turned down.166   
 The Liberal government followed a similar path when confronted by the “Chinese 
wall” that the US had erected around Cuba, setting up tariffs and subsidies that virtually 
precluded the sale of Canadian wheat to it.167  Ếmile Vaillancourt, the Canadian 
Ambassador to Cuba, requested instructions from the Canadian government, asking if he 
should co-operate with the US or oppose it.168  Lester Pearson, who had just become the 
new Secretary of State for External Affairs, informed him that it was not desirable to 
openly oppose the policies of the United States and he should “take advantage of every 
opportunity to emphasize “Canadian-United States collaboration.”169 
 US influence on Canadian policies towards Latin America also eclipsed Canada’s 
strong British connection.  How far Canada had moved from the British orbit to the 
American one was highlighted by the decision of the Canadian government to withhold 
recognition of the Venezuelan government until the United States had extended it.170  The 
decision to wait for US action was taken in spite of the fact that Britain had already 
recognized the new government and that the Canadian government saw no reason not to 
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extend it.171  Though Diefenbaker opposed this Liberal shift of emphasis from Britain to 
the US, the reality was that his own foreign policy was also conceived largely without 
much consideration of the British connection. 
 It is too simplistic to say that the Liberals always followed the US lead in Latin 
America and Diefenbaker always opposed it.  Both Liberal and Conservative 
governments, at different times and for different reasons, supported and resisted US 
influence on their Latin American policies.  An example of the Liberal government 
charting a more autonomous course for Canada’s Latin American policy was the position 
it took on Canada joining the OAS. 
Despite the importance he placed on a positive relationship with the US, King 
continued to avoid establishing formal ties with the OAS even when pressured by the US.  
King’s desire to avoid an organizational entanglement was reinforced by the 
schizophrenic approach taken by the US toward Canada and the organization during the 
Second World War.  In many ways the approach of the US government increased the 
Canadian government’s fear of being stuck between it and the countries of Latin 
America.  
 Following the Second World War, US concern that Canadian actions were an 
extension of British interests was greatly diminished.  The US now viewed Canadian 
membership in the OAS in a positive light.  Thus at various times it pressured the 
Canadian government to take steps to join the organization. In each instance the Canadian 
government politely refused. 
 The nadir of the pre-1957 US effort to bring Canada formally into the pan-
American system occurred in 1947, as the Pan-American Union prepared to hold its 1948 
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Conference in Bogota.  The US effort was spearheaded by US Senator Arthur Hendrick 
Vandenberg who stated that it was, “one of the great ambitious of my life” to have 
Canada join the Union.172  Vandenberg was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and wielded great influence in the US government.173 
 He saw Canadian involvement in the formal defense of the Americas as essential.  
He was an advocate of a strong inter-American defense system and helped negotiate the 
Rio Pact in which an attack on any American state was to be met with collective action 
by the others.174  This created the requirement of a regional security zone, as Latin 
American nations could not be expected to fight on behalf of the US if it was to become 
involved in a conflict outside of the Americas.  Vandenberg saw the security zone as 
reaching from pole to pole in the Western Hemisphere, thus including Canada, and he 
hoped that Canada would “cease to be a ward of the inter-American system and become 
more of a partner.”175 
 Both Pearson and King, however, reiterated Canada’s desire to remain outside the 
organization.176  King hoped to avoid the whole question and preferred, “not to be invited 
to attend in any capacity which would seem to commit us to later association with the 
Inter-American Defence arrangement or with the Pan-American Union.”177  This desire to 
remain outside formal inter-American commitments was further outlined in a 
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memorandum circulated to the Canadian Cabinet where a number of reasons were given 
for staying “ aloof from United States policies and attitudes towards Latin America.”178  
The Liberal governments’ refusal to join the organization was not based on any desire to 
oppose US policies but rather to retain Canada’s freedom of action regarding Latin 
America.  
 The appearance of freedom was of great benefit to Canada.  There was little love 
lost between Latin America and the US following the Second World War.  As US 
influence in the region increased and Cold War paranoia mounted, the US Administration 
acted against democratically elected governments (from Argentina to Guatemala). Hence 
more open resentment towards the US in the region grew.  When US Vice-President 
Richard Nixon traveled to South America in 1955 as part of a good-will tour he was 
roundly booed in Venezuela where rioting students surrounded his car and forced the 
driver to return to the US Embassy.179 Meanwhile, Canada sought to appease both sides, 
appealing to Latin American nations as a country that also had the dynamic of having to 
deal with the US colossus, and to the US as a steadfast ally.   
Diefenbaker was not inclined to continue this balancing act when he replaced St. 
Laurent in 1957.  He supported the US when he believed that it was necessary and 
pursued a more autonomous Canadian policy in Latin America when he thought it 
benefited the Canadian national interest.  He saw little need to pretend to back US claims 
in order to reassure Washington that Canada remained a strong ally.  He believed his 
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public support for the United States during the Cold War and his attacks on Communism 
made this self-evident. 
 Another influence on Canadian policy towards Latin America in the post-war 
years was the pressure exerted by a number of nations in the region to draw Canada 
further into the inter-American system.  As Canada emerged as a country with its own 
foreign policy and opened up its own embassies and missions in Washington, Paris, 
Tokyo, Amsterdam and Antwerp the countries with which it shared the Western 
Hemisphere began to pressure the Canadian government to also expand diplomatically 
into Latin America.180  This pressure initially came from Brazil and Argentina, a fact that 
fortuitously coincided with the Department of External Affairs’ own ranking of the Latin 
American nations that were most important to Canada, a ranking which put Brazil and 
Argentina at the top.181 
 Brazil faced an interesting problem early in the Second World War as it was 
governed by Getúlio Vargas and his Estado Nôvo party (which some had accused of 
being fascist.)  At the beginning of the war Vargas was torn over which side to support, 
the Allies (who had the United States moving increasing into their camp) or the Germans 
with whom Brazil had strong ties.182  He eventually bowed to US pressure and sided with 
the allies in 1942.  However, he initially tried to play the two sides against each other, 
offering minimum support to both.  During this period, he sought to increase Brazil’s 
connections with the US, Britain and Canada. 
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 Vargas’s interest in developing a positive relationship with the Canadian 
government was perhaps best exemplified by his decision not to nationalize Brazilian 
Traction, a Canadian-owned company that was one of the largest in Brazil.183  Part of his 
efforts to nationalize the Brazilian economy entailed imposing policies that financially 
hurt the company, such as the order that the company use Brazilian coal at least 10% of 
the time in its operations, but the company remained in Canadian hands. 
 Brazil’s attempt to navigate between the two sides at the beginning of the Second 
World War was also paralleled, as mentioned earlier, by Argentina.  Argentina 
maintained its neutrality far longer than Brazil (it entered the war in 1945 on the side of 
the Allies) but faced the possibility of isolation for its efforts to create an independent, 
neutral South American economic bloc.184  It actively sought to avoid this by 
strengthening its relationships with its hemispheric neighbours, including Canada.  
The Canadian response to Brazilian and Argentine overtures was initially muted 
under the Liberals but would become more animated under Diefenbaker (see Chapter 
Six).  King was primarily concerned about the financial cost of diplomatic expansion into 
the Americas and only reluctantly agreed to open missions in Argentina and Brazil.185  At 
this point Canadian government officials demonstrated their naive understanding of inter-
American politics.  They had assumed that opening missions in Brazil and Argentina 
would be understood as a tentative first step into the system.  What they had not taken 
into account was the relationship of Chile to its southern neighbours. 
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 Chile viewed itself as on par, in terms of international prestige, with Argentina 
and Brazil and for the Canadian government to open official diplomatic relations with 
these countries and not include Chile was a diplomatic affront to the Chilean 
government.186  But the Canadian government ranked Chile in the second tier of Latin 
American countries, along with Mexico and Cuba.187  Further complicating the situation 
was the personal ambition of the Chilean Consul General Luis E. Feliú who King 
suspected of pushing for a formal exchange of ministers between the two nations so that 
he could earn promotion in rank.188  When Chile requested that Canada establish an 
embassy there, King responded angrily, informing the Chilean government that Canada 
did not plan any diplomatic expansions in the near future.189 
 He was forced to change his mind, however, when faced with pressure from the 
US government.  The US Department of State felt that “from the point of view of general 
‘hemispheric defense’ considerations, it would be very helpful if Canada could meet 
Chilean sensibilities in this matter by including Chile in the projected diplomatic 
representation in South America.”190  Faced with this pressure, King relented and 
Canada’s Ambassador to Argentina was also given accreditation for Chile.191 
 The Mexican government also shared the desire for closer diplomatic relations 
with Canada.  This was not a new post-war phenomenon but one that had deep historical 
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roots.  Mexico, faced with the same problem as Canada in the form of US economic 
dominance of its trade, periodically looked north to Canada as a potential solution.192  
Both the Liberal and Conservative governments, as chapter four will make clear, would 
respond to the Mexican government’s overtures. 
Following the Canadian decision to open missions in South America, the Mexican 
government began to press the Canadian government for a similar exchange, pointing out 
that “Mexico is one of the most important countries in the Latin American group.”193  
Canada held off for a few years and then in 1943 began the process of opening a mission.  
Before the official exchange had been completed, the Canadian government decided that 
it wanted to upgrade the level of the diplomatic relationship and contacted the Mexican 
Ambassador to the US to offer an exchange of ambassadors instead of ministers.194  The 
Mexican Ambassador informed the Canadian government that he did not need to refer it 
back to his government and immediately accepted the offer.195 
 This enthusiasm for Canadian diplomatic accreditation was echoed by a large 
number of Latin American countries, for much the same reason –– the hope that Canada 
could mitigate the political and economic influence of the US.  By the end of the Second 
World War Canada had received requests for the establishment of formal diplomatic ties 
from Bolivia, Colombia, Uruguay, Ecuador and Panama.196  The King and St. Laurent 
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governments, however, continued to expand representation in Latin America at a slow 
pace and by 1957, Canada had still not established official recognition in all the nations 
of the region.  It was a task that was completed under Diefenbaker. 
 The attempts by Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and other Latin American nations to 
draw Canada closer into the inter-American system were not limited to pushing for 
diplomatic recognition.  There were numerous attempts by these governments to persuade 
Canada to join the Pan-American Union and later the OAS in the hopes of getting Canada 
to formally commit itself to involvement in the pan-American system.  These efforts 
ultimately failed, as neither the post-war Liberal governments of King and St. Laurent 
nor the Diefenbaker government succumbed to the pressure. 
   This pressure on Canada from Latin American countries to join the Union during 
and after the Second World War was constant and fairly uniform.  In 1942, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Honduras, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Venezuela, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, Guatemala and Mexico all favoured 
Canadian participation in the Pan-American Union.197  In 1947, pressure again mounted 
for Canadian participation at the 1948 Conference and the Canadian government was 
forced to admit that a failure to join on its part could strain relations with countries in 
Latin America.198   
In response to this pressure, as well as pressure from the US, the Department of 
External Affairs offered seven reasons why Canada should not join the Union.  First, 
Canada was more of an Atlantic country than an American one. Second, Canada did not 
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want to be caught in the middle of disputes between the United States and Latin America.  
Third, not joining had as yet not hurt Canadian relations with the region.  Fourth, the 
Canadian government preferred to avoid regional defense arrangements.  Fifth, there was 
no public support in Canada for membership.  Sixth, there were possible complications 
with joining because of Canada’s commitment to the Commonwealth.  Finally, there was 
a manpower shortage in the Department of External Affairs and joining would obligate 
Canada to open embassies in every Latin American nation.199 
These reasons were hardly compelling.  One of the seven points was contradicted 
in the same memo when concerns were expressed over the negative effect that a refusal 
to join would have on relations with Latin America. Despite both US and Latin American 
pressure to join the Pan-American Union the simple fact was that the governments of St. 
Laurent and Diefenbaker were uncertain about making a formal commitment to the 
region.  King, on the other hand, had not been convinced that Latin America was 
important to Canada.200  He dealt with the region’s pleas for greater involvement by 
slowly increasing the Canadian government’s presence in the region while continuing to 
refuse to consider membership. 
Canadian relations with Latin America during the post-war period were also often 
subject to, and influenced by, domestic pressures within Canada.  Though there was little 
awareness in Canada of Latin America, the uncertainty of the public’s reaction acted as a 
negative force, slowing down Canadian integration into the inter-American system. In 
1948 the lack of Canadian public reaction to the controversial adoption of an anti-
colonial bill at the Pan-American Union Conference in Bogota was noted by the King 
                                                 
199 “Memorandum to Cabinet”, 1039-40. 
200 McKenna, 73. 
 73
government.201  A similar lack of press and public reaction was also noted by the 
Department of External Affairs in 1953, when the Liberals under St. Laurent were once 
again pressured to take a more active role in the OAS.202  This trend continued after 
Diefenbaker and the Conservatives took power.  When Howard Green called for the 
public’s input into the question of Canadian membership in the OAS less than 50 people 
responded.203  The Canadian public, it appeared, was not overly interested in Latin 
America, although events in Cuba would suggest otherwise. 
 On the other hand, Canada’s post-war governments were also influenced by 
economic considerations, specifically a desire to increase Canada’s external trade with 
the Latin American region.  Canadian interest was exemplified by two trade missions to 
the region, one sent by King and one by St. Laurent in 1941 and 1953, respectively.  The 
trade missions were both examples of personal diplomacy and were the idea of, and 
centered around, senior Ministers. However, in both cases, the result was the same, as 
their efforts ultimately failed to make major gains in Canada’s trade with the region.  It 
was a result that preceded, and in many ways foreshadowed, the results of Diefenbaker’s 
own personal diplomacy in Latin America. 
The first trade mission was the brainchild of King’s Minister of Trade and 
Commerce, James MacKinnon, who sought to put his own stamp on the Department and 
thus sought out new avenues for Canadian trade.204  Latin America offered him the 
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opportunity to do both.  After an abortive first attempt (he came down with a case of 
kidney stones in Barranquilla, Columbia),205 he led a mission that visited Brazil, Chile, 
Peru, Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay.206  During his visit, MacKinnon negotiated trade 
agreements with all six nations.207 
MacKinnon felt that the success of the mission warranted a return trip to complete 
the tour of Latin America.  Thus in 1946 he traveled to Mexico, Panama, Columbia and 
the five Central American republics.208  It was another successful mission in terms of 
treaties signed as both Mexico and Columbia concluded agreements with the Canadian 
government.209  The mission was less successful in Central America where MacKinnon 
discovered that “Canadians were not held in high esteem for their business techniques” 
because it appeared that Canadian businesses had rebuffed several Central American 
attempts to expand trade.210  As a result, the only Central American nation to sign a trade 
agreement with Canada was Nicaragua.211   
Louis St. Laurent’s Trade Minister C. D. Howe led the next Canadian trade 
mission to Latin American in 1953.  Unlike the MacKinnon mission, this time the focus 
was more informal and the purpose was to create contacts between business leaders in the 
various countries.212  Howe was one of the most powerful and influential ministers in 
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both the King and St. Laurent governments.  Known as the Minister “who gets things 
done” he was serving as Acting Prime Minister when he left on the mission.213  The 
mission included such Canadian business dignitaries as K. F. Wadsworth, President and 
General Manager of Maple Leaf Milling and Clive B. Davidson, Secretary of the 
Canadian Wheat Board.214  It traveled to Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Trinidad, 
Venezuela, Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba and Mexico.215  Howe 
considered it to be a major success and there was a general feeling that it had succeeded 
in generating no small amount of “goodwill”, though once again, little in the way of new 
trade.216   
The use of high level missions to promote goodwill, diplomatic relations and 
economic ties continued under Diefenbaker.  The primary vehicle for the missions 
switched from the Department of Trade and Commerce to the Department of External 
Affairs but the underlying intentions remained largely the same.  Sidney Smith and 
Howard Green would become the first two Ministers of External Affairs to travel to Latin 
America, as MacKinnon and Howe had been the first two Ministers of Trade and 
Commerce to do so, and Diefenbaker would become the first Prime Minister to visit 
Latin America when he traveled to Mexico in 1960. 
The desire to expand Canada’s economic relationship with Latin America was a 
source of continuity that linked the Liberal and Conservative administrations.  The lack 
of success in both cases was another.  Despite these efforts, Latin America remained a 
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relatively small market for Canada and never realized the potential that so many 
diplomats and leaders saw in it. 
The post-war governments’ policies were shaped by the geo-political context of 
the Second World War and the Cold War.  They were influenced by US and Latin 
American pressures, by a lack of domestic interest in Canada, and by the desire to expand 
economically into the region.  They resulted in expanded diplomatic representation and 
trade missions.  The Liberal governments’ initiatives also set in place the groundwork for 
Diefenbaker’s policies.   Yet the Diefenbaker government, shaped and influenced by the 
same issues and actors, at times responded to the pressures in very different ways. 
Diefenbaker’s Latin American policies had his indelible stamp on them. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 DIEFENBAKER AND THE FEDERATION OF THE WEST INDIES 
 
Diefenbaker’s policy towards the West Indies reflected his desire to create more 
autonomy for Canada in foreign affairs; much like other aspects of his government’s 
Latin American initiatives, it was implemented largely through the personal relationships 
that he developed with its political leaders. His fondness for the Commonwealth, strong 
nationalism, belief in equality, and desire to assist the less fortunate were at the root of 
many of his initiatives and policies towards the islands.  It was not that those policies 
differed substantially from Liberal policies; indeed, he built on previous policies and 
initiatives in pursuing his own agenda.  
In 1958, the various islands that formed the British West Indies took their first 
tentative steps towards independence from Britain and formed the West Indies 
Federation.  The new Federation sought to establish itself in the Western Hemisphere and 
found an ally in the newly elected Canadian Prime Minister, John G. Diefenbaker. 
Diefenbaker would work to expand Canada’s political and economic involvement with 
the new Federation through policy initiatives in aid, immigration and trade.   
When Diefenbaker looked at the new Federation, he saw not only increased 
trading opportunities for Canada but also a fledgling member of the Commonwealth that 
was seeking assistance. Developing a relationship with the Federation appealed to his 
anglophile nature and also his deep-rooted desire to better the lives of the less fortunate.  
Furthermore, with British influence in the region waning, he saw an opportunity for 
Canada to make a larger impact in the region.   
 Canadian connections with the West Indies were already well established, thus 
giving Diefenbaker a strong base upon which to build.  Since the mid-nineteenth century 
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Canada had enjoyed a semblance of an economic and a defense relationship with the 
islands. The Maritimes had traded salt fish, lumber, flour and manufactured goods with 
the West Indies in exchange for sugar, molasses, rum and spices.217  At the end of the 19th 
century Canadian capital institutions, markedly the Royal Bank and the Bank of Nova 
Scotia, began to open up branches in the region and proceeded to establish a strong 
presence there. By 1959 the Royal Bank alone had 75 branches in the Caribbean.218  
Canada and the West Indies had both also been engaged in the defense of the British 
Empire, most notably during both World Wars when Canada had sent troops to the 
Commonwealth Caribbean to assist in garrison duty there.219 
 The various islands that formed the British West Indies had been slow to grow in 
the early years. A period of depression in the 1930s led to general anger at the colonial 
authorities who responded with a concentrated effort to increase the economies of the 
islands.  This was somewhat successful in the post-war years but the economic successes 
combined with a desire for self-governance led the British to consider what form a post-
colonial West Indies government should take.220  They determined that the islands, too 
small to form their own government, should be combined to create a viable federation.221   
 In 1958 the Federation of the West Indies was born.  It was a shaky arrangement 
as the smaller islands (Antigua, Dominica, etc.) feared that they would be dominated by 
the larger islands (Jamaica and Trinidad), which in turn were already thinking about the 
possibility of achieving their own independence. The leaders who supported the new 
                                                 
217 D. G. L. Fraser, “Canada’s Role in the West Indies” in Behind the Headlines (January, 1964), 5.  
218 Robin W. Winks, Canadian-West Indian Union: A Forty Year Minuet (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1968), 21. 
219 David Murray, “Garrisoning the Caribbean: A Chapter in Canadian Military History” in Canada and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, (ed.) Brian Douglas Tennyson (United States: University Press of America, 
1988), 285-287. 
220 D.A.G. Waddell, The West Indies and the Guianas (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 109-130. 
221 Ibid., 130. 
 79
federation, such as its first Prime Minister, Sir Grantley Adams, knew they needed 
external support in order to make it work.  One source of support was Canada. 
These developments occurred roughly at the same time that the new Conservative 
government in Canada, led by John G. Diefenbaker, began to work on shifting Canada’s 
foreign policy priorities.  The Federation created a new dynamic between Canada and the 
West Indies that appealed to Diefenbaker.  The Federation was independent and this 
created space in which Canada could increase its influence; it would be easier than 
dealing with each island on an individual basis.  The Federation was also a member of the 
Commonwealth, the international organization to which Diefenbaker felt a strong 
personal connection.  Finally, the Federation sought to counter the growing US influence 
in the region, and its leaders could thus see the advantage of drawing Canada into a closer 
relationship.  For Diefenbaker, whose new government was also seeking greater 
autonomy from the US, the goals of the two federations dovetailed nicely.   
A highly influential factor in bringing Canada and the West Indies together was the 
personal relationship that developed between Adams and Diefenbaker.  Even before he 
assumed his new post as Prime Minister, Adams made known his desire to strengthen ties 
with Canada.  In 1957, while still Prime Minister of Barbados, he had delivered a speech 
at Mount Alison University in New Brunswick where he outlined the importance of 
Canada to the Federation. 
We have commercial ties with the United States, and we are not likely to be 
anti-American especially if we are appealing for American investment.  But 
we are profoundly convinced that our whole future depends on the closest 
possible relationship with the Dominion of Canada.  We have already passed 
appropriate resolutions at some of our federal meetings, and we intend in a 
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short time to send delegations up to Ottawa.  We are already determined to 
explore the possibilities for increased trade and for increased immigration.222  
 
Shortly following the establishment of the Federation, between 1958 and 1959, 
Adams began to exchange correspondence with Diefenbaker.  He inquired as to the 
nature of the Canadian federation, expressed his admiration for its successes, and 
expressed his desire to reproduce the Canadian model in the islands of the Lesser 
Antilles.223  Diefenbaker was both flattered and intrigued.  He supported the creation of 
the Federation at the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in 1957 and offered to 
extend diplomatic recognition when it achieved independence. Upon its official 
declaration of independence he expedited the appointment of a Canadian Ambassador 
(Robert Guy Carrington Smith) to the Federation, as a sign of the importance that he 
attached to it.224  At the time neither Haiti nor the Dominican Republic had their own 
Canadian representative, both being under the purview of the Canadian Ambassador to 
Cuba. 
 Adams visited Canada twice in successive years.  In 1958 he requested a meeting 
with Diefenbaker and he visited Ottawa and had lunch with the Prime Minister.225  The 
next year he was invited to deliver the Henry Marshall Tory Lecture at the University of 
Alberta.  When Diefenbaker learned that Adams would be in Canada, he invited him to 
Ottawa.  On October 23rd, 1959, nearly a year after his first visit, Diefenbaker and 
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Adams met for lunch again.226  During both meetings the two leaders discussed trade, 
politics and the strengthening of relations between the two federations. 
 Adams saw many similarities between Canada and the West Indies Federation.  
Both were artificial creations that incorporated different peoples, some with different 
laws (St. Kitts still used the Napoleonic Code.)227  Additionally, both had a federal 
system of government, the various islands maintaining their respective legislatures and 
the proper authority to pass laws.228  It was not an accidental but rather a deliberate 
attempt to copy the Canadian system, which many West Indian politicians, including 
Adams, viewed as very successful.229 
 Diefenbaker also saw the similarities between Canada and the West Indies 
Federation –– towards which he took a somewhat paternalistic approach.  He saw 
Canada’s role as helping to guide the new Federation in its encounter with the new 
challenges of statehood. Diefenbaker often spoke about Canada’s “responsibility to the 
world,” and he believed that this responsibility extended, in particular, to helping new 
international entities such as the British West Indies establish themselves in the 
international system.  In the Federation he thought Canada should be taking a “particular 
interest.”230 
Diefenbaker often attempted to personally assist Adams and the Federation.  For 
example, he was approached by Adams prior to the 1961 Commonwealth Conference in 
London and asked if he would represent the Federation’s view on various subjects that 
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were to be on the conference agenda.”231  Diefenbaker agreed to do so. Likewise, in the 
waning days of the Federation, as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago began to agitate for 
separation, Adams turned to Diefenbaker and asked for help.232  Specifically, he asked 
him to tour the various islands and promote the idea of the Federation.233  Unfortunately, 
at this time, in 1962, Diefenbaker was under political siege at home, barely hanging onto 
power at the head of a precarious minority government. Reluctantly he declined Adams’ 
request, because, as he explained, his schedule was “so pressing that it did not seem 
possible to get away from Ottawa for the time required.”234  
 In his memoirs Diefenbaker would warmly remember his “close friend, Sir 
Grantley Adams” whom he “admired greatly.”235  He also recorded his fondness for “the 
island states that were formerly part of the British West Indies” and for the dream of “a 
great federation of the British islands from Jamaica to Trinidad and Tobago.”236  He 
expressed his regret at the Federation’s eventual collapse.237 
 In some ways, Adams’ administration and the Diefenbaker government were 
similar. Both were born amidst high hopes and expectations, yet neither would last a 
decade.  In the end, neither fulfilled the promise of their beginnings and both were 
overtaken by events over which they had limited control. Still, during their time as 
leaders, Diefenbaker and Adams shared a similar international vision and desire to 
increase the autonomy of their federations. Both men were supporters of the 
Commonwealth and both sought to diversify their nation’s economic relations beyond the 
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great powers.  They were also wary of the influence and strength of the US, though as 
they each stated on different occasions, they were not anti-American. 
 The strengthening of the political and bureaucratic ties between Canada and the 
West Indies was driven personally by Diefenbaker and began in 1958.  In the previous 
year, Diefenbaker had just emerged as the surprising victor in the Canadian national 
election and had a number of major foreign policy decisions to make, including deciding 
whether or not Canada should join NORAD and preparing for his first Commonwealth 
Conference. His first policy decision with regard to the Federation of the West Indies, of 
relatively minor importance, yet demonstrative of his desire to increase Canada’s 
presence there, was the appointment of Robert Guy Carrington Smith as the Canadian 
Commissioner to the Federation. At the time of his appointment Smith was the 
Commercial Minister to the Canadian Embassy in Washington and a Liberal appointee.  
He had, however, spent over thirty years in the federal public service and was an 
experienced diplomat.  The experience that Smith brought to a post that really mattered to 
Diefenbaker outweighed any doubts that he might otherwise have had about appointing 
an individual who had connections with the Liberal Party.  
 Much has been written about the apparent flaw in Diefenbaker’s character 
reflected in his deep suspicion of bureaucrats in places like the Department of External 
Affairs. The appointment of Robert Smith as Canadian Commissioner to the Federation, 
who was recommended by the Department, is an example of the opposite characteristic: 
Diefenbaker’s willingness to rely upon the public service to further his vision of 
Canada’s national interest. Whatever feelings he had towards the Department of External 
Affairs he realized instinctively that quality appointments to government posts were 
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important to the furtherance of his government’s agenda. It was undoubtedly for this 
reason that there was very little turn-over of officials in the Department of External 
Affairs under his leadership.238    
 There were pragmatic reasons why Diefenbaker neither disturbed the make-up of 
the Department nor necessarily rejected the policy advice that was coming from its senior 
officials. In the first place, he was trying to come to grips with his new position as Prime 
Minister of Canada.  He was, in a manner of speaking, thrown into the deep end of the 
pool when he won the 1957 election.  While he had few positive feelings about the 
policies of the Liberal government that he replaced, he had little time to prepare an 
alternative policy agenda. His stint as Leader of the Opposition had been too short for 
that. As a consequence, he decided to continue with the existing policies unless or until 
they contradicted his idea of Canada’s national interest.  Secondly, a number of the 
Liberal policies were in fact compatible with Diefenbaker’s vision for Canada –– for a 
key goal for the Liberals in foreign policy had been to improve Canada’s international 
position.  What Diefenbaker did was focus on particular policy matters in Canada’s 
external relationships that he thought would further the national interest. In Canada-West 
Indies relations, these areas were immigration, trade and aid.  
When Diefenbaker became Prime Minister in 1957, immigration was an area of 
historic friction between Canada and the West Indies.  Successive Canadian governments 
had kept immigration from the West Indies to Canada low for much of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  In 1943, during the Second World War, the Department of 
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Labour pressed Mackenzie King to allow increased immigration to offset labour 
shortages in Canada caused by the war.239  King decided against it because of the “social 
and demographic considerations” that would accompany an increase in “coloured 
immigration.”240 
 An order in council in 1949 which limited the admission into Canada of “coloured 
people” to close relatives of Canadian citizens and special cases of merit had the effect of 
dividing immigration from the West Indies along racial lines.241  While white West 
Indians could apply for immigration, coloured West Indians could not.  When this 
division was brought before the cabinet of King’s successor, Louis St. Laurent in 1951, 
ministers argued that the only alternative was to set up a quota system. But because such 
a system would be politically damaging if its existence came to light, a decision was 
made to maintain the status quo.242 
 In 1955, however, the St. Laurent government decided to allow a small number of 
domestic servants to work in Canada on a trial basis and on the condition that they return 
to the West Indies when they had completed their terms of services.243   At the same time 
it reversed its previous decision and decided to implement an immigration quota for the 
West Indies.   The new quota would become effective with the official creation of the 
Federation of the West Indies.244   
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This marked the beginning of an opening to the West Indies and Diefenbaker built 
on both of these initiatives, expanding the number of domestic servants allowed entry 
into Canada and opening up non-racial based immigration from the region.  Immigration 
was an issue of no small importance to Diefenbaker and his government eliminated 
racially based immigration quotas.  He disagreed strongly with the historical approach 
taken by the Liberals towards immigration because of its racial bias. However, he was 
pragmatic enough to recognize the pitfalls of opening up borders to all who wanted to 
come to Canada. Immigration would still need to be limited but it must not be limited by 
race. It could, in his view, be justifiably limited by class. 
Diefenbaker personally opposed racism, both domestically and in Canada’s 
foreign affairs.  For example, he appointed Canada’s first Aboriginal Senator and he led 
the opposition to apartheid in South Africa that resulted in that country’s withdrawal 
from the Commonwealth. In 1959, a reporter’s question concerning Canada’s racist 
immigration policy towards Guyana brought the issue of the West Indies before 
Diefenbaker.  He informed cabinet that the policy for Guyana and the West Indies needed 
to be consistent with the policies for all other Commonwealth nations.245  
Diefenbaker inquired privately at a Commonwealth Conference in London as to 
the feelings of the non-white member states towards Canada’s immigration policy, 
making it clear that Canada was determined to remove racial bias as a factor in 
immigration.  The various leaders responded that they would tolerate limits on 
immigration as long they were justified on the grounds that new immigrants could not be 
readily assimilated into the Canadian economy and were not based on colour.246  
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The racial restrictions were removed in January 1962 and replaced by a test 
designed to measure “education, training, skills or other special qualifications.”247  The 
result was an immediate increase of immigration from the West Indies to Canada; the 
number of immigrants went from 710 in 1952 to 1480 in 1963 and then 2227 in 1963.248  
Diefenbaker also increased the number of West Indian domestic workers allowed 
into Canada.  In 1957, the Department of Immigration requested the admission of 200 
domestic servants from the West Indies, an increase (albeit a small one) over the previous 
Liberal program which allowed 100.  After some deliberation the cabinet concluded that, 
“In view of the previous agreements with the British West Indies, their trade relations 
with Canada and their new impending status in the Commonwealth, it would be most 
unfortunate if these proposals were refused.”249  The following year the government 
increased the number from 200 to 250.250  
Emigration was also a major issue for the government of the Federation of the 
West Indies, which saw it as a potential solution to the issue of over-population.251  
Though Diefenbaker did liberalize Canada’s immigration policies, some West Indian 
politicians were dissatisfied.  Drawing attention to the 18,000 plus West Indians who 
were admitted to Britain, 252 and the large number of Southern European immigrants 
being allowed entry into Canada, they questioned Canada’s commitment to non-racial 
immigration policies.253 
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The reality was that despite Diefenbaker’s progressive views of race and the 
positive changes brought about by the Conservative government, race as a category was 
still considered acceptable by many Canadians.  Though the Conservatives might 
eliminate race officially from the screening process for new immigrants, Canadians in the 
1960s still felt more comfortable with white immigrants who spoke a different language 
and brought with them a different culture than black immigrants who spoke English and 
were raised in a Commonwealth country.  Writing a year after Diefenbaker’s defeat in 
1963, Canadian political scientist Duncan Fraser supported his government’s immigration 
policies, stating that: 
The problems involved in a massive West Indian immigration into Canada 
are great.  The economic problem is of minor consequence; the social 
problem is a major one.  So far as Canada is concerned the admission of 
large numbers of West Indians as immigrants would create grave 
hardships for the immigrants involved and would create social problems 
that would challenge the abilities and conscience of Canada.254    
 
In terms of immigration, Diefenbaker could not go too far in opening the doors to 
Canada for West Indians. 
Diefenbaker also took a personal interest in assisting the Federation by increasing 
the amount of aid that Canada sent to the West Indies.  This was another case of a Liberal 
policy which Diefenbaker continued because it supported his foreign policy objectives.   
In 1956, the Liberals had proposed a major Canadian aid package to the West Indies.  
With the creation of the West Indies Federation imminent, the British had sought aid 
from various Commonwealth countries for the new federation.  Canada agreed to provide 
a lump sum amount of aid, including the construction of one or two steamships and 
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technical assistance.255  It was a generous package, which the Liberals expected to 
implement once they had taken care of the troublesome annoyance of a national election.  
But the Liberals were thrown out of office before they had an opportunity to move this 
initiative to completion.  
On January 22nd, 1958, the Progressive Conservative Cabinet discussed a request 
from the West Indies for technical assistance.  It decided to approve $150,000 to “finance 
the provision of technical assistance to the West Indies.”256  More substantial aid was on 
the way and the next day, Diefenbaker informed the House of Commons that, “in the 
very near future an announcement would be made indicating what steps this government 
[was proposing] to take to give immediate evidence of Canada’s willingness to help this 
new country, through such forms of assistance as may be appropriate.”257 Sidney Smith 
made the announcement in the House on January 30th, adding that this was only a 
preliminary measure and that a more comprehensive aid package was forthcoming.258  
 The more substantial aid package had already been prepared by the Department of 
External Affairs and, after consultation with officials from the West Indies, it was 
determined that the plan was still viable; the best form Canadian aid could take, it was 
decided, was assistance in the development of inter-island shipping.259  The cabinet 
agreed and decided that a ship built in Canada and donated to the West Indies would best 
serve this purpose. A short while later the construction of a second ship was authorized.  
It was at this point that the government decided to increase the amount of funding and set 
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the amount of $10,000,000 spread over the course of the next five years, as the total for 
the aid package.260   
 The decision to build the ships met with very little criticism in the House of 
Commons or in the media.  The Liberals, of course, could hardly criticize what was, in 
essence, an expanded version of their own policy.  The decision on where to build them, 
however, was not as well received.  The government decided to accept a bid from Port 
Weller Dry Dock and Vickers Ltd, a firm based out of Montreal.261  This led to 
accusations of the government favouring Eastern shipping interests over Western.  The 
government defended itself by stating that it had simply gone with the lower bid.262 
 Though the construction of the two ships, the Federal Palm and the Federal 
Maple, used most of the $10,000,000 aid package, between 1957 and 1963, the 
Diefenbaker government provided other forms of assistance to the West Indies. 263  It 
provided $1,000,000 towards the construction of a deep water wharf and warehouse on 
the island of St. Vincent,264  purchased port handling equipment, and helped finance a 
residence for the Faculty of Engineering of the University College of the West Indies, as 
well as supporting approximately 30 Canadian experts, teachers, and advisors on the 
islands.265    
 On the Island of Dominica, the Diefenbaker government assisted in opening two 
schools and provided important advice concerning the exploitation of the island’s forest 
resources.  Canadian experts demonstrated that the Gommier trees, which were plentiful 
                                                 
260 National Archives of Canada, RG 2, Series A-5-a , Vol. 1898, 4-5. 
261 Diefenbaker Archives, Vol. 337 (P.M.O. Series) File# 380 W.I.F., 402989. 
262 Ibid., 402990. 
263 Trevor Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs, 1957-1959 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968) 193-194. 
264 National Archives of Canada, RG 2, Series A-5-a, Vol. 2747, 3. 
265 National Archives of Canada, RG 2, Series A-5-a, Vol. 6177, p.12-13.  Diefenbaker Archives, Vol. 533 
(P.M.O. Series) File# 802 WIF, 406783. 
 91
on the island but were not used by the forestry industry, could be used in the creation of 
plywood.266  Finally the government provided $50,000 for a survey of the island’s natural 
resources.267 
 Diefenbaker often framed foreign aid in terms of duty or rather helping the less 
fortunate in the world. On such matters he was nothing short of passionate, believing 
strongly that the wealthy countries of the west had a responsibility to support the poorer 
ones. In his memoirs he wrote that his father had taught him that “each of us was our 
brother’s keeper.”268  He also thought of foreign aid, thanks to his prairie background, in 
agricultural terms.  In his memoirs he related how he followed his father’s advice by 
advocating a World Food Bank to store surplus food so that it could be distributed in the 
event of famine.  On a more pragmatic note, he also saw the distribution of aid as an 
opportunity to further Canada’s domestic agricultural base.269   
 However, Canadian aid to the West Indies was not a matter of providing 
agricultural relief; rather, it was based on firm economic realities.  Diefenbaker believed 
that Canada had a natural interest in helping the West Indies to build a robust economy.  
It was exporting over $40 million a year to the islands but more importantly than that, the 
West Indies (along with British Guyana) were also the main source of bauxite for the 
Canadian aluminum industry.270  The Canadian Company ALCAN had already invested 
over $100 million in the area .271 
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 ALCAN was one of two major Canadian corporations that had strong economic 
connections to Latin America.  The other was Brazilian Traction, which had greater 
influence on Diefenbaker  when it came to shaping Canadian policies towards the West 
Indies.  The difference was the lack of a personal connection, as Brazilian Traction’s 
President, Henry Border, was a friend of Diefenbaker –– who already had a reliable 
source of information on the West Indies in Adams. 
 Further aid plans were considered by the Diefenbaker government, again on a 
bilateral basis.  Its recommendations called for a “Colombo style” plan, based on the very 
successful Commonwealth aid program established at Colombo in 1950, which would 
have the advantage of getting other Commonwealth nations involved.  The understanding 
was that the US would not be invited to participate until other Commonwealth countries 
had been approached and been given the opportunity to approve the plan.272  The plan 
survived the fall of the Diefenbaker government in 1963 and Pearson continued with the 
various plans to increase aid to the West Indies.273 
 An example of how Diefenbaker’s personal interest in policy matters could create 
complications for his government is found in its decision in 1957 to reverse the Liberal 
policy of subsidizing the Canadian National Steamships company, the primary carrier of 
sea-born trade between Canada and the West Indies.  Previously, in 1956 the Liberals had 
decided to address a potential problem for Canadian-West Indian trade when they 
decided to allow Canadian National Steamships Limited to continue to exist.  The 
steamship service had been introduced in 1929 but in recent years had begun to run up a 
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large yearly deficit.274  The St. Laurent government decided that in spite of the deficit 
(estimated to be at $200,000 a year) the company should run for another five years, after 
which its future would be reviewed.  One of the reasons for this decision was the 
importance of the company and its service to Canadian-West Indian trade.275   
The future of the company, however, would soon be clouded by a major strike, 
which prompted the new Diefenbaker government to sell it off. This decision sparked a 
heated debate in the House of Commons.276  Considering that the company’s eight ships 
formed a considerable part of Canada’s deep-sea fleet, its sale seemed to contradict the 
Diefenbaker government’s attempts to expand Canadian trade to the Islands.277   
 The main factor in the Government’s decision, it turned out, was the state of 
unionism at the company and a personal antagonism between Diefenbaker and the leader 
of the Canadian chapter of the Seafarers’ International Union, Hal Banks. Banks had 
amassed enormous power in the union, and had put together a blacklist (called the “do 
not ship list”) having the effect of preventing certain workers from finding employment 
on Canadian cargo vessels.278   When the Conservative cabinet met to discuss the union 
problem at the company it agreed that, “it was an intolerable situation that employment 
on government owned ships should be decided by Banks” and “steps must be taken to 
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break the man’s hold.”279  Michael Starr, the Minister of Labour, was particularly 
“appalled” by the “do not ship list” and sought ways to expose it and make it illegal.280 
 Diefenbaker had little love for Banks.  During his years as Leader of the 
Opposition he had pressed hard to have him brought to justice for various crimes he 
allegedly committed in Canada.281  In 1957, as the crisis over the Canadian National 
Steamships company reached its peak, Diefenbaker obtained Banks’ criminal record.  
Though it is unclear if it was sent to him or if he ordered it, the Pinkerton National 
Detective Agency had secured it from the Los Angeles Police Department and delivered 
it to the Canadian government.282   
The criminal record confirmed what Diefenbaker had suspected about Banks, that 
he was a convicted felon.  It listed assault with a deadly weapon, kidnapping and murder 
as charges that had been laid against him, although he had been found not guilty of the 
murder charge and pleaded no dispute to the kidnapping charge.  The record contained 
two newspaper articles concerning the murder that were particularly damning to Banks, 
both implying his guilt.   
These accusations did little to endear Banks to Diefenbaker.   But his criminal 
record was not the only problem.283 Banks was also a Liberal fund raiser and had been 
allowed into the country thanks to a special order-in-council signed by the St. Laurent 
cabinet in 1954 after the Ministry of Immigration had recommended that he be deported 
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because of his aforementioned troubles.284  In his memoirs Diefenbaker would claim that 
Banks was Liberal “election muscle” and that all of the Conservative government’s 
attempts to deport him were “frustrated by developments, legislative and otherwise, 
initiated during the previous administration.”285 
 Despite Diefenbaker’s feelings towards Banks, however, the decision was made 
to offer Banks and the union one last chance to accept the company offer of a 15 cent 
raise; Banks wanted 30 cents.  If Banks and the union did not accept, then the 
government would permit the company to change the registry to another country, 
allowing it to hire a new work force.286  The union was told of the consequences but it 
refused to settle and the strike continued.  The company switched the registry on the ships 
but it found that the longshoremen refused to unload the ships.287  Thus the strike 
continued and the ships were rendered idle. 
 The decline in shipping trade caused by the strike was quickly reversed, however, 
when a number of other Canadian companies took on the contracts. Meanwhile, the ships 
were still costing the company approximately $145,000 per month while they lay at 
anchor and the Canadian government decided that it could sell them.288  The company 
entertained a number of offers, which needed final approval from the government before 
they could be finalized.289  In an interesting turn of events, an offer from the Cuban 
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government of Fulgencio Batista was the front runner and the cabinet approved the sale 
of eight Canadian ships to the Banco Cubano for the sum of $2,800,000.290 
 After the sale, Diefenbaker’s government continued to answer questions 
concerning it.  The timing of the sale proved particularly problematic because only a few 
months later the Batista regime fell to Fidel Castro’s July 26th Movement.  The 
Diefenbaker government’s decision had thus unintentionally provided communist Cuba 
with a deep sea fleet.  The Liberal Opposition seized upon this and repeatedly expressed 
its outrage in the House of Commons.291   
 Diefenbaker’s actions in the Banks Affair typified the approach that he often took  
on policy issues where he had strong personal feelings towards the individuals involved.  
Fortunately in the end, the decision to allow the sale of the ships did not adversely affect 
the levels of trade between Canada and the islands.  In fact, trade between Canada and the 
Federation of the West Indies during the Diefenbaker era increased steadily.  This 
occurred, however, with little direct assistance from the Canadian government.292 The 
Federation and its component islands were eager for Canadian investment. Jamaica was a 
particular example as in the years following the Second World War it had focused on 
industrializing and passed a number of incentive laws to encourage foreign investment.  
Private Canadian companies, most notably ALCAN, invested over $125 million in 
Jamaica alone.  In addition, dozens of factories were built in Jamaica using Canadian 
capital.293 
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 A trade agreement signed back in 1925 had established policies of preferential 
treatment between Canada and the islands of the West Indies. Based on an earlier 
bilateral trade agreement signed in 1912, the agreement of 1925 remained in force 
through the Diefenbaker era and granted preferences to a wide variety of exports both 
from Canada to the West Indies and vice versa.294  The result of the agreement was a 
steady increase in trade that continued on past Diefenbaker’s defeat in 1963.295  Though it 
had taken little direct action to spur trade between Canada and the West Indies, the 
Diefenbaker government had sustained the connections that would continue to promote it.  
 Diefenbaker’s policy towards the Federation of the West Indies was based on his 
desire to create greater autonomy for Canada by expanding into a region that did not yet 
have an overpowering US presence.  It also reflected his personal convictions relating to 
a number of policy areas, including aid and development, support for a multi-racial 
Commonwealth, and the promotion of racial equality. Furthermore, his policy was 
supported and influenced by the government of the newly formed Federation of the West 
Indies which hoped to create a stronger relationship with Canada.  It is important to note 
that the policy, in certain respects, continued policies or programs initiated by the 
previous Liberal government. Diefenbaker’s contribution was to take a special interest in 
certain initiatives and place them within a larger formulation of the national interest 
pertaining to Latin America.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DIEFENBAKER AND MEXICO 
 
In 1959, Adolfo López Mateos, the newly elected President of Mexico, visited 
Canada. It was more than a courtesy call.  It was his first state visit and he chose Canada 
over the US and other Latin American countries.  It was a gesture rich in symbolism, 
reflecting the desire by the Mexican government to strengthen its relationship with 
Canada.  It appealed to Diefenbaker, a man who valued personal diplomacy and also 
sought greater autonomy from the US in foreign policy.  López ‘s visit marked the 
beginning of Diefenbaker’s attempt to improve Canada’s relationship with Mexico, both 
politically and economically.  Diefenbaker would accomplish this primarily through his 
personal relationship with López, sending two trusted supporters, Pierre Sevigny and 
Howard Green, to Mexico and making personal interventions in Cabinet discussions 
concerning Mexico.  
 Prior to the visit by López in 1959, Canadian-Mexican relations had been rather 
limited.  Early problems between Britain and Mexico over the latter’s nationalization of 
oil production meant that Canada and Mexico did not establish diplomatic representation 
until 1944.296  Shortly thereafter James MacKinnon included a stop in Mexico as part of 
the second phase of his trade mission to Latin America in 1946.297  This mission led to 
the 1947 trade agreement that gave each nation most-favoured nation status.298  
MacKinnon, however, did not have the ear of Mackenzie King, who had little desire to 
expand Canada’s role in the world in the post-Second World War geo-political climate; 
                                                 
296 Stephen J. Randall, “Sharing a Continent: Canadian-Mexican Relations since 1945” in Beyond Mexico 
(Jean Daudelin and Edgar J. Dosman edts.), 19. 
297 J.C.M. Ogelsby, Gringos from the Far North: Essays in the History of Canadian-Latin American 
Relations, 1866-1968 (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1976), 17. 
298 G. A. Calkin, “The development of relations between Canada and Mexico” International Perspectives 
(1973), 55. 
 99
generally he  saw Latin America as a having too many potential problems.299  
Furthermore, the US remained concerned about Canadian involvement in the region and 
advised the Canadian government not to sell arms to Mexico when the latter asked to 
purchase frigates from the Royal Canadian Navy.300  Thus, under King, Mexican-
Canadian relations languished.  The relationship remained in this state until the arrival of 
St. Laurent. 
 St. Laurent took a more progressive view of Canada’s international role, and 
applied it to Canada’s relationship with Mexico.  By the time he assumed office, the 1947 
trade agreement had led to an increase in Mexican-Canadian trade.  In fact, by 1950, 
Mexican purchases from Canada had doubled and by 1955 Mexico was the largest Latin 
American importer of Canadian goods.301  Meanwhile officials in the Department of 
External Affairs and the Department of Trade and Commerce wanted to increase 
Canadian involvement in Latin America.  In 1953, when C.D. Howe proposed his own 
trade mission to the region, St. Laurent supported it.302  Though the mission produced 
few tangible results, it was considered to be “particularly active and effective” by 
Howe,303 helped engender Mexican goodwill towards Canada, and was a factor in 
López’s 1959 visit to Canada. 
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 López’s visit was the spark that ignited Diefenbaker’s interest in promoting 
Canadian-Mexican relations.  Though Diefenbaker had previously visited Mexico in 
1953 for his honeymoon with second wife Olive, he had not at that time formulated any 
strong ideas concerning Mexico’s relationship to Canada.  Furthermore, during the hectic 
first year in office, Diefenbaker had little time to focus on developing a stronger 
Canadian-Mexican relationship.   
In 1957 Canada’s Ambassador to Mexico, Douglas Seaman Cole, attempted to 
alert Diefenbaker to Mexico’s potential as an alternative economic market for Canadian 
trade.  On July 1st, 1957, Diefenbaker gave a speech in which he stated that Canada 
would be seeking to substantially shift the course of its export economy. 304   In response 
to the speech, Cole sent Diefenbaker a long memo outlining the enormous possibility of 
Canadian-Mexican trade.  Cole, the author of Mexico: An Economic Survey, had long 
been a proponent of expanding Canadian-Mexican trade.305  He saw an opportunity to 
push it forward under Diefenbaker’s new policy.  Unfortunately, Diefenbaker had more 
immediate concerns, in particular another election in 1958.  Following this victory, 
Mexico slipped further from his mind as he dealt with numerous domestic and external 
issues. 
 In 1959, Diefenbaker was in the midst of trying to get a handle on the 
complexities of foreign policy, but he lacked the patience or talent for the diplomatic 
negotiations that were such an integral component of it.306  All the while he had to deal 
with escalating US-Soviet tensions, fallout from his decision to cancel the Avro Arrow, 
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the death of his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sidney Smith, and the 
appointment of Howard Green in his place.  It was the proposed visit of López that put 
Canadian-Mexican relations on this rather full agenda.  The visit also demonstrated the 
importance of personal interactions to how Diefenbaker formulated and initiated policy. 
 The timing was excellent.  López had just won the Mexican Presidency in 1958 
and was eager to demonstrate Mexico’s independence from the US in international 
affairs.307  He was noted for his youth and energy and he made an immediate personal 
connection with Diefenbaker. In many respects, his foreign policy concerns paralleled 
Diefenbaker’s.  For example, he refused to break off relations with Castro and communist 
Cuba and yet was careful to avoid direct conflict with the US over the issue. 
The first meeting between the two leaders went exceptionally well, thanks to the 
numerous commonalties between them. López, like Diefenbaker, was a gifted orator.308  
Like his Canadian counterpart, he also sought to promote a more autonomous foreign 
policy from the US.  Both López and Diefenbaker were conscious of the US colossus but 
were not anti-American in outlook.309  López saw in Canada what Diefenbaker saw in 
Mexico, an ally which knew the difficulties of walking a fine line between keeping a 
respectful distance from the US and respecting US leadership in the west.  
López visited Ottawa on October 14th, 1959, stayed three days and brought his 
wife and daughter along with him.  Though his visit did not garner much publicity in 
Canada, it was important in Diefenbaker’s eyes. 310   He and López established an 
excellent rapport with each other.  López’s admiration of Canada played well to 
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Diefenbaker’s nationalistic impulses.  Upon his return to Mexico, López informed Lionel 
V. J. Roy, the Canadian Chargé d’Affairs in Mexico, that he enjoyed his visit because 
“the welcome came from the heart.”311  To express his thanks for the treatment he 
received during the visit, he sent Diefenbaker, in a touch of irony given the latter’s 
reputation for non-indulgence, a box of Mexican tequila.312 
 López’s visit had a number of repercussions, including the resulting appointment 
of the new Canadian Ambassador to Mexico.  In April 1958, Douglas Cole was to retire 
and a replacement needed to be found.  Initially Diefenbaker favoured replacing Cole 
with J. W. Murphy, a long time Conservative and former Member of Parliament from 
Lambton County who had expressed an interest in the Ambassadorship as a reward for 
his contributions to the party.313  Murphy had the additional appeal of being from outside 
the Department of External Affairs and therefore would not be strongly influenced by the 
“Pearsonalities” there.314  Loyalty and an outsider status rated exceptionally well in 
Diefenbaker’s scale of virtues and it appeared as if he had found his man. 
 However, Howard Green had another man in mind.  He pushed for Arthur Irwin, 
a seasoned diplomat, arguing that the position of Ambassador to Mexico was critical to 
Canada’s Latin-American relations.315  The disagreement between Green and 
Diefenbaker spilled over into cabinet, which put off the decision twice.  The final 
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agreement was that the appointment would “be the subject of further conversations 
between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Prime Minister.”316   
The decisive factor in the eventual appointment of Irwin was Diefenbaker’s 
acceptance of an invitation in 1960 to travel to Mexico, repaying López’s visit with one 
of his own. With the Prime Minister’s visit on the horizon, Green was able to make a 
stronger argument for a Latin American specialist, and Diefenbaker relented.  That 
Irwin’s recommendation had come from the Department of External Affairs was less 
important than that Diefenbaker’s trip to Mexico be a success and thus that Canada-
Mexico relations be strengthened.317 
 Irwin was a good choice.  He had a varied and highly successful career both in 
and out of government.  He had been assistant editor and then sole editor of Maclean’s 
magazine between the years 1925 and 1950.  He had been High Commissioner to 
Australia and later Ambassador to Brazil.  Most importantly, he had numerous Latin 
American contacts and a thorough knowledge of the region.318  He also had the full 
confidence of Green who later appointed him as an observer to the 1960 meeting of the 
OAS.319 
 In including Mexico on his very busy itinerary for 1960, Diefenbaker was 
attempting to show López the high priority that the latter put on the Canada-Mexico 
relationship.  He was a frequent traveler but it is highly unlikely that his travels would 
have included Mexico if not for the relationship that he formed with its president. 
                                                 
316 Ibid., 2 
317 See Chapter Three for more information on Smith’s appointment. 
318 House of Commons Debates, February 9th, 1960, 863. 
319 “Appointment – Ambassador to Mexico”, Cabinet Conclusion.  N.A.C., R.G. 2, Series A-5-a, Vol. 2745, 
3-4. 
 104
The visit to Mexico was to last four days, a fairly long stay, and there was a lot of 
groundwork to be accomplished before the Prime Minister arrived.  Fortunately, Irwin 
arrived with enough time to ensure a proper reception for the Canadian delegation, and 
the mutual respect that existed between López and Diefenbaker helped to smooth over an 
awkward moment early in the visit.  The circumstances were the occasion of  
Diefenbaker’s speech upon his arrival in Mexico City.  He was greeted by López and he 
answered the greetings with a short speech in English and then in Spanish.  When he 
asked the President if he understood what he had said, López replied that while he 
understood English, Mexicans spoke Spanish not Portuguese.320 
 The valiant but ultimately futile attempt at speaking a language other than English 
was typical of Diefenbaker.  He tried for years to master French and would continue to 
deliver speeches in Canada’s other official language despite the protestations of his 
French advisors.321  It was indicative of the man to believe that through perseverance and 
a sheer act of will that he could accomplish his goals.  His policies towards Mexico and 
Latin America in general would be deeply influenced by this characteristic determination 
to succeed. 
 Diefenbaker saw untapped potential in Mexico, both as an international ally that 
shared many of the same values as Canada, and as a market for Canadian goods.  In 
Mexico he saw a nation that struggled to come to terms with the US and one that was 
attempting to chart an autonomous course despite American interference.  In other words, 
he thought that Mexico, like Canada, was trapped by the Cold War paradigm with the 
result that any actions that contravened US policies would be interpreted as a failure of 
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Western solidarity.  He also saw a country that was attempting to diversify its markets 
from an increasing dependence on the United States, again like Canada.  In both of these 
areas he thought Canada and Mexico were well situated to help each other. Diefenbaker’s 
attempts to unlock this potential would be largely personal and would not involve many 
new policies or treaties.  His actions yielded small dividends in terms of improved 
Canada-Mexico relations but they did draw attention to the personal interest that 
Diefenbaker gave to foreign policy questions that were important to him.  
 Still, Diefenbaker’s visit to Mexico was somewhat of a success in terms of 
improving Canadian-Mexican relations.  In a number of speeches both Diefenbaker and 
López commented on the strong personal relationship that they had developed and their 
desire to strengthen Canadian-Mexican relations overall.  Interestingly, they also 
emphasized that both countries had a number of important commonalities such as the free 
institutions and traditions of democracy.322 
 The truth was that this was a strained comparison at best.  Mexico under the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was essentially a one-party state which had a 
strong corporatist economy, as opposed to Canada’s multi-party system and free market 
capitalist economy.  Furthermore, Canada had no equivalent to the Mexican Revolution 
(the Rebellions of 1837-38 could not be seriously considered in this category) and 
retained the British monarchy as a respected feature of government where Mexico had 
made a complete break with the Spanish crown. 
 Diefenbaker really had little knowledge of Mexican history and likely only 
scanned the briefing reports before his arrival.  For him the historical nuances were not as 
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important as the contemporary opportunities and they could be exploited by two men 
who were empowered to make decisions and had reached an understanding between 
themselves.  Thus he would emphasize the similarities, as would López. 
Later, at a dinner given in his honour, Diefenbaker again emphasized the 
similarities between the two federations but this time in a contemporary context where 
the comparison was more accurate and appropriate.  He expressed the view that current 
geo-political realities, specifically the power of the United States and the threat of the 
Soviet Union, were pushing Canada and Mexico closer together.323  The realities of the 
bi-polar world were limiting the ability of both Canada and Mexico to pursue policies 
that were in their respective national interests, a situation that Diefenbaker felt was 
unacceptable. 
While he was in Mexico, Diefenbaker also gave a speech to a joint meeting of the 
Mexican College of Law and the Mexican Bar Association, where he further elaborated 
on the differences between the US and Canada and the similarities between Canada and 
Mexico.  In the speech he discussed the concept of international law and the fact that both 
Canada and Mexico accepted and supported its expansion.  He also pointed out that the 
US was one of those countries that did not support an International Court because of 
concerns that the Court would interfere with American domestic affairs. Diefenbaker then 
stated that, “the difference, however, between our two countries [Canada and the United 
States] is this.  We leave it to the Court to determine whether or not it is a matter of 
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domestic jurisdiction.  The United States determines the question itself and does not leave 
it to the court.”324 
It was perhaps his greatest criticism of both the US and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics that neither properly respected the rule of law.  For countries caught 
in their respective orbits, like Canada and Mexico, the rule of law was of primary 
importance.  On a personal level, the rule of law and its ability to protect those who do 
not have access to power and prestige was something that Diefenbaker held dear.  The 
corollary of this was the desirability of using international institutions to interpret that 
law. Though he was not fond of the UN, the organization where his Liberal nemesis 
Pearson had achieved so much acclaim, he nevertheless thought it had a place of 
importance in solving international disputes.  For example, during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, he believed that mediation by the UN could potentially defuse the situation.  It 
was Washington’s willingness to by-pass the UN whenever it suited its interests that 
particularly irked him.   
 During his trip to Mexico Diefenbaker also took the opportunity to visit the 
University of Mexico where he once again reiterated his belief that Canada and Mexico, 
while having different histories, were now traveling down the same geo-political road.325  
It was a message that played well to a nation that had long been the victim of US 
aggression.  During the same speech he also praised universities in general and offered a 
gift of books dealing with Canadian history and geography as well as a number of 
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subscriptions to Canadian academic journals.326  In response, the University created a 
“Canadian Book Exhibition” to display the gifts.327  It was the sort of gesture that 
appealed to Diefenbaker, who enjoyed such overt displays of support. 
Before he left Mexico, Diefenbaker took the opportunity to discuss a number of 
issues in private, first with Mexico’s Foreign Minister, Manuel Tello and then with 
López.  Accompanied by Irwin, Diefenbaker discussed Mexico’s stand on the Law of the 
Sea and Canadian membership in the OAS with Tello.  This was an opportunity to see 
how much of the personal relationship that Diefenbaker had established with López 
would translate into tangible support.  The results were decidedly mixed. 
The main issue discussed involved a Canadian proposal to modify the rules that 
governed the Law of the Sea.  The first two UN Law of the Sea Conferences occurred 
during Diefenbaker’s years as Prime Minister (1958 and 1960) and the Canadian 
delegation proposed that fishing rights be extended beyond the three mile limit to twelve 
miles.328  The delegation also suggested that underwater mineral rights be extended to a 
depth beyond 200 feet.329  The proposals had not received the two-thirds vote they 
needed at the first conference so Diefenbaker now sought Mexico’s support.  The 
Mexican government, however, believed that its sovereignty extended past the twelve-
mile limit; thus the Canadian proposal would involve a relinquishing of sovereign 
territory. Tello was adamant that Mexico would not surrender any of its historical 
rights.330   
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On the issue of the OAS, Diefenbaker and Tello were closer.  Tello expressed 
Mexico’s hope that Canada would join the organization and stated that it would be a 
“most welcome development” if Ottawa would send an observer to the next meeting.331  
Diefenbaker was more prepared than he had been in the past to consider this possibility 
and took this endorsement as one more reason to join. He would never be closer to taking 
such a step than when in personal conversations with Mexico’s president. 
On the same day that Diefenbaker spoke to Tello he also had the opportunity to 
speak privately with López.  This time the focus of the meeting was on economic rather 
than geo-political issues.  He mentioned the Law of the Sea, but expressed his 
appreciation for Mexico’s position.  To antagonize López, he realized, would have been 
counter-productive.  Instead, he brought up the application by a Canadian company, 
Dominion Steel and Coal, for a Mexican steel rails contract, stating that, “the successful 
consummation of this transaction would much more than anything else at the present time 
strengthen the commercial relations between Canada and Mexico.”332  The Mexican 
government eventually gave the contract to the Canadian company and Diefenbaker fast- 
tracked the company’s request for export insurance from the Canadian government 
through cabinet.  During the same discussion López told Diefenbaker that a business deal 
had been successfully negotiated by Canada’s Pemex Polymer Company with the 
Mexican state oil monopoly.333 
Here was an example of Diefenbaker’s personal diplomacy at it best.  He thrived 
in a personal setting where he was dealing with someone who could make decisions.  He 
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was uncomfortable when surrounded by officials, believing that they impeded his ability 
to make the necessary connections.   His telling remark to Basil Robinson was that 
“diplomats always found a complicated way of expressing simple thoughts.”334  He 
changed his mind on the value of having officials present only after a few meetings 
where he had forgotten the details and promises he had made.335   
In López he found a leader who also excelled in personal diplomacy and the two 
forged a positive relationship without actually signing any new treaties or coming to any 
major agreements.  Perhaps the best example of the relaxed nature of their relationship 
occurred during a luncheon held in Diefenbaker’s honour in Mexico City.  Both 
Diefenbaker and López threw away their prepared speeches and spoke about the mutual 
respect they shared and the “values and objectives held in common by the two peoples 
represented.”336  
Once again Diefenbaker strained the historical record in his effort to emphasize 
connections.  It was easy to do, as he tended not to apply Canadian values and standards 
to non-Commonwealth countries. In his view, countries like Mexico could not be 
expected to be held to the same standards.  Had Mexico been a Commonwealth nation, 
such as the Federation of the West Indies, its one-party rule and corporatist system would 
be cause for concern.  However, since it was not, he was able to overlook these failings.  
The situation was similar with both Cuba and China, where human rights violations and 
communist governments did not preclude the pursuit of trading relations. By contrast, the 
apartheid policies of South Africa, a Commonwealth country, were unacceptable.   
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Diefenbaker’s visit to Mexico, unlike López’s visit to Canada, succeeded in 
raising public awareness of Canadian-Mexican relations in both countries.  In Canada, 
local and national papers such as the Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star and the Regina 
Leader Post, covered the trip.337  While in Mexico, no less than seven papers wrote 
editorials praising his visit.338  Howard Green would capitalize on this increased 
awareness of Mexico and by extension, Latin America, by asking Canadians for their 
opinion as to whether or not Canada should join the OAS.  The public’s response was, it 
turned out, deeply influenced by pressure that Washington was putting on Canada to join. 
The most popular response was “no” with the justification being that if the United States 
wanted Canada to join, then it should not. 
Upon his return from Mexico, Diefenbaker delivered a report on his visit to the 
House of Commons.  He spoke of the closeness that was developing between the two 
countries: “I can say there are no basic differences in our approach to world problems.”339  
He added that, “there remained both a place and a necessity for consultations at a high 
level with political leaders not only of countries associated with Canada by tradition and 
alliance, but those of all other states whose similarities in background, outlook and 
interests are bringing them closer to us.”340 The speech was praised by the Conservatives 
as well as the opposition Liberals and CCF.341 
For Diefenbaker the trip was a resounding success and marked the high point of 
his interest in Latin America.  His reception by both the Mexican public and López 
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gratified him and helped strengthen his belief that Mexico was a natural friend to Canada.  
It also led him to promote Canadian business enterprises in Mexico and rethink his 
opposition to Canadian membership in the OAS.   
The trip proved to be only the first of a number of visits by members of the 
Diefenbaker government to Mexico.  These later trips would serve to reinforce the beliefs 
that Diefenbaker developed during his own visit.  Both Howard Green and Pierre 
Sevigny, Canada’s Associate Minister of National Defence, traveled there as well.  In 
1960, a month after Diefenbaker returned from Mexico, Green undertook a tour of Latin 
America.  His official reason was to represent Canada at the celebrations of the 150th 
anniversary of Argentina’s independence, but he also visited Chile and Peru.  Of note, his 
trip included a brief stop in Mexico City on his way back from South America where he 
met with Tullo and discussed the state of Canadian-Mexican relations.342  Like 
Diefenbaker, Green was favourably impressed with Mexico and the potential for growth 
in Canada’s relations with Latin America.  As one of the few ministers who had 
Diefenbaker’s confidence with regard to foreign affairs, Green helped influence the 
Prime Minister’s geo-political view of Mexico and Latin America.  
In the interests of continuing to build upon his successful visit, and the brief stop-
over by Green, Diefenbaker appointed Pierre Sevigny as a Special Ambassador to 
Mexico and had him stop-over in Mexico on his way to a special meeting of the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council, where he was to be Canada’s representative. 
Along with Sevigny went a totem pole carved in Victoria, B.C.343  The pole was a gift 
from the Government of Canada to the people of Mexico for the celebrations marking 
                                                 
342 House of Commons Debates, May 30th, 1960, 4337. 
343 “Independence centennial gift for Mexico”  Cabinet Conclusions, September 15th, 1960.  NAC, RG 2, 
Series A-5-a, Vol. 2747, 5-6. 
 113
Mexico’s 150th year of independence and the 50th anniversary of the revolution.  Though 
on the surface it seemed a strange gift, it symbolized one of the commonalities between 
Canada and Mexico that Diefenbaker had emphasized during his visit –– their Aboriginal 
heritage. 
Like Diefenbaker’s previous attempts to emphasize similar democratic traditions 
between Canada and Mexico, the totem pole as a symbol of a shared Aboriginal heritage 
was a strained one. While both Canada and Mexico admittedly had pre-colonial 
Aboriginal populations, there was little that those populations had in common, or in the 
way in which Europeans had interacted with them. 
Nonetheless, it was the perception of commonalities that led López to Canada and 
Diefenbaker to Mexico and that was the driving force behind Diefenbaker’s attempts to 
increase Canadian trade with Mexico and other parts of Latin America. Though the Latin 
American region accounted for very little in terms of Canadian external trade and geo-
political interests, Diefenbaker saw it as an area rife with opportunity for Canada.  
Mexico, one of the largest and most influential nations in Latin America, would be a key 
player. 
There were limits, however, to how far Diefenbaker was prepared to go in 
developing the Canada-Latin America relationship.  This was evident in 1960 when 
López sent Diefenbaker a personal letter asking for his assistance in resolving the 
growing conflict between the US and Cuba.  López addressed the letter “My dear Prime 
Minister and distinguished friend” and began with the words: “The strained relations 
between the Governments of Cuba and the United States of America are the source of my 
 114
deepest concern.”344  He hoped that Canada would consent to join with Brazil and 
Mexico to help negotiate an end to the crisis.345  Diefenbaker feared that the US would 
respond negatively to such pressure and replied that he could not commit to the effort.346   
There was a subtle difference between Canada and Mexico in their relationship 
with the US.  Though, in the end, neither country bowed to US pressure to cut its 
relations with Cuba or join the US embargo, Diefenbaker ultimately put Canada’s forces 
on alert and stood by the US during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Mexico did not, stating 
“their [the United States] attitude in international affairs reflects the belief that what they 
do is good because it is they who do it.”347  While both Canada and Mexico sought 
greater autonomy from the US in foreign policy, Diefenbaker accepted that Canada was 
fully on the side of the western democracies. For him, it was a case of offering support to 
the US because it was in Canada’s interest to support the side of freedom.  
Diefenbaker’s refusal to support Mexico’s proposal did not damage the goodwill 
that his visit to Mexico had generated.  Less than a year later, during his State of the 
Union message, López mentioned the close cordial friendship that Mexico enjoyed with 
both Canada and the US.348  Mentioning Canada at the same time as the US was a 
reflection of the respect which he had for Canada.349  Just over a year later, Ambassador 
Irwin was able to go so far as to say that “Mexico looks at Canada as a hemispheric 
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ally.”350  It was never made clear which countries or country Canada and Mexico were 
allied against, but it was undeniable that Canada and Mexico were closer in 1962 than 
they were when Diefenbaker took power in 1957. 
But while he succeeded in strengthening the Canadian-Mexican political 
relationship, Diefenbaker was less successful in attempting to unlock Mexico’s economic 
markets for Canadian exports –– the other major goal of his Mexican policies.  In his 
efforts to do so, he once again attempted to rely on personal initiatives –– and this 
severely limited his achievements.  He did not seem to recognize that the personal 
approach that he used to improve the broad state of Canada-Mexico relations might not 
work as effectively in achieving substantive improvements in trade. Trade agreements 
were achieved by methods that were not his strong suit –– slow and sometimes endless 
negotiations involving junior and senior bureaucrats, which produced a succession of 
texts that embodied impenetrable bureaucratic language. He had no patience for such 
lengthy and arduous processes and preferred to intervene personally when issues came 
before him. It was for this reason undoubtedly that no major economic or trade agreement 
was signed between Canada and Mexico while Diefenbaker was Prime Minister.   
 Most of the impetus for new trade by Canadian companies in Mexico came from 
the companies themselves.  However, Diefenbaker did attempt, on an individual case-by-
case basis, to give some assistance to those that were attempting to exploit the Mexican 
market –– usually by either personal diplomacy or by assuring Cabinet approval where it 
was needed. 
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The first major Canadian company to approach the Diefenbaker government was 
the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation.  Its officials contacted the government in 
1959, prior to Diefenbaker’s visit to Mexico, and stated that they wished to obtain 
government approval and insurance for the sale of approximately 150,000 tons of steel 
rail, worth approximately $25 million, to the National Railways of Mexico.351  Donald 
Fleming, the Minister of Finance, recommended that the sale be approved.352 Cabinet 
discussed the issue on six different occasions throughout 1959, each time putting off the 
decision for another meeting. Diefenbaker wanted to be sure that no Canadian jobs would 
be lost and wanted more information on the deal before they granted export insurance. It 
was granted approval following Diefenbaker’s return from Mexico.  The timing was 
hardly coincidental, reflecting the upbeat mood in Canadian-Mexican relations following 
the trip. Dominion Steel and Coal had promised it would not cut Canadian jobs, and the 
Mexican government announced that no European firms had been invited to bid on the 
contract, demonstrating that it wanted Canadian investment dollars.353 
Still, Diefenbaker’s trip to Mexico left him with the impression that Canada was 
not properly exploiting the Mexican market.  Shortly after his return to Canada, he 
informed Cabinet that during his stay he had an opportunity to speak with the French 
Ambassador and the latter had informed him that since the end of the Second World War 
France’s exports to Mexico had more than tripled.  Furthermore, this was in commodities 
that Canada could provide.  Diefenbaker pointed out that Canada was not taking 
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advantage of its opportunities, and Cabinet agreed to look at what steps would be 
required to expand Canadian exports to Latin America.354 
Diefenbaker’s visit to Mexico had a profound effect on the speed of Cabinet 
decisions regarding business dealings with Mexico.  An application by the National Steel 
Car Corporation to sell 144 passenger coaches valued at $18 million to Mexico was 
approved in one sitting of Cabinet.355  The application by Trans-Canada Air Lines to sell 
five North Star aircraft to the Mexican Airline LAUSA was similarly approved 
immediately by Cabinet,356 as was the application by Montreal Locomotives Works Ltd. 
for the sale of 75 diesel electric locomotives to the National Railways of Mexico.357  The 
speedy approval of those applications was in direct contrast to the endless Cabinet 
discussions around the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation’s request.  
Diefenbaker was always concerned about the impact of the government’s 
decisions on offshore business on the Canadian domestic economy.  Approval for the 
Dominion Steel and Coal Company’s Mexican bid was withheld in part because of fears 
that the company might close a mining operation in Newfoundland.  Cabinet agreed to 
support the bid only when it was assured that the mine would remain open.358 
A similar concern about affected Canadian interests was evident with the attempts 
to establish a bilateral air agreement between Canada and Mexico.  Before a deal could 
be reached Diefenbaker wanted to know if, “Trans Canada’s operations would be 
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adversely affected.”359  Only when the Trans-Canada Airlines had indicated that its 
revenues would not be affected in the immediate future by the agreement did Cabinet 
give its approval.360 
All these proposals increased Canadian exports to Mexico and improved the 
Canadian-Mexican economic relationship.  They were all, however, one time deals and 
despite his efforts, Diefenbaker never created any permanent legislation or signed any 
agreements or treaties on trade with Mexico.  The necessary groundwork at the 
administrative level was not laid and the potential that the Mexican market offered was 
not fully exploited.  
On the other hand, Diefenbaker attempted, and largely succeeded, in improving 
Canada-Mexico relations.  His personal connection with Mexican President Adolfo 
López Mateos was fostered over the course of two state visits and there was continuing 
correspondence between the two leaders.  They were of the same mind regarding many of 
the hemispheric questions faced by both Canada and Mexico, as exemplified in the 
decisions of their respective governments to join the US embargo of Cuba.  Although no 
bilateral agreements or treaties were signed as a result of the connection that was made 
between the two leaders, it is notable that trade between Canada and Mexico increased, if 
modestly, during the Diefenbaker years.  
 Diefenbaker’s Mexican policy was not a radical departure from the policy 
approach taken by the St. Laurent government, but the method by which it was 
implemented, entailing the personal interventions and involvement of the Prime Minister, 
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were both characteristic of Diefenbaker’s style of leadership and indicative of his 
approach to important foreign policy questions.  
 120
CHAPTER 5 
DIEFENBAKER AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 
 
Created in 1908, the OAS and its precursor the Pan-American Union, included 
every nation in the western hemisphere except Canada until 1988, the year Canada finally 
joined. In 1960 it almost joined the organization when Prime Minister Diefenbaker, who 
had initially opposed Canadian membership, endorsed the idea.  It proved to be a short-
lived policy as he eventually decided that there were good reasons for not joining the 
organization.  This brief flirtation with OAS membership has been seen by various 
writers as just another one of Diefenbaker’s policy “flip flops,”361 or rather as indicative 
of his typical indecision on important foreign policy issues. Yet this is too simplistic an 
explanation and belies the shifting and often complex nature of the influences that came 
to bear on the question of OAS membership.   
Diefenbaker’s approach to the question of OAS membership reflected his 
determination that Canada should keep a respectful distance from the US on foreign 
policy questions, in short, his search for greater autonomy for Canada.  The usefulness of 
membership in the OAS measured in relation to this larger foreign policy goal, shifted in 
response to pressure emanating from various Latin American countries and the US.  As 
well, domestic influences within Canada affected his government’s perspective on the 
question.  And, as in the case of other issues in Canada-Latin America relations, so did 
Diefenbaker’s tendency to involve himself personally in the issues.   
The origins of the OAS can be traced back to the first International Conference of 
American States, held in Washington D.C., in 1889 and various conferences that 
followed roughly every decade or so.  The OAS was officially founded in 1948 at the 
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Ninth International Conference of American States, in Bogotá, Columbia, with the 
signing of the Charter of the Organization of American States.  The slow growth of the 
organization from idea to form coincided with a growing pan-Americanism in the 
western hemisphere and the increasing influence of the US in the region.  Yet as pan-
Americanism increased and the influence of the US grew, Canada remained removed and 
played little or no role in these developments.362 
This situation reflected Canada’s focus on its relationship with the British Empire 
and Western Europe. Canadians did not share the sense of revolutionary struggle or the 
common thread of republicanism that connected the US with most of Latin America, and 
most Canadians felt little connection or shared sense of identity with the region.  
Furthermore, following Confederation, Canadians had more immediate concerns than 
establishing close connections with Latin America.  Busy expanding across the top of the 
North American continent, Canadians rarely cast their eyes further south than the US. 
Canada had more than enough problems simply resisting the orbital pull of the US and 
Britain. 
Canadian membership in the organization, however, was desired by various Latin 
American nations and the US.  The former hoped that Canada could act to mitigate the 
growing influence of the US.  US leaders hoped that Canadian support for their initiatives 
would help smooth over fears amongst the rest of the hemisphere of US imperialism.  As 
early as 1910, when the headquarters of the Pan-American Union was constructed, US 
Secretary of State Elihu Root ordered the addition of a 22nd chair, inscribed with the 
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name “Canada,” to the board room, in anticipation of Canada’s eventual participation in 
the organization.363   
 Though the Canadian government sent two missions to the region in the middle of 
the 20th century to explore the possibility of expanding its presence in that part of the 
world, its potential for Canada remained largely untapped.364  By 1957, the region was 
still not important enough to have warranted a single visit by Canada’s foreign affairs 
minister (although Trade Minister C.D. Howe had traveled there in the 1950s) and 
Canadian trade with Latin America was still vastly overshadowed by trade with the US 
and Europe.  The diplomatic and economic distance between Canada and Latin America 
was exemplified by Canada’s continued refusal to join the OAS. 
 The election of Diefenbaker initially did little to change this.  Yet despite his 
reluctance to discuss the issue of OAS membership, Latin American nations continued to 
pressure Canada to join.  Particularly in the emerging bi-polar post-war world, Latin 
American governments sought to mitigate the hegemony of the US in the region and with 
the change of government in Canada they saw the potential for renewed interest on the 
part of the Canadians.  
 Diefenbaker, however, was wary of making a commitment.  He feared that 
Canada would inevitably be faced with the tough choice of supporting US policies over 
the objections of Latin American nations or siding with the latter against the US.  He 
viewed the OAS as a no-win situation.  Furthermore, the US relationship with Latin 
America had become quite volatile in the 1950s.  Anti-American sentiment in the region 
was growing, as demonstrated by the riots that greeted Vice-President Richard Nixon in 
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Venezuela.  As well, Diefenbaker’s knowledge of the region was very limited; he was 
basically unaware of the strong desire for a greater Canadian involvement in the region 
coming from Latin American nations.  With his limited information and concern about 
the dangers of being caught in the middle between the US and Latin American countries, 
Diefenbaker initially saw little opportunity for the advancement of Canadian interests in 
joining the OAS.   
Diefenbaker’s interest in the organization grew slowly and was based on personal 
reports.  These began with E. J. Broome’s visit to Latin America.  Broome, a 
Conservative Member of Parliament from the Vancouver South riding, was the first 
official representative of the Diefenbaker government to travel to the region.  He 
represented Canada at the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference, held July 24th to 
August 1st, 1958, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.  While there, he held discussions with a 
number of Brazilian government officials and sent back a lengthy report to Diefenbaker 
explaining that the Brazilian government held Canada in high regard and that many of the 
Brazilians with whom he had spoken to wanted Canada to join the OAS.  It was their 
hope, Broome reported, that Canada’s “voice added to Latin America’s would balance 
the scales as far as the United States was concerned.”365 
 The report did not radically alter Diefenbaker’s view that membership in the OAS 
was not in Canada’s best interest.  It ended up as a minor footnote to his early foreign 
policy deliberations since it arrived in the midst of the hurried planning for his first world 
tour.  Still, the strong Brazilian desire for Canada to play an important role in inter-
American affairs quietly struck a chord.  Increasing Canada’s status on the world stage 
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was of no small importance to Diefenbaker, particularly in light of his continued personal 
competition with Pearson, who was now leader of the Official Opposition in Parliament.   
Diefenbaker’s tour of Europe and Asia did not produce invitations to Canada from 
other countries to play a greater role in the world. If anything, Diefenbaker determined 
that there were limits to how much Canada could influence world affairs. The contrasting 
message that he would get from the leaders of Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and the West 
Indies was quite different. They wanted Canada to extend and deepen its relationship 
with the region.   
Latin America had attributes that were appealing to Diefenbaker; the region was 
largely virgin territory for Canada in terms of its external relations.  Neither King, St. 
Laurent nor Pearson had ever taken any major steps, beyond a couple of trade missions, 
towards increasing Canada’s role politically or economically in Latin America.  Here was 
an opportunity to operate outside of the Liberal foreign policy tradition. 
 Latin America began to take on a more significant place in Diefenbaker’s thinking 
and by extension, the OAS did as well.  Adding and reinforcing this growing interest in 
the region was the visit of Sidney Smith, shortly after the return of Broome.  It was the 
first visit by a Canadian foreign affairs minister to Latin America.366  Smith spent much 
of his time in Brazil and he explored a number of issues with various representatives of 
Latin American nations, but the central theme of most of the discussions was Canadian 
membership in the OAS.367   
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During his trip Smith also had the opportunity to have a private meeting with 
Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek.  He reported to Diefenbaker that during the 
meeting, Kubitschek expressed the hope that Canada would join the OAS.  Kubitschek 
told Smith that “Canada could play an important role in the Organization.”  Smith 
responded that his visit was a reflection of Canada’s increased interest in the region.368 
He later informed Diefenbaker that his trip left him with the impression that, “the Latin 
American countries are very desirous of establishing closer relations with us.”369 
Kubitschek was obviously well prepared for his meeting with Smith.  Speaking 
English throughout, he raised a number of points with the Canadian minister regarding 
Canada’s role in Latin America and he drew a number of interesting parallels between 
Canada and Brazil, including the presence of Aboriginal people in both countries.  
Anticipating that Smith would deliver a full report to Diefenbaker, he made a point of 
making a positive reference to the Prime Minister’s heritage.  He commented on the fact 
that his own grandmother had been born in Eastern Germany and added “that it could 
only happen in Brazil and Canada that the grandsons of immigrants could attain the 
highest post in government.”370 
 Smith’s report drew attention to a number of points that Diefenbaker should 
consider in thinking about the OAS membership issue. First, there was evidence that 
most Latin American nations wanted Canada to join.  Second, Canada enjoyed a great 
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deal of goodwill in the region.  And third, leaders such as Kubitshek spoke warmly about 
Canada being involved in the region.  
 Kubitshek’s personal entreaties were, however, wasted in this instance.  While the 
Brazilian President left a very favourable impression on Smith, the Minister had yet to 
earn Diefenbaker’s full trust in terms of advocating new policy initiatives.  Smith would 
come to have some influence on Diefenbaker regarding Canadian policy towards Mexico 
and Argentina, but his recommendations on the OAS failed to get Diefenbaker’s early 
support. The Prime Minister, it turns out, would be more open to the entreaties of Smith’s 
successor, Howard Green, and would also be deeply influenced by his own journeys to 
Latin America. 
 As was so often the case, it was his direct personal involvement in the OAS 
question that was most influential in shaping Diefenbaker’s policy decisions.  The early 
pressure from Latin American nations laid the ground work for Diefenbaker’s policy 
positions but it was not until his own visit to Latin America that membership was 
transformed from an unlikely possibility to an important opportunity.  He followed up the 
visits of Broome and Smith with his Latin American trip when he traveled to Mexico in 
1960.  This was in response to the visit to Ottawa of López in 1959.  
By 1959 Diefenbaker was becoming far more familiar with the issues relating to 
foreign policy.  He had a new External Affairs Minister, Howard Green, whose views not 
only complemented his own but who had some influence on him.  In many ways 
Diefenbaker gave Green more freedom in shaping Canada’s foreign relations than Smith 
and the new Minister was a strong proponent of strengthening Canadian-Latin American 
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relations.371  With Green offering support and Diefenbaker more comfortable with 
foreign affairs, and exhibiting a greater willingness to move in new directions, the Prime 
Minister was greatly influenced by his trip to Mexico; he was now more willing than ever 
before to consider membership for Canada in the OAS.  
 During the trip, he spoke of how the current climate of international affairs was 
pushing Canada towards a greater involvement in Latin America and bringing Canada 
and Mexico closer together.372  His statements reflected his view that Canada was trapped 
by the Cold War and its ties to the US. Jamie Glazov has argued that Diefenbaker’s anti-
communist and anti-American ideas were contradictory and paralyzed his government.373 
The reality is that his anti-communism and concern about the overwhelming influence of 
the US were not contradictory at all.  In fact these views led him to seek alternative areas 
for trade and political support, particularly in Latin America.  The climate of international 
affairs was pushing Canada and Mexico closer together. 
Despite their mutually supportive public pronouncements, it was in private 
meetings that Diefenbaker and López connected with each other.  As a sign of how much 
Diefenbaker’s views on membership in the OAS had changed, he was the one who first 
brought up the issue in his conversation with Mexico’s Foreign Minister, Manuel Tello.   
Tello expressed Mexico’s hope that Canada would end its self-imposed isolation and 
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join.374  López echoed Tello’s comments and pressed Diefenbaker to tangibly bring 
Canada more fully into the inter-American sphere. 
On his return home from Mexico it appeared that Diefenbaker had made up his 
mind to bring Canada into the OAS.  He wrote two memoranda.  In the first he stated, 
“that the advantages of joining the organization outweigh the disadvantages.”375  He 
offered a more nuanced interpretation in his second memo when he discussed the Latin 
American economies and their potential for growth, stating that “the O.A.S. symbolizes a 
new world and emphasizes the need of American solidarity.”  He felt that “the only 
interpreter to the Commonwealth of this new realignment in power in the Western 
Hemisphere is Canada being associated with the O.A.S.”376 
The most interesting comment was perhaps the connection made between the 
Commonwealth and the OAS.  Diefenbaker sought to increase Canada’s role in the world 
and both he and Green saw the Commonwealth as a vehicle to do this; it was Green’s 
belief that Canada would surpass Britain, France and West Germany in terms of its 
influence on the world before the end of the century.377  Joining the OAS would not only 
expand Canada’s role in the region but allow Canada to strengthen its position as an 
influential leader in the Commonwealth.  
The victory of Fidel Castro and the movement of Cuba towards Communism 
created a further impetus for Canada to join the OAS, or at least swept away one of the 
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arguments for not joining. While refusing to endorse the Revolution itself, Diefenbaker 
refused to break off relations with Castro. He argued strongly that it was not the policy of 
Canada to change the nature of its relationship with a country because of a change of 
government –– although “the continuance of trade relations in no way constitute[d] 
approval, overt or tacit, of the Government of Cuba, nor [did] that action reveal any 
alteration in opposition to communism and its works.”378  It was a policy that was popular 
amongst Latin American nations, many of whom feared the spread of communism but 
saw the reactions of the US to the Cuban Revolution as heavy handed and counter-
productive. 
 Washington’s mild reaction to Diefenbaker’s refusal to break relations with the 
new Castro regime  had the effect of weakening one of the fundamental arguments for 
opposing Canadian membership in the OAS –– the danger of siding against the United 
States on a specific issue.  Here was a prime example of such a situation, and the US 
response gave Canadians little to worry about. Though Canadian-US relations were 
strained, they did not suffer greatly as officials in the US State Department believed that 
the Canadian government was acting out of ignorance, not malice.379  It appeared that 
Canada could stand to chart a different course from the US.   
The Cuban situation led Latin American nations to lobby even harder for Canada 
to join the OAS because it plainly demonstrated the inability of Latin American nations 
to effectively counter US policies that they opposed.  Some Latin American leaders 
believed that Cuba would not be inhibited from spreading its revolution elsewhere, but 
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most believed that the US economic embargo of Cuba would simply push it further into 
the communist bloc. 
Diefenbaker sought to gauge the feelings in some of the Latin American 
countries, following the Revolution, toward Canadian membership in the OAS.  On July 
3rd, 1961, he spoke with Joseph Couillard, Canada’s Ambassador to Venezuela, who 
indicated that Venezuela still hoped that Canada would join and act as a counter-weight 
to the United States.380  Diefenbaker came to believe that it was not just the larger Latin 
American countries that wanted Canada to join but that broad consensus existed in Latin 
America for Canadian membership.      
Argentina was another country that exerted an influence on Diefenbaker’s 
regarding OAS membership. Once again it was the case of a charismatic leader who 
connected on a personal level with Diefenbaker. Through personal appeals and economic 
promises, Argentine President Dr. Arturo Frondizi sought to encourage Canadian interest 
in his country and in the region more generally.  
 Diefenbaker was elected Prime Minister at approximately the same time as 
Frondizi was elected Argentine President, the latter gaining power on February 23rd, 1958 
in Argentina’s first elections following the 1955 military coup that overthrew Juan 
Domingo Perón.  On March 14th, 1958, Diefenbaker was given a report on the election 
outcome.  What he read led him to believe that he should attempt to strengthen 
Argentine-Canadian relations.  The report summarized the attitudes of the new 
government and tellingly stated that “there may be a shift of emphasis [by Argentina] 
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away from the United States.”381  Considering that Diefenbaker was of the belief that 
Canada needed to do much the same thing, the outlook for an improvement in Canada-
Argentina relations was good.   
 Frondizi saw Canadian membership in the OAS as a way to reduce US 
domination of the organization.  He pressured Canada to join.  The parallels between 
Frondizi’s attempts to reshape the Argentine-US relationship and Diefenbaker’s efforts to 
alter the Canada-US relationship are striking.  Both men saw the answer to be in 
multilateral organizations, which could serve to dilute US influence.  For Diefenbaker the 
premier international organization in this regard was the Commonwealth; for Frondizi it 
was the OAS expanded in size.  
In 1960 and 1961, Frondizi had a number of opportunities to exhort the Canadian 
government to join the OAS.  The first was early in 1960 when Green traveled to Latin 
America where he hoped to, as he stated in the House of Commons, “further the good 
will between Canada and the Latin American countries.”382  Green attended the May 20th 
independence celebrations in Argentina, demonstrating Canada’s emerging interests in 
the region.  He had a private meeting with Frondizi where the two discussed Canada’s 
membership in the OAS, and Frondizi expressed his hope that Canada would join.383  
Green’s visit was a success in terms of promoting stronger Canadian-Argentine relations.  
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Regarding OAS membership for Canada, Green left convinced that “there was no single 
thing we could do that would bring greater immediate returns in goodwill.”384  
One year later, in August 1961, Frondizi had an opportunity to make his case 
again as Pierre Sevigny, Canada’s Associate Minister of National Defence, traveled to 
Argentina, following his attendance at the Conference of the Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council, which took place in Punta del Este, Uruguay.  At both the 
Conference and during the visit the pressure on Canada to join the O.A.S. continued to 
build. 
At the Conference the Canadian delegation encountered a warm reception from 
most Latin American nations.  Heath Macquarrie, a Conservative M.P. who was part of 
the delegation, later reported back to Diefenbaker that “among the many Latin Americans 
I had a chance to meet I found universal goodwill toward Canada and yourself, and a 
genuine desire that we join the O.A.S.”385   
Macquarrie was a strong supporter of Canadian membership, declaring in the 
House of Commons that he thought Canada should join.386   However, he made the 
wrong argument in trying to influence Diefenbaker when he said: “I am firmly convinced 
that the Punta Del Este conference was a real success and it is to be hoped that the 
governments of Latin America will avail themselves of U.S. aid and leadership.”387  For 
Diefenbaker, more US involvement in Latin America meant less space for Canadian 
interests. 
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Sevigny was also impressed with the reception that the Canadian delegation 
received from various Latin American nations.  His report to Diefenbaker was far more 
detailed than Macquarrie’s and explained the US position towards Latin America before 
discussing the many benefits that Canada would enjoy by joining the OAS.  Showing a 
deeper understanding of both Diefenbaker and geo-politics than Macquarrie, Sevigny 
stated: 
By allowing Canada to drift into the Organization of American States, 
the Canadian government stands to lose some of the political advantage 
which would inevitably flow from a positive response to the request of 
American States.  From the international as well as from the internal 
point of view, it would seem preferable to dramatize Canada’s position 
and serve notice that if Canada joins the inter-American system, it does 
not wish to remain an acquiescent partner, but intends on the contrary to 
play a useful role.388 
 
His report concluded that Canada’s technical knowledge was invaluable to the 
developing Latin American countries and that Canada had an opportunity to play a major 
role in the region.389 
Sevigny then traveled to Brazil and Argentina.390  In Argentina he met with 
Frondizi who gave him a letter to be delivered to Diefenbaker.  In it Frondizi urged 
Diefenbaker to take the final step and have Canada join the organization.391  In addition 
to making the personal appeal for Canadian membership, he pointed out that Canada 
could serve as a bridge between Latin America and Europe; Canada was, he said, “linked 
by destiny to its American sisters.”392   
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In the above mentioned cases, Frondizi made his pleas for Canadian membership 
through intermediaries, which was not the most effective manner to communicate with or 
influence Diefenbaker.  However, he had the opportunity to make his case in person 
when he visited Canada in November 1961.  It was the first official visit by an Argentine 
Head of State to Canada.393  Frondizi and Diefenbaker had lunch together, along with 
their respective foreign ministers.  Later, Frondizi visited Montreal accompanied by 
Sevigny, a sign of the positive personal relationship that had developed between the two 
leaders during the latter’s trip to South America.394 
 Frondizi wasted little time in getting his point across.  Upon his arrival at Uplands 
Airport in Ottawa on  November 27th 1961, he stated that the timing of his visit, “is not 
just a mere coincidence.  World affairs in this era are based on an increasing 
interdependence between peoples.”395  The message was clear, the time had come for 
Canada to acknowledge its place in inter-American relations and join the OAS. 
Diefenbaker left a lasting impression on the Argentinean leader who, as he was 
leaving, sent Diefenbaker a telegram which stated, “I am taking with me the best possible 
impression of my visit to Canada.  I am convinced that the conversations we had in a 
climate of frank and cordial friendship will help the cause of the peoples of the Americas 
to which Canada and Argentina are firmly bound.”396 
Unfortunately for Frondizi, Diefenbaker had by this time begun to change his 
mind about membership in the OAS.  Yet, on account of Frondizi’s influence, 
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Diefenbaker refused to rule out the possibility.  He wrote that although Frondizi thought 
it was of great importance that Canada join the organization, a decision on membership 
would probably require further examination.397 
By 1962 two events in Latin America effectively change Diefenbaker’s mind.  
First, the OAS suspended Cuba on January 22nd, 1962, a move that could be traced to US 
pressure and brought US policy into conflict with Canada’s. Secondly, the arrest of 
Frondizi in late March 1962 by the Argentine military, removed one of Diefenbaker’s 
closest Latin American allies.  The suspension of Cuba made clear the potential for 
Canadian-US conflict if Canada joined the organization.  Viewing Kennedy as a 
dangerous leader, Diefenbaker began to think that joining the OAS was not in Canada’s 
best interests.    
The second event, the arrest of Frondizi, was precipitated by the President’s 
decision to allow Peronists to run in the March 18th congressional elections.  When the 
Peronists achieved electoral success, the armed forces demanded his resignation.  
Frondizi’s successor was José María Guido, who nullified the election and quickly 
moved Argentina back into the geo-political orbit of the United States.398  The prospect 
of Canadian membership in the OAS now began to fade.   
During Diefenbaker’s seven years in power, the pressure emanating from Latin 
America on Canada to join the OAS was not matched by Canadian domestic pressure to 
join.  If it had been, it is likely that despite the rift with Kennedy, Diefenbaker would 
have brought Canada into the organization decades before Canadian Prime Minister 
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Brian Mulroney did.  As was the case in so many other instances, without a strong base 
of domestic support, Diefenbaker was loath to make major commitments.   
Initially, there was little public interest in Canada in the OAS.  Though 
Diefenbaker did receive some correspondence from interested parties, it totalled less than 
50 letters between 1957 and 1960.399  Diefenbaker’s visit to Mexico, however, succeeded 
in raising public awareness of Latin America a little, an important first step.400   
Upon his return from Mexico, Diefenbaker attempted to prepare the public for a 
more dynamic Latin American policy and possible membership in the organization  In a 
speech to the House of Commons he stated that there were “no basic differences in our 
[Mexico’s and Canada’s] approach to world problems”; “there remained”, he continued, 
“both a place and a necessity for consultations at a high level with political leaders not 
only of countries associated with Canada by tradition and alliance, but those of all other 
states whose similarities in background, outlook and interests are bringing them closer to 
us.”401 
At first, what public awareness existed in Canada seemed to be in favour of 
joining; however, this dramatically changed with Kennedy’s visit to Ottawa in 1961.  
Following the visit and Kennedy’s publicly expressed hope that Canada would join the 
organization, Diefenbaker’s correspondence took on a strong anti-OAS tone.402  The 
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same trend held true for newspaper editorials.403  It was even reflected in French Canada 
where there existed a more favourable view of Latin America.404 
For the most part the Canadian public was not particularly knowledgeable about 
Latin America.  This remained the case throughout Diefenbaker’s time as Prime Minister.  
There was, however, a powerful groundswell of anti-Americanism into which 
Diefenbaker had generally tapped to win his parliamentary majority, and which turned 
public opinion on the OAS.  The majority of those who took the time to write to 
Diefenbaker or make their opinions known in the press believed that Canada must not 
join if it looked like the nation was doing so at the specific request of the US.  As 
sensitive to public opinion as any politician, Diefenbaker was not prepared to ignore it in 
this instance. 
Kennedy was immensely popular in Canada, particularly after his strong stand in 
the Cuban Missile Crisis.  He was as popular north of the 49th parallel as he was south of 
it, for all the same reasons –– his youth, energy and vision.  In fact, more than one 
historian has argued that it was Kennedy’s support for Pearson (whether real or 
perceived) that turned the election in 1963 against Diefenbaker.405 But Kennedy’s 
popularity did not extend to public support for every position that he was taking on 
foreign policy questions. His expressed desire that Canada join the OAS was one of 
these. Diefenbaker was prepared to move Canadian forces to a higher alert status during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis and to add Canadian strategic goods to the US embargo against 
                                                 
403 “Canadian Membership in the O.A.S. Public Opinion Trends” Memorandum for the Minister. DCC, 
Box 572 P.M.O. Series, Vol. 890 Organization of American States – General 1960-1962, 434259. 
404 “French Canadian attitude towards Canada and the Organization of American States” Memorandum 
from the Latin American Division to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. DCC, Box 572 
P.M.O. Series, Vol. 890 Organization of American States – General 1960-1962, 434280. 
405 See Gerald Craig, The United States and Canada  (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1968), 254. 
 138
Cuba but where the Canadian public was telling him that US policies were detrimental to 
Canada’s national interest, he listened to it rather than to Washington. There was a 
simple-mindedness to Peter Newman’s assertion that Diefenbaker “tried to respond to 
every gust of public opinion.”406  Diefenbaker simply believed that the public did have an 
understanding of what was conducive to the furtherance of the Canadian national interest.  
In addition to Canadian public opinion, Diefenbaker was also influenced by the 
views of his Cabinet. How these views evolved over time help explain the positions that 
he took towards the question of OAS membership. In 1957, the Cabinet was unanimously 
of the view that Canada should stay outside the organization. Diefenbaker’s own position 
was that membership was an idea whose time had not yet come.407  However, when he 
began to rethink his policy, he found that Cabinet support was split.408  Believing strongly 
that there had to be a consensus in Cabinet before the government could act, he declined 
to move forward.  
 The situation resolved itself with Kennedy’s visit to Ottawa in 1961.  During his 
address to Parliament the President, with no notice to Diefenbaker, publicly called upon 
Canada to join the organization. Diefenbaker was furious.  Kennedy’s reiteration of his 
public call in a private meeting with Diefenbaker only made matters worse. He later 
informed the Cabinet that in response he had told Kennedy that “in light of the unsettling 
events in Cuba, Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil and British Guiana … Canada was not 
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prepared to become a full member at this time.”409  Diefenbaker had the full support of 
his Cabinet, although Howard Green argued that the possibility might yet be explored.  
The truth is that Green found himself increasingly isolated on the issue as there 
was now growing opposition among the Ministers. During the Cabinet discussion of 
Canadian participation in the OAS’s Inter-American Economic and Social Council the 
strong feeling against membership was evident.  Green recommended that the Canadian 
delegation informally mention that the question of Canada joining the OAS was under 
active consideration.410  But the Cabinet disagreed and decided that “no indication be 
given that Canada would join the Organization of American States.”411   
 Diefenbaker was undoubtedly influenced by Howard Green, the strongest 
proponent of the idea among his Ministers, particularly when he began to rethink his 
position. Green’s views were shaped by the belief that the Latin American nations could 
serve as a strong voting bloc in the UN, by the talk of the creation of a Latin American 
free trade area, and by his own experiences in Latin America.412  He also had similar 
ideas to Diefenbaker’s regarding what policies were in Canada’s national interest.413   
 Yet in the end, it seemed to be the pressure applied by the US that was decisive in 
turning Diefenbaker against the idea of OAS membership for Canada. More particularly, 
it was Kennedy’s overt attempts in both public and private to pressure Diefenbaker that 
ultimately changed his mind on the issue. He was not driven by anti-Americanism.  He 
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did not reject membership simply because the US requested it.  Washington had been 
requesting it for nearly two decades so Kennedy’s request in 1961 was hardly new. 
Rather, it was the distasteful manner in which the request was made by Kennedy and its 
subsequent effect on Canadian public opinion that determined the outcome.  
As historians have observed at length, the personal relationship between Kennedy 
and Diefenbaker had, of course, come to be problematic. Kennedy had taken office as 
President of the US on January 20th, 1961, and his relationship with Diefenbaker actually 
began on a positive note.  After he met with Diefenbaker in Washington, he stated that 
he, “liked the Prime Minister and that he gained the impression that he would be on his 
side on really important issues.”414  He could not have been more wrong.  The two would 
soon clash over a number of issues. 
On March 1st, 1961, Kennedy officially announced his Alliance for Progress, a 
US-sponsored program designed to assist Latin American nations.  In fact the program 
was intended to counter the growing appeal of Fidel Castro and revolutionary politics in 
the region; it involved funneling billions of dollars into Latin America through a variety 
of multinational programs.  The program was initially well received by many Latin 
American nations and the final details were to be worked out later that year at the next 
meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in Punte del Este, Uruguay.  
The announcement precipitated a general drop in the antagonism between the US and 
Latin America, and it threatened to render Diefenbaker’s vision of Canada acting to 
mitigate the influence of the US in the region irrelevant. 
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A few months after the announcement, Kennedy visited Canada to meet with 
Diefenbaker.  During the visit a member of the Kennedy staff dropped a memo into a 
waste basket that was later found and given to Diefenbaker.  An offending line in the 
memo read: “What we want from the Ottawa Trip.”  There were two primary goals:  
1. To push Canada towards an increased commitment to the Alliance for 
Progress; 
 
2. To push Canada towards a decision to join the OAS. 415 
Kennedy next sought to pressure Diefenbaker by proposing in Parliament that Canada 
join the O.A.S.416  
 Following these events, Diefenbaker’s attitude toward Canadian involvement with 
the OAS began to harden. Still angry about the lack of respect shown by Kennedy during 
the visit, he later announced that he had told Kennedy that Canada would not be joining 
the OAS.417 Canada, moreover, was not prepared to make a commitment to the Alliance 
for Progress..418   
 If there were any lingering doubts about the government’s position on the OAS, 
they were erased by the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Diefenbaker was deeply 
offended at being left out of the decision-making process and being informed of the 
nuclear weapons in Cuba only hours before Kennedy’s public announcement419  
 Kennedy’s reaction to Canadian actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 
pressure from Washington to accept nuclear weapons demonstrated conclusively to 
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Diefenbaker that it was very difficult for Canada to navigate a line between Latin 
American and US interests. The primary argument against Canadian membership in the 
OAS, that Canada could become caught between the US and Latin America, was now 
overwhelming.  Membership had perhaps been a possibility when Diefenbaker’s good 
friend “Ike” was President but certainly not with the young, brash Kennedy.  Thus, 
Diefenbaker’s view of membership in the OAS had come full circle.   
 Diefenbaker’s handling of the OAS question has often been used to demonstrate 
his inability to follow through on a policy objective, or to illustrate the depths of his anti-
Americanism.  The former explanation is inaccurate and the latter is overly simplistic.  
US actions and pressure may have played a pivotal role in Diefenbaker’s decisions with 
regard to the OAS but it was not an anti-American bias that determined his position. 
Kennedy’s insensitivity on the issue infuriated him, but he had already decided that it was 
not in Canada’s interests to pursue this initiative. When it appeared that membership 
would be advantageous to Canada and would open more opportunities for Canadian trade 
and political influence in Latin America, Diefenbaker began to contemplate it.  But when 
it became apparent that Canada would be placed in an awkward position where, in certain 
instances, it would have to decide between supporting the leader of the western world and 
countries with which it strongly wanted to conduct business, he rejected the idea.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DIEFENBAKER AND BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA 
 
 The approach taken by Diefenbaker towards Latin America was not based on a 
specific, coherent policy that encompassed the region as a whole.  Rather he reacted to 
crises and opportunities and was guided by his personal instincts and his 
conceptualization of Canada’s national interest, in particular the interest of achieving 
greater autonomy for Canada in foreign policy.  Nowhere was this more apparent than in 
his policies towards Brazil and Argentina.  Any reasonable Latin American policy would 
need to take into account two of the region’s largest and most influential countries, yet 
Diefenbaker did not take the initiative to try to build strong connections with them.  
Instead he reacted belatedly to economic and political overtures from both countries 
which saw themselves as potential markets for Canadian goods.   
 The importance of Diefenbaker’s relationship to Brazil and Argentina and how it 
completes the picture of his government’s Latin American policies has been completely 
overlooked by historians.  The reason for this omission is a general dearth of studies on 
Canadian-Argentine and Canadian-Brazilian relations.420  Additionally, there is virtually 
no mention of either country in the literature on Diefenbaker.  It is quite literally a blank 
slate.    
 Diefenbaker had little knowledge of Argentina and Brazil prior to his victory in 
the 1957 federal elections.  It was not until a year later, in 1958, that Canadian 
connections to both nations came to his attention.  Both Brazil and Argentina provided 
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the sort of economic and political opportunities to expand Canadian influence that so 
often attracted Diefenbaker to Latin America.   
Brazil 
 The first political connections between the Diefenbaker government and the 
government of Brazil were made in the summer of 1958.  The Inter-Parliamentary Union 
Conference of 1958 was held in Rio de Janeiro and Ernest J. Broome was the Canadian 
representative.  While there he spent considerable time investigating Canadian-Brazilian 
relations.  He subsequently sent Diefenbaker a detailed report of his visit and 
observations.421 
   In his report Broome emphasized that the Brazilian representatives he 
encountered thought that Brazil had a “special affinity” with Canada.  This, he believed, 
was based on three factors.  First, Brazil was a “Portuguese island in a Spanish sea” and 
therefore had to fight to maintain its culture, just as Canada did with the US.  Second, 
both had large unexplored areas that were rich in natural resources.  Broome pointed out 
that “as we have our unknown North so do they have a practically unknown interior.”  
Third, Brazilians considered Canada to be a mitigating force against the US.422  Broome 
also said that Brazil was trying to lessen its dependency on the US and that this attempt 
had created a golden opportunity for Canada.423 
 Broome’s report coincided with Diefenbaker’s announcement that he intended to 
shift 15% of Canada’s trade from the US to Great Britain.  Though the practical 
impossibility of this goal was quickly pointed out to the Prime Minister, the intention was 
                                                 
421 “Letter from Ernest J. Broome to John G. Diefenbaker,” August 16th, 1958.  DCC, Series VI, Volume 2, 
File# Inter-Parl/B827, 001118-24.  
422 Ibid., 001118-24. 
423 Ibid., 0011121. 
 145
clear.   Diefenbaker was looking to mitigate the huge economic and political influence of 
the US on Canada. Broome’s report that Brazil was in a similar situation and seeking 
Canadian assistance was very well received. 
 Broome’s point was driven home a few months later by Sidney Smith.  As 
mentioned in previous chapters, Smith had embarked on a Latin American tour and had 
included a stop in Rio de Janeiro, where he had the opportunity to meet with Brazilian 
President Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira.  In his report to Diefenbaker he echoed many 
of Broome’s conclusions, including the possibilities of increasing Canadian trade to the 
region and remarked about the high esteem in which Canada was held in by many 
Brazilians. 
 The Brazilian government attempted to make a positive impression on Smith, 
including putting the new presidential airplane at his disposal to fly him between Rio de 
Janeiro, Brasilia and Sao Paulo.424  Their efforts succeeded and Smith left with the belief 
that the Canadian and Brazilian governments had much in common and that, in the case 
of the UN, their delegations should work more closely together.425  He also believed that 
the Brazilian leaders felt well disposed to Canada and that the two countries shared a 
similar view of the US. 
 Perhaps the most encouraging part of Smith’s visit was the luncheon that he had 
with President Kubitschek, and he wrote a separate memorandum to Diefenbaker 
detailing their discussion.426  Kubitscheck began by drawing a connection between 
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himself and Diefenbaker, pointing out that both leaders were the grandsons of immigrants 
and now were the leaders of their countries.427  He added that he had once spent a full 
week in Canada. Speaking about world politics, he expressed his deep concern about the 
“economic infiltration of the USSR in countries that are under-developed.”428   
 These comments would likely have struck a chord with Diefenbaker.  
Kubitscheck’s reference to the leaders’ shared immigrant experience was exactly the type 
of attention to detail that Diefenbaker loved.  Diefenbaker was also deeply concerned 
about the Soviet Union and its infiltration in Latin America.  Finally he would have been 
impressed that Kubitscheck had some knowledge of Canada. It was clear that the 
Brazilian leader left a positive impression with Smith, who told Diefenbaker:  “I was 
greatly impressed with this hard working and clear thinking leader.” At the end of their 
conversation Kubitscheck looked Smith in the eye and said, “Do you know, I like 
you.”429  
 The Brazilian government followed up this promising beginning by sending its 
foreign minister, Horacio Lafer, to Ottawa to visit Diefenbaker in March, 1960.  This was 
at the time when Diefenbaker’s interest in joining the OAS was at its peak and the two 
talked about it at length.430  Lafer indicated to Diefenbaker that he was “particularly 
impressed by the clear understanding that you have shown of the problems connected 
with the relations of Canada and the Hemispheric nations.”431 
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 Diefenbaker’s interest in Brazil was obvious.  Yet when the prospect of achieving 
a strong Canadian presence in Latin America’s largest (both in population and land mass) 
country was present, Diefenbaker failed to create a systematic plan to achieve this goal.  
Rather, as discussed below, he continued to rely on personal interventions on issues to 
strengthen economic and political ties between the two countries.   
 Lafer’s visit to Canada was followed a year later by the visit from Sevigny to 
Brazil.  By then, the political situation in Brazil had begun to get more complicated.  
Jânio de Silva Quadros was elected President in 1960, replacing Kubitschek.  Quadros 
immediately began to chart an independent foreign policy.432  Though this appealed to 
Diefenbaker, as did Quadros’s desire to promote trade between Canada and Brazil, the 
new President unexpectedly resigned shortly after his victory and his replacement, João 
Belchior Marques Goulart, was suspected of having communist sympathies.433 
 Sevigny’s report contained none of the enthusiasm for Brazil that Broome’s or 
Smith’s did.  Although he supported a greater Canadian involvement in the OAS, he saw 
Brazil as being controlled by the military and further stated that “democracy as we know 
it and understand it in North America is not the same form of democracy which is 
understood by the Latin American nations.”434 
 This sort of misperception, that the people of Latin do did not understand “real” 
democracy, has often coloured Canadian perceptions of Latin America.  The belief that 
somehow, Latin American nations are simply not developed enough to properly create a 
functioning democracy subtly influenced Canadian foreign relations with the region for 
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decades following the end of the Second World War.  Ironically, the tendency towards 
“caudilloism” in Latin America worked to the benefit of Canada during Diefenbaker’s 
time. The strong focus on the leader meant that real change was much more likely to 
occur as a result of one-on-one meetings between leaders.  Diefenbaker, of course, 
preferred this type of direct, personal diplomacy and many of his Latin American policies 
grew from his meetings with foreign leaders.   
 This type of personal diplomacy had both advantages and disadvantages.  On the 
positive side, when power was centralized and decisions were made between two people 
with the authority to implement them, results occurred much faster.  However, there were 
two distinct disadvantages to this approach as well.  First, when it was just two people 
involved in the discussion, for example, Diefenbaker and Kubitschek, nuances could be 
discussed and understood as when the two leaders decided to increase trade but there was 
plenty of minutia that still needed to be negotiated by the respective bureaucracies; this 
often did not occur.  Second, and particularly importantly for Latin America, if there was 
a leadership change, then the building of personal connections would have to start all 
over again.  In Latin America this situation occurred with both Brazil and Argentina. 
 Sevigny was not the only member of the Canadian delegation to the Punta del 
Este Conference; he was accompanied by Macquarrie, among several others.  As 
mentioned earlier, Macquarrie wrote to Diefenbaker following the Conference and 
mentioned a brief encounter he had with a member of the Brazilian House of 
Representatives.435  The Brazilian told Macquarrie that he admired Diefenbaker for two 
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reasons –– his Baptist religion and his independence in foreign policy.436  Macquarrie 
advised Diefenbaker that he should visit Latin America because he thought it could 
“bring about untold good in our relations with these key countries.”437  Diefenbaker 
would follow this advice, traveling a few months later to Mexico.  There would be, 
however, no more diplomatic exchanges between Canada and Brazil after Kubitschek 
was replaced. 
In addition to the political overtures, Diefenbaker also tried to increase trade 
relations with Brazil by directly intervening in the process when he could.  As with most 
of his Latin American policy, these interventions mainly involved  support for pro-
Brazilian motions during Cabinet meetings. In early 1958, the Cabinet discussed the 
possibility of offering tariff incentives to Brazil, as well as support for the sale of wheat 
and credit insurance for the sale of steel rails.438  The sale of wheat would in fact go 
forward and Cabinet authorized insurance for 50,000 tons of wheat a few months later ––
 a positive first step towards increasing Canada’s economic interests in Brazil. 439 
 Of greater interest, however, was the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade) negotiations with Brazil.   Diefenbaker took an interest in the proceedings and 
recommended that Brazil be offered the same GATT terms as Poland.440  This is of note 
for a number of reasons.  First, it demonstrated that Diefenbaker was interested in 
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improving Canadian-Brazilian relations.  And second, the country that he selected as the 
model for building the Canada-Brazil trading relationship was communist.  
 Diefenbaker received much criticism for his decision to maintain relations with 
communist Cuba and he consistently defended himself by arguing that the Canadian 
government could not cut off relations with another country simply because it did not like 
its political system.441  Maintaining a trading relationship with Poland was a perfect 
example of his reasoning.  Not only did Canada trade with this communist country –– a 
practice that in fact predated the Diefenbaker government –– but the tariff concessions it 
enjoyed were more generous than the ones made to a non-communist country, Brazil.
 When the possibility of the sale of Canadian wheat to Brazil arose, the Minister of 
Trade and Commerce, Gordon Churchill, proposed to the Cabinet that the Canadian 
Exports Credit Insurance Corporation be authorized to cover the shipments under the 
same terms as it did for wheat purchased by Poland.442 Cabinet agreed with Churchill’s 
recommendation and approved the measure.443 
 Churchill would play an important role in influencing Diefenbaker’s attempts to 
expand Canada’s trade with Latin America.  He was a close confidant, having supported 
Diefenbaker during the 1956 Progressive Conservative leadership convention and he had 
been a key manager of Diefenbaker’s 1957 election campaign.444  Diefenbaker appointed 
him because he felt he needed a “strong minister” in Trade and Commerce.445  Churchill 
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was, according to Diefenbaker, “the one minister who never failed to tell me frankly his 
views.  When Churchill disagreed, I reconsidered.”446  In the case of Latin America, there 
was no disagreement between Churchill and Diefenbaker, as both sought to expand 
Canada’s economic presence and the former reinforced Diefenbaker’s own views on the 
region. 
 In the summer of 1958 the Brazilian government attempted to purchase steel rails 
from the Algoma Steel Company and Churchill suggested that the Export Credits 
Insurance Corporation extend its coverage to the deal.447  The contract was for more than 
the Corporation would normally insure but after carefully examining the sale, Churchill 
felt that the contract would be a boon to the Canadian steel industry.448  Once again, 
Cabinet approved the sale. 
The Brazilian government continued to pursue the possibility of purchasing 
Canadian wheat.  In August, 1961, it submitted a detailed set of inquires that seemed to 
indicate an imminent request to purchase.449  The memorandum was sent to Diefenbaker 
by the Minister of Agriculture, Alvin Hamilton, who also informed him that the new 
Brazilian Ambassador, Sette Camara, had been personally instructed by the new 
President Quadros, to promote the expansion of Canadian/Brazilian trade.450 
 However, the possibilities of expanding Canada-Brazil political relations were 
soon dealt a blow when the political situation in Brazil changed and first Kubitschek, 
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then Quadros, left office. This in turn led to divisions in Diefenbaker’s Cabinet 
concerning the question of Brazil’s credit status.451  The first such questions arose 
concerning the purchase of Canadian locomotives by the Brazilian government.  In the 
end, the decision was made to offer credit support to the purchase particularly in light of 
the 250,000 man hours of employment that would be generated in Canada.452  Another 
purchase of locomotives by the Brazilian government brought out a sharp divide in the 
Cabinet between those who favored expansion into Latin America (Diefenbaker, Green, 
Churchill and the latter’s sucessor at Trade and Commerce, George Hees) and those who 
opposed it.  The group in opposition was led by Donald Fleming, the Minister of Finance, 
who argued that the Brazilian government was “not all that stable and now subject to 
Communist influence.”453  Those who opposed Fleming argued that Canada “was in as a 
good a position extending export credits covering sales to Brazil as to China and 
Poland.”454  In the end, Diefenbaker’s view carried the day. 
 It was a sign of Diefenbaker’s determination to push the expansion of Canadian 
trade into Latin America that Fleming, his Finance Minister, opposed the various Cabinet 
decisions that sought to develop economic relations with the region.  Fleming was close 
to Diefenbaker, and the Prime Minister described him as “highly competent” and an 
“extraordinarily good Finance Minister.”455 His objections had more to do with a strong 
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distrust of the capabilities and stability of Latin American governments than with the idea 
of expanding trade to Latin America.456 Still, Diefenbaker opposed him.  
 The split in Diefenbaker’s Cabinet was evident at the next Cabinet meeting when 
final approval of the locomotive sale was discussed.  Fleming stated simply that “the 
credit arrangements were hardly justified”; he was rebutted with the observation that 
“Brazil had come through its constitutional crisis reasonably well.”457  This was a 
reference to the elevation of João Belchior Marques Goulart to the Brazilian Presidency, 
the compromise solution between the military, congress and Goulart that ended a 
potential political crisis.  In the Cabinet debate, Fleming’s objections were overcome and 
final approval was granted. 
 Diefenbaker consistently supported the various commercial requests before 
Cabinet in the hope that they would increase Canadian trade in the region.  He considered 
them items that he could deal with personally, rather than matters where the government 
could formulate an overarching economic policy or plan.  In virtually all cases, the 
Cabinet approved measures that increased trade with Latin American countries.   
 A strong influence on Diefenbaker’s Brazilian policies was Henry Borden, the 
President of Brazilian Traction, a Canadian telephone company operating in Brazil.  
Borden was a lawyer and former civil servant, having served as chairman of the War 
Times Industry Control Board under C.D. Howe during the Second World War. And he 
was a Conservative Party fund-raiser.  In 1957 Diefenbaker appointed him the Chairman 
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of the Royal Commission on Energy.458  He formed a strong relationship with 
Diefenbaker, addressing him as “John” and signing off as “Henry” in their 
correspondence regarding matters pertaining to Canadian-Brazilian relations. 
 Borden was president of Brazilian Traction from 1946 to 1963, one of the largest 
telephone companies in Brazil.  In 1962, it operated 800,000 telephones, which amounted 
to 80% of all telephones in Brazil.459  In addition, 48% of Brazilian Traction’s shares 
were held by Canadians, making it easily the largest Canadian company operating in 
Brazil.460 
 Borden first wrote to Diefenbaker concerning Canadian-Brazilian relations in 
October, 1960.  He urged him to appoint a special representative to Brazil to attend the 
inauguration ceremonies for the new President.  He pointed out that this had been done 
for the 1955 inauguration ceremonies and had been commented on favorably by the 
Brazilians; in 1951 no representative of the Canadian government had attended the 
ceremonies and that had left an unfavorable impression in Brazil.461 
 Diefenbaker responded that Canada would indeed send a representative of the 
Canadian Government.462  He then discussed the situation with Green who agreed 
someone should be sent.  Green told Diefenbaker that Brazil was “one of the more 
democratic and progressive Latin American countries, with which [Canada’s relations 
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had] always been excellent.”463  Inquiries from the Canadian government, however, soon 
revealed that the new President did not want any “special Ambassadors” at the inaugural 
ceremonies.464 
 For Diefenbaker Borden often acted as a personal source of information about 
Brazil.  The Prime Minister was fond of using non-traditional sources to keep him 
informed of foreign affairs and welcomed Borden’s information.465  In one letter Borden 
advised him that Brazil was interested in a number of goods from Canada, including 
wheat and fishing boats, as well as stronger cultural exchanges and a general 
intensification of trade between the two countries.466  He also explained that Brazilian 
President Quadros had hinted that he planned to travel to Canada in December of 1961.  
Borden suggested that if a formal invitation had not already been sent to the President, 
then it should be.467 
 It is likely that had he not unexpectedly resigned in September, 1961, Quadros 
would have made a trip to Ottawa.  His resignation occurred before a formal invitation 
could be extended.468  In terms of strengthening Canadian-Brazilian relations this would 
have been an important step.  The resulting political instability in Brazil, however, meant 
that there were now limits to what could be done. The turnover of leaders in Latin 
America would remain a problem for Diefenbaker, who relied on the personal 
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relationships that he was able to develop with particular leaders to develop the Canada-
Latin America relationship. 
After this, little progress would be made in developing Canadian-Brazilian 
diplomatic relations but trade and commercial activity between the two countries 
continued to grow. Between 1960 and 1961 exports to Brazil increased from C$19.8 
million to 30.1 million while imports increased from 24.9 million to 29.1 million in the 
same years.469  Though these were small numbers in relation to Canadian exports overall, 
they marked a definite step in what Diefenbaker saw as the right direction.  
 
Argentina  
 Diefenbaker followed many of the same policies towards Argentina as he did 
towards Brazil which resulted in a number of interesting parallels.  These included 
several diplomatic missions, personal overtures to Diefenbaker by Argentine leaders, and 
limitations to the Canada-Argentine relationship caused by political instability in the 
region.  Like Brazil, Argentina offered another potential, largely untapped market for the 
expansion of Canadian influence and Diefenbaker reacted to the individual trade 
opportunities that arose instead of following a specific plan that targeted the country.  His 
focus was mainly on establishing diplomatic missions and furthering economic prospects. 
Politically, Diefenbaker began to take an interest in Argentina in 1958 when he 
read an External Affairs report on Argentina about recent political changes in the country. 
The report speculated that under the new president, Dr. Arturo Frondizi, there might be a 
shift in emphasis away from the US-Argentine relationship.470  This, of course, paralleled 
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Diefenbaker’s own foreign policy goals.  He received a second report from Cabinet 
Minister Ellen Fairclough, whom he sent to Argentina as a special Canadian Ambassador 
to Frondizi’s inauguration.471   
The Argentine government had originally invited the Prime Minister to the 
inauguration.472  He considered attending but put off making a firm decision for two 
weeks.473  In the end he replied personally to the Argentine Ambassador to Canada, 
Carlos Torriani, that he was unable to attend and was sending Fairclough in his place.474  
The Argentine government impressed Fairclough with its friendly reception and 
enthusiasm, including the fact that the Canadian delegation was given a Guard of Honour 
and that a “tremendous crowd” saw her off at the airport.475  Her report detailed a warm 
reception that was similar to the receptions that Diefenbaker received in other Latin 
American countries.  They demonstrated a desire by Argentina to bring Canada into a 
closer relationship with the pan-American system.   
 Diefenbaker attempted to facilitate a meeting between himself and Frondizi in the 
fall of 1958.  Frondizi had hinted that he would enjoy an opportunity to travel to Ottawa 
and Smith suggested to Diefenbaker that he be invited in connection with his trip to 
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Washington in January, 1959.476  Diefenbaker concurred but Frondizi was forced to 
decline because of a tight schedule, a situation that he said he “deplored.”477  They would 
not have the opportunity to meet until 1961. 
 Before this, however, there were a number of diplomatic exchanges between the 
Canadian and Argentine governments.  First, in 1960, Howard Green included Argentina 
on his tour through Latin America.  This was the second tour undertaken by 
Diefenbaker’s Secretary of State for External Affairs to Latin America and, unlike the 
previous Smith-led mission, the focus was on Argentina: the purpose was to represent 
Canada at the 150th Argentine Independence Day celebrations. 
 It was reflective of the growing importance of Latin America in general and 
Argentina in particular that Green decided to attend personally.  Previously these types of 
invitations had brought out MPs and sometimes junior cabinet ministers.  Coming so 
shortly after Diefenbaker’s visit to Mexico, this was a deliberate attempt to lay the 
foundations for a more active Canadian policy in the region. 
Green was as smitten by Argentina as Fairclough had been and reported back to 
the House of Commons that he was “impressed” and found Argentina was very similar to 
Canada.478  He had the opportunity to meet with Frondizi and the two discussed 
strengthening Canadian-Argentine relations as well as the possibility of Canada joining 
the OAS.479  Green was one of the few representatives who attended the inauguration 
who received an audience with Frondizi, a reflection of the importance the new President 
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attached to Canada.480  In the eyes of Canada’s Ambassador to Argentina, Robert Plant 
Bower, Green’s visit was “a success from every point of view.”481  
 Nearly one year later, Pierre Sevigny, the Associate Minister of National Defence 
briefly visited Argentina as part of his attendance at the Special Meeting of the Inter-
America Economic and Social Council, which was held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 
August 1961.482  While in Argentina he became the third member of Diefenbaker’s 
government to meet with Frondizi. 
 Frondizi continued to make a favourable impression on the Diefenbaker 
government.  Sevigny called him “a remarkable man who has fully succeeded by his 
wisdom and inspired leadership in restoring order and prosperity in his country.”483   
Furthermore, when Sevigny returned from his trip he reported to Diefenbaker that he was 
convinced of the importance of Canada joining the OAS and believed “that Canada 
[would] be called upon to play a major role in the necessary development of the South 
American Continent.”484 
 While Sevigny was in Argentina, Frondizi gave him a four-page letter to 
personally deliver to Diefenbaker.  In it, Frondizi urged Diefenbaker to deepen Canada’s 
involvement in inter-American affairs.485  He pointed out that Canada’s foreign policy 
was vigorous but moderate, that it served not only Canada’s interests but also the 
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interests of all people in the preservation of world peace.”486  Finally, he stated that 
Canada, because of its close connections with Europe and Latin America, could act as an 
intermediary between the two regions.487 
 These last two points would have resonated with Diefenbaker.  By mid-1961, he 
had begun to support the views of Green who was a strong advocate of nuclear 
disarmament.  He viewed Canadian influence on the world peace movement as an 
opportunity to strengthen Canada’s place in international affairs, and he  also saw 
Canada’s role in the international system as that of a link between Europe and Latin 
America. 
 Shortly after Sevigny’s trip, the Diefenbaker government again invited Frondizi to 
visit and this time he accepted.  He brought his wife, his foreign minister, and a number 
of other dignitaries with him and he traveled to Ottawa, Toronto and Montreal.488  While 
in Ottawa he met with Diefenbaker and in Montreal, Sevigny accompanied him.489  He 
stayed a total of three days in Canada. 
 During his stay, Frondizi once again emphasized the importance of Canadian-
Argentine relations and his desire to strengthen them.  His visit marked the first time the 
President of Argentina had visited Canada and he stressed that for him, it was “not 
intended to have just a ceremonial meaning,” rather it was to bring about closer ties 
between the two countries.490 
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 Following his visit, Frondizi informed Diefenbaker that he was leaving with “the 
best possible impression” and he signed his farewell note “your very affectionate 
friend.”491  For Diefenbaker, who was being assailed at home by the media and faced a 
less than friendly US president, a “very affectionate friend” would have been welcome.  
Although Frondizi’s appeal to have Canada join the OAS had little prospect of success as 
long as Kennedy was pushing for it, the possibility of a closer Canadian-Argentine 
political and economic relationship certainly appealed to Diefenbaker. 
 Unfortunately, as in the case of Canadian-Brazilian relations, the ground work for 
a stronger Canadian-Argentine relationship was undone by domestic Argentine politics.  
Frondizi allowed Peronists to run in congressional elections and when they did better 
than expected, he lost his majority in Congress and was replaced by the military.492  His 
replacement, Jose Maria Guido, reversed Frondizi’s foreign policy and firmly aligned 
Argentina with the US.493  Guido’s pro-US stance effectively ended Diefenbaker’s 
interest in Argentina as well as Argentine overtures towards Canada. 494 
 Diefenbaker not only sought to further Canadian-Argentine relations on a political 
level but also on an economic one.  He followed a policy which was very similar to his 
Brazilian policy; he used the government to support private initiatives undertaken by 
Canadian firms.  In Cabinet, Diefenbaker again made personal interventions on questions 
involving Argentina and supported Churchill’s decisions regarding trade.  He consistently 
did this not just with Argentina but virtually all Latin American nations –– in the latter 
half of his administration against Fleming’s advice.   
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The first such instance where Diefenbaker used Cabinet to promote greater 
Canadian-Argentine trade occurred in 1959, when the Argentina State Oil Enterprise 
attempted to buy 237 oil storage tanks from Sparling Tank and Manufacturing, a 
company based out of Toronto.495  Churchill pointed out that Argentina had experienced 
balance of payments difficulties and had a low credit rating; however, he still believed 
that the request should be met.496  He told Cabinet, “the government should be promoting 
trade and fostering ties with South America” and that “the Argentines were themselves 
anxious to do more business with Canada.”497  Cabinet agreed and authorized the sale. 
 In November, 1960, Diefenbaker shuffled his Cabinet and moved Churchill to 
Veterans Affairs and brought George Hees to Trade and Commerce.  Churchill had 
performed indifferently at best in his the Trade portfolio while Hees had become one of 
Diefenbaker’s most capable ministers.498  He also echoed Diefenbaker’s attitudes towards 
the promotion of trade with Latin America. 
 There remained, however, differences in opinion within the Cabinet, with strong 
opposition again coming from Fleming.  As mentioned with regard to Brazil, Fleming 
tended to oppose in principle the extension of credit protection to business ventures in 
Latin America.  These differences became evident during a Cabinet discussion of the sale 
of Canadian road graders to the Argentine government. 
 In 1961, the Dominion Road Machinery Company was negotiating with the 
Argentine government for the sale of 240 Champion road graders.  Hees, like Churchill 
before him, recommended that Cabinet approve the coverage of the sale by the Export 
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Credit Insurance Company.499  He was opposed by Fleming who argued that Argentina’s 
credit standing was not that high and that any such agreement would set a bad precedent 
for future cases.500  In the initial debate on the issue, Cabinet agreed to approve the 
coverage if the company successfully negotiated a deal with the Argentine government; 
in accord with Fleming’s wishes, it noted that the deal was not to be seen as a precedent 
for future cases.501 
 But the issue arose again in the late spring of 1962 when Fleming wanted to stop 
further negotiations with Argentine officials.  The contract had shifted from the 
Government of Argentina to the country’s provincial governments and the political 
situation in the country had become less stable, with Frondizi being replaced by Guido.502  
Still, Fleming found himself in the minority.  Those who opposed his views, led by 
Diefenbaker, Hees and Churchill, pointed out that negotiations had been taking place for 
some time and that there was no harm in allowing them to continue.503  The best Fleming 
could get from the Cabinet was an agreement to re-examine the issue later.504 
 Two weeks later Fleming again attempted to stop the negotiations.  He raised the 
same point, Argentine political instability, and argued that the Canadian government 
should wait until the situation was no longer “unsettled.”505  But, Fleming’s view was not 
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supported and Cabinet agreed to authorize the financing.506  Diefenbaker’s support in 
Cabinet was crucial in approving the previously discussed policies.   
 Even with the many human rights violations in Argentina and the interference of 
the military in the political process, it was the removal of Frondizi that was key in 
changing the Canadian-Argentine dynamic for Diefenbaker.  The military had played a 
major role in Argentine politics throughout Frondizi’s term as President, and human 
rights abuses had not stopped with his election.  The fact that Diefenbaker could overlook 
these things once again demonstrated his unwillingness to apply Canadian values to 
countries outside of the Commonwealth.  The focus was on increasing Canadian ties to 
Argentina, not on promoting Canadian values.  Nor were other nations to be judged by 
Canadian values. 
 Diefenbaker’s ability to overlook human rights violations, whether based on 
ignorance or calculation, reflected the lack of nuance in aspects of his foreign policy.  
Strong democratic systems in Brazil and Argentina, with a military in check, would 
ultimately have been of great benefit to Canada.  The military establishment in Latin 
America was traditionally pro-US, as it received supplies, training and funding from 
there.  If Diefenbaker was looking for nations to help counter-balance the US pull on 
Canada, then it made sense for him to promote freer institutions in nations like Brazil and 
Argentina.  Yet, there is no indication that this was ever a priority for his government.  
Instead, Diefenbaker focused on the leaders of the day and his view of Canada’s interests 
in the region. 
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 Diefenbaker was somewhat successful in his attempts to promote trade and 
political connections between Canada and South America’s two largest countries, 
Argentina and Brazil.  His attempts were consistent with his approach to Latin America 
as a whole and his desire to create greater autonomy for Canada.  His policies towards 
Argentina and Brazil also demonstrated his refusal to judge non-commonwealth countries 
for their system or choice of government.  Diefenbaker’s policies towards the two nations 
were mirrored by his policies towards Cuba following the Revolution. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DIEFENBAKER AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 
 
On January 1st, 1959, long time US ally and Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, 
fled Cuba.  This marked the victory of Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution.  At this 
point Cuba began a slow movement towards communism, a movement which accelerated 
as relations with the US deteriorated.  Eventually, relations between the Cuban and US 
government were completely severed and the US sought the support of its allies in its 
conflict with that country.  Diefenbaker refused to sever relations with Cuba or join an 
US-led economic embargo against the island state.  These decisions were entirely 
consistent with his Latin American policy and his desire that Canada’s foreign policy be 
conducted so as to further Canadian national interests.  His actions and policies towards 
Revolutionary Cuba were shaped by his personal diplomacy and by a variety of 
sometimes contradictory influences, including his relationship with US President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, pressures by Cuba, information he received about the Revolution, the 
view of his Cabinet, and public opinion.  
Cuba had been in the US orbit since the 1898 US victory in the Spanish-American 
War.  Following this victory, it existed as a protectorate of the US.  After an initial 
attempt to allow democratic elections in Cuba produced candidates deemed unacceptable 
by the US Administration, Washington decided to maintain a military presence on the 
island and reserved the right to intervene in Cuban affairs.507  
Canadian commercial interests in Cuba began shortly after the Spanish-American 
War.  The initial connections were commercial in nature as Canadian banks and 
businesses began to find opportunities there.  The Royal Bank opened its first branch in 
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1899 and by the mid-1920s had 65 branches on the island.508  It was so successful that it 
became, in many ways, Cuba’s de facto central bank.509  In 1906, the Bank of Nova 
Scotia joined the Royal Bank in Cuba.510  Other commercial businesses followed and by 
1949 Canadian exports to the island had increased to $14,391,000.  This was followed by 
a steady increase in bilateral trade throughout the 1950s.511  
The expanding trade and financial relationships quickly spawned a diplomatic 
relationship.  The first official Canadian representative in Cuba arrived in 1909 when the 
Department of Trade and Commerce opened an office in Havana.512  Diplomatic relations 
between Canada and Cuba were upgraded following the Second World War when the 
commissioners became consuls in 1945 and this culminated in the exchange of 
Ambassadors in 1950.513 
During the post-war years, the Liberal governments of King and Louis St. Laurent 
were focused mostly on improving and preventing any disruption to Canadian-Cuban 
trade.  Very few formal connections were established.   Furthermore, new or stronger 
connections were created usually only when there was a possible disruption in the trading 
relationship.  For example, it was concerns over the sugar trade between Canada and 
Cuba in 1951 that prodded the two nations to sign their first trade agreement.514  When 
these concerns passed, the Canadian government did not renew the treaty.   
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 Diefenbaker initially saw little reason to alter the laissez-faire nature of the 
Canadian-Cuba relationship.  However, rising tensions in Cuba soon moved the Canada-
Cuba relationship from a low to a high priority item on his foreign policy agenda.  
Disenchantment in Cuba with the status quo and particularly with the rule of the US- 
backed dictator, Fulgencio Batista, grew steadily.  Led by Fidel Castro’s 26th of July 
Movement, opposition forces eventually succeeded in overthrowing the dictator, who 
subsequently fled Cuba on New Year’s Day, 1959.  Castro emerged as the head of a new 
Cuban government and moved quickly to consolidate his power. 
 At first, there were few problems with Batista’s successor.  Canada and the US, as 
well as most of the nations of the world, quickly recognized the new Cuban government 
as legitimate and relations continued as before.  Yet Castro rapidly wore out his welcome 
with the US government, as his consolidation of power coincided with mass arrests and 
executions.  Far worse, however, was his acceptance of the Cuban Communist Party as a 
legitimate political entity and his slow turn towards the Soviet bloc for support. 
 Despite these actions and the deteriorating Cuba-US relationship, little changed in 
terms of the Canada-Cuba relationship during the early months of the Revolution.  
Canada had a history of trade with non-allied and communist nations and thus, as far 
Diefenbaker was concerned, the movement of the Cuban Revolution towards 
Communism was not a de facto cause for any immediate change in the relationship. 
 The situation deteriorated when the Castro regime began to nationalize the means 
of production in Cuba.515  It was the beginning of a sharp turn towards a communist 
economic system and presaged a confrontation with the US.  Diefenbaker was both anti-
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communist and a strong supporter of the US in the Cold War –– thus expanding Canadian 
investment in Cuba appeared problematic. 
 In 1960, the US enacted an economic blockade of Cuba, in response to the shift in 
Cuban policies towards communism and the Soviet bloc, as well as the nationalization of 
US businesses by the Cuban government.  The US expected its allies and in particular 
Canada, to support the blockade.  Diefenbaker was now faced with a critical decision.  In 
the end, he compromised.  He moved to prevent US companies from circumventing the 
embargo, by shipping goods to Cuba through Canada and by agreeing to join an embargo 
on strategic goods.  However, he refused to join the larger commercial embargo. 
US President Dwight Eisenhower attempted to influence Diefenbaker’s Cuban 
policies during the first three years of the Cuban Revolution.  The manner in which this 
was done explains why the two leaders never had serious differences over Cuba. 
Diefenbaker’s abiding respect for the US position during the Eisenhower presidency 
helps to discredit the argument that Diefenbaker was fundamentally anti-American.  
He had first seen Eisenhower in person at the 1952 Republican Convention in 
Chicago.516 He remembered how the Republicans at the convention had admired 
Eisenhower’s opponent, Senator Robert A. Taft, but had loved Eisenhower.  He had 
himself been swept along by the outpourings of emotion at the convention.   
The two leaders formally met just over five years later during Diefenbaker’s first 
visit to Washington in 1957.  He was as impressed with Eisenhower in person as he had 
been on stage at the 1952 convention.  There was, according to Diefenbaker, “no limit to 
Mr. Eisenhower’s congeniality” and he left Washington with the feeling that “Canada’s 
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position was more clearly understood.”517  They built on this promising beginning and 
continued to have an excellent relationship, referring to each other as “John” and “Ike” in 
their correspondence, until Eisenhower left office in 1960.      
Eisenhower often communicated with Diefenbaker on a personal level in both 
meetings and through correspondence.  This created in Diefenbaker feelings of personal 
importance and convinced him that Eisenhower took the Canada-US relationship 
seriously.  During the Cuban Revolution, Eisenhower sought to bring Diefenbaker around 
to the US viewpoint with one of his personal letters, in which he stated, “We are facing a 
very serious situation in the Caribbean which is obviously inviting Soviet penetration of 
the Western Hemisphere.”518  He then went on to invite Diefenbaker to express his views 
on the subject.   
It was a telling example of the differences between the manner in which 
Eisenhower and his successor, John F. Kennedy, dealt with Diefenbaker.  Eisenhower 
had a long history of dealing with diverse personalities, particularly from his time as an 
allied commander in the Second World War.  From British General Bernard Montgomery 
to Free French leader Charles de Gaulle, Eisenhower was able to manage people of 
strong character.  Diefenbaker was no exception.  The invitation to Diefenbaker to 
express his views on the subject of Cuba was exactly the gesture that carried great weight 
with him.  This was in direct contrast to Kennedy, who had little time for Diefenbaker or 
his views on international affairs.  Not surprisingly, Eisenhower’s diplomacy often 
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resulted in Diefenbaker’s wholehearted support for US initiatives, while Kennedy’s 
diplomacy often led Diefenbaker to reject them. 
The Cuban Revolution was not the first time that Eisenhower contacted 
Diefenbaker in advance of a planned US international initiative.  In 1958, the US 
government sent marines into Lebanon to support the pro-US government there.519  The 
day before, Eisenhower contacted Diefenbaker by telephone and the Prime Minister gave 
his full support to the mission.520  Immediately following their telephone discussion 
Eisenhower sent Diefenbaker a letter via Livingston T. Merchant, the US Ambassador to 
Canada, in which he provided a more detailed summary of the US plans.521  Diefenbaker 
then defended the US intervention to his Cabinet colleagues, informing them that Canada 
would support the US actions.522  He defended the US action before the UN Security 
Council, leading Eisenhower to write: “I cannot tell you how deeply appreciative I am of 
your prompt and decisive support of us in the United Nations Security Council.”523 
During the Eisenhower years, Diefenbaker thought that Canada was treated as an 
important ally of the US. The two leaders held similar views on national and international 
security matters, and this led to close co-operation and Diefenbaker’s general support of 
the Eisenhower Administration’s foreign policy.  
 In fact, during this time, Diefenbaker was not entirely comfortable about what 
policy Canada should adopt towards Cuba. On one hand, he was a staunch Cold Warrior 
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and a firm supporter of the US in the struggle against communism.524  He also had a close 
relationship with Eisenhower that he wished to keep.  On the other hand, he believed that 
the US approach to Cuba was excessive and he was concerned about Canadian interests 
on the island, primarily business and banking.525 
The position towards which he gravitated was that communist Cuba did not 
constitute a threat to Canada, and that to comply fully with the US embargo would harm 
Canadian trade and commercial interests.  His Latin American policies were predicated 
on the hope of diversifying the Canadian economy away from its dependence on the US.  
In particular, he wanted to expand Canada’s economic and commercial presence, and its 
diplomatic involvement, in the region.  He was resistant to leaders in Washington who 
embraced the idea of pursuing an anti-communist crusade in the region. This was not a 
case of anti-Americanism, as has often been maintained by authors such as Newman, 
Granatstein and Glazov, although Diefenbaker was not above tapping into that strain 
when he found it in Canadian society.  
Anti-American sentiment indeed enjoyed somewhat of a renaissance in Canada 
during the later half of the 1950s and Diefenbaker gave expression to negative feelings 
towards the US during both the 1957 and 1958 elections.  He often saw opportunities to 
score political points by using anti-American rhetoric and took advantage of such 
situations.526  However, it is important to differentiate between political rhetoric and 
Diefenbaker’s actual beliefs. A careful examination of his private correspondence reveals 
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nothing in the way of an anti-American bias and there is little evidence that he let anti-
American sentiment dominate his government’s foreign policy.  
In fact, Diefenbaker shifted Canadian foreign policy so that it was more firmly on 
the side of the US on Cold War issues than the previous Liberal administrations of St. 
Laurent and Mackenzie King.  His support for the US in fact often led to clashes with the 
officials of the Department of External Affairs who wished to see Canada cultivate a less 
aggressive position towards the Soviet Bloc.527   
Another factor in Diefenbaker’s refusal to sever political relations with Cuba or 
join the US commercial embargo was the opportunity that he believed the Cuban 
situation created for Canada.  Canada could, by virtue of its positive relationship with 
both Cuba and the US, exert its influence to try and ease the tensions between the two 
countries.  Basil Robinson reported that, as the Cuban-American relations worsened, 
Diefenbaker indicated that he “wanted to avoid any action that might prejudice Canada’s 
capacity to ease the strain in US-Cuban relations.”528   He was loath to alienate the Cuban 
government and lose the leverage that Canada had with it.  This was again not a policy 
based on an anti-American bias; it was in fact quite the opposite and in keeping with the 
older Liberal idea, of Canada serving as a mediator of international tensions. In 
Diefenbaker’s view, Canada was clearly an ally of the US. But it could also play the role 
of a moderating force between the US and Cuba. Canada could help to move the Cuban 
government in directions that the United States would like to see it go.  In his memoirs 
Diefenbaker observed that, “by maintaining normal relations with Cuba, Canada might 
have little opportunity to influence the course of Cuban events; by breaking diplomatic 
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relations with Cuba, Canada would have no opportunity to influence these events at 
all.”529 
Few contemporary analysts predicted the speed with which Cuba found itself 
joining the Soviet Bloc.  In 1960 the fate of Cuban-American relations was hardly a 
foregone conclusion and Diefenbaker was not alone in believing that the relationship 
could be saved through the efforts of third parties.  In July 1960, Mexican President 
Adolfo Lopez Mateos wrote to him asking that Canada join Mexico and Brazil in an 
effort to mediate the crisis between the US and Cuba.530   
Despite Diefenbaker’s belief that Canada could be involved in such an effort, he 
decided to turn down the Mexican President’s offer. Diefenbaker realized that, with the 
US position so deeply entrenched, joint mediation, even with the involvement of other 
countries like Brazil, Mexico and Canada, would be unsuccessful.  He also believed it 
would anger the US, which, was, after all, one of Canada’s closest allies. 
He did not see his failure to fully support the US embargo as either an anti-
American action or as support for the new Castro regime.  As he wrote in 1961, 
“continuation of our trade relations in no way constitutes approval, overt or tacit, of the 
Government of Cuba nor does that action reveal any alteration in opposition to 
communism and its works.”531  For Diefenbaker, maintaining trade with Cuba was in line 
with Canada’s previous policies and did not constitute a change in Canada’s support of 
the US in the Cold War.   
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What Diefenbaker did decide to do was place limits on Canada-Cuba trade. He 
placed an embargo on strategic/military goods, which prevented US goods from being 
sold to Cuba through Canada and circumventing the embargo.532  The total value of 
Canadian exports to Cuba actually declined from $13,000,000 in 1960 to $10,000,000 in 
1962, thus contradicting the numerous letters, editorials and cartoons in the press that 
argued or implied that Canada was enriching itself through the embargo. 533     
Diefenbaker was aware of these criticisms and attempted to counter his critics.  In 
a speech he delivered in 1961 he described the attitude of the Canadian government 
towards Cuba:  
The Canadian government is as concerned as any government over the 
communistic trends of the Cuban government.  However, Canada, while 
deploring the various actions and practices of the Cuban Government, has not 
considered such disapproval to constitute a reason for departing from the 
normal relations with which the Canadian Government has endeavored to 
maintain with various countries whose philosophies are repugnant to us.534 
 
This was not, however, enough for one State Department official who called Canada’s 
refusal to follow the US lead “disturbing.”535  US officials were sufficiently upset with 
Canada that when Washington severed formal relations with Cuba it refused the British 
suggestion that Canada represent US interests in Cuba.536 
 One can almost feel the sense of frustration that Diefenbaker experienced when he 
was forced to repeatedly explain his Cuban trade policy.  Twenty years later he recalled 
in his memoirs that “it became rather tiresome repeating over and over that we were 
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protecting United States interests and that our motives in trading with Cuba were not 
simply economic opportunism.”537  
One of those explanations came in the House of Commons during the 1960 winter 
session.  Diefenbaker’s comments were succinct; “we respect the views of other nations 
in their relations with Cuba just as we expect that they respect our views in our 
relations.”538  The statement defined the Canada-US relationship, from Diefenbaker’s 
perspective.  For him it was a relationship based on mutual respect, and the unspoken 
corollary of respect was equality. Diefenbaker understood fully that Canada and the US 
were not equal in terms of military and economic power, but he believed that they were 
both sovereign nations whose decisions deserved equal respect.  He believed that there 
was insufficient justification for Canada to join the US-led boycott, and that joining it 
would be possible only if Canadian interests would not be harmed.539  His conclusion was 
that a boycott would negatively affect Canadian business and banking interests in Cuba. 
He also believed that, “the diplomatic ostracizing of Cuba by the Western powers could 
serve only to eliminate her options and drive her into the Soviet orbit.”540  
Officials in the State Department and other US governmental agencies were not 
impressed by Diefenbaker’s position or justifications.  This was the situation when 
Eisenhower’s successor, John F. Kennedy Jr., became President of the United States.  
The Kennedy-Diefenbaker relationship would lack the cordiality of the Eisenhower-
Diefenbaker relationship, and it would be sorely tested, and found wanting, by the time of 
the escalation of the Cuban situation. 
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 Diefenbaker’s early policies towards revolutionary Cuba were shaped not only by 
his personal relationship with Eisenhower and pressures from the US government 
agencies but also by the actions of revolutionary Cuba itself.  Castro deliberately sought 
to cultivate a strong relationship with Canada.  He took a number of steps in this direction 
during the early years of the Revolution, including making a personal visit to Canada, 
sending trade delegations there, and finally negotiating the takeover of the Canadian 
banking interests in Cuba as opposed to the forced nationalization of US businesses. 
Diefenbaker’s response to Cuba’s overtures demonstrated the limits posed by the new 
Canadian-Cuban relationship and by his views of the Revolution. 
 In April, 1959, Castro visited Canada in an attempt to allay fears that Cuba was 
becoming communist.541  He was invited by a group to visit Montreal and he hoped that 
this would be followed by an official visit to Ottawa to meet with Diefenbaker.542  
Diefenbaker hesitated to extend the invitation and then decided against it.  He was uneasy 
about the nature of Castro’s regime, having received disturbing reports from numerous 
sources detailing human rights abuses in Cuba, and he did not want to offend 
Eisenhower.543   
 On December 9th, 1960, the Cuban government sent an uninvited eleven-man 
trade delegation, including Cuba’s Minister of Economic Affairs, M. Regino Boti, to 
Ottawa with the express purpose of increasing Canada-Cuba trade.544  The delegation met 
with Diefenbaker’s Minister of Trade and Commerce, George Hees, and discussed the 
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subject of selling sugar mill equipment.  Afterwards Hees publicly declared “You can’t 
do business with better businessmen anywhere.”545 
Although Hees comments were in keeping with the letter of the government’s 
policy, which was to expand Canadian trade and maintain a political relationship with 
Cuba, they were not in keeping with its spirit, which was a reluctant, rather than a 
wholehearted, acceptance of Cuba’s new regime.  Hees was forced to backtrack on his 
statements a few days later in a television broadcast and apologize for his “insensitive 
remarks.”546  Diefenbaker attempted to make his government’s position clear in a 
statement he released to the media later that month regarding Canada’s trade with Cuba.  
He stated: 
In answer to those well intentioned people who feel that Canada should 
follow the course taken by the United States, I would emphasize that no other 
country, including each and all of the NATO allies of the United States has 
taken any action to impose a similar trade embargo. 
 
Embargoes and trade controls are powerful and sometimes double edged 
weapons.  If we use them towards Cuba we may be under pressure to use 
them elsewhere and unnecessary damage will be done to Canadian trade, 
present or prospective.  As a country which lives by international trade, 
Canada cannot lightly resort to the weapons of a trade war. 
 
We do not minimize American concern, but it is the Government’s view that 
to maintain mutually beneficial economic relations with Cuba may help to 
contribute to the restoration of traditional relationships between Cuba and the 
Western world. 
 
Canada respects the right of every country to determine its own policy 
towards Cuba; we naturally expect others to respect our right to do 
likewise.547 
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A close examination of the speech reveals no positive references to Cuba.  In fact, there is 
no record of Diefenbaker ever praising Fidel Castro or communist Cuba and he was 
obviously not won over by Cuban overtures.  His decision to continue trade with Cuba 
was a decision based primarily on the promotion of Canadian interests. 
 Despite the less than friendly Canadian responses to his overtures, Castro 
continued to promote a positive relationship with Canada.  In 1960, he nationalized 
Cuba’s banks, with the important exception of the Royal Bank and the Bank of Nova 
Scotia.  Instead the Canadian banks sold their assets to the Cuban government in an 
amicable parting.548  The Royal Bank maintained a representative office in Havana that 
served as a financial link for Cuba to the outside world.549  This would later prove useful 
when Castro agreed to release prisoners from the abortive Bay of Pigs invasions for $60 
million, as the money was funneled through the Royal Bank.550 
 Castro’s treatment of the Canadian banks was appreciated by Diefenbaker and 
strengthened his belief that his policy of maintaining relations, both diplomatic and 
economic, was the correct course of action.  He may not have liked Castro or the Cuban 
Revolution, but he wanted to avoid a political crisis with Cuba that might threaten 
Canadian economic and commercial interests.  
Another important influence on Diefenbaker was the information he was receiving 
on the Revolution from both official and unofficial sources.  As in the case of Brazil, this 
facilitated his personal involvement and interest in the situation. While not particularly 
well informed about the political repression in other countries in Latin America, he 
received much information on the repression in Cuba.  Most of this information came 
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from Canada’s Ambassador to Cuba, Hector Allard, as well as unofficial sources, such as 
businessmen Arthur D. Margison and R. G. MacIsaac, who both traveled to the island 
and sent back reports. 
As early as March, 1959 Allard was reporting back to the Department of External 
Affairs that communist influences were spreading throughout Cuba like “a cancerous 
growth.”551  In a letter to Allard’s successor, Allan Anderson, in September of the same 
year Howard Green, expressed the belief that:  
Castro shows an unwillingness to give way to the moderates and right wing 
elements who backed his revolution, either by slowing down his radical 
agrarian reform plan or by taking overt action to curtail Communist influence 
in his government.552 
 
Anderson shared these concerns and his reports consistently maintained an anti-
Communism and anti-Castro tone.553   
Diefenbaker relied on non-Departmental sources for information on Cuba, such as 
Arthur D. Margison.  Margison was a successful engineer and businessman who 
corresponded with Diefenbaker in 1960 and looked to do business in Cuba.554  Before he 
formalized any deal with the new Castro government, Margison decided to go to Cuba 
and see for himself what the situation was like.  Upon his return to Canada, he wrote 
Diefenbaker and informed him that he would not be doing business with Cuba as long as 
the current regime was in power.555  In his letter, he pointed out that “the present 
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government ministers are following a policy of complete Soviet-Union directed 
conversion to a communist state.”556  He also stated that “it is a complete police state 
with Fidel Castro being converted into an image of a savior” and that “the city of Havana 
is a dying city” with many Russian technocrats moving in.557 
 Margison’s conclusions were echoed by R. G. MacIsaac, the Executive Vice-
President of the insurance firm Stewart, Smith Limited.  MacIsaac wrote to Diefenbaker 
following a visit of his own to Cuba and argued that “Castro was in the hands of the 
Communists and that “the U.S. was persona non-grata.”558  He suggested “aggressive 
tactics” were necessary to deal with the threat that Cuba now posed.559   
 Being strongly anti-communist, Diefenbaker was deeply concerned about what 
was going on in Cuba, and he refused, in the end, to meet with Castro or to offer any sort 
of moral support for the Revolution.  However, his primary concern was not with the 
domestic politics of other nations but rather how Canadian trade and influence in Latin 
America might be expanded.  
In addition to the information and pressures that he was receiving from other 
places, Diefenbaker’s Cuban policies were influenced by domestic political 
considerations. Public opinion in Canada concerning the Cuban Revolution was mixed.560  
The Canadian public generally found it hard to disassociate their increasingly negative 
feelings towards the US from the questions concerning communist Cuba.  In general, 
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Diefenbaker was on safe ground with his compromise that cut off strategic support to the 
Castro regime, while maintaining ongoing trade relations with Cuba. 
Public opinion mattered to Diefenbaker, to whom it was an article of faith that his 
government had to always answer to the Canadian people.  Despite his conservative 
beliefs, he did not a share the Burkean belief that elected politicians had a better 
understanding of what policies were needed than the people who elected them; rather he 
saw himself connected to the “common man” and standing against the landed aristocrats 
of the Conservative party, the party’s old guard who had previously blocked his attempts 
to become party leader. 
 However, this did not mean that Diefenbaker simply followed public opinion 
blindly.  There is little evidence, besides comments from his detractors, that he responded 
to the Cuban Revolution and the subsequent Cuban Missile Crisis completely in reaction 
to public opinion.  That there was a substantial part of public opinion that supported his 
early decision to continue to trade with Cuba did serve to reinforce his inclination to 
maintain that policy, but it was only one of a number of factors that influenced him.  
Even his landslide election victory in 1958 did not lead him away from keeping his finger 
on the pulse of public opinion.  
 Diefenbaker was able to enjoy Cabinet support on Cuban issues for much of 1959 
and 1960.  The decision that he should not meet with Castro when the latter visited 
Canada in 1959 and the policy of preventing US firms from circumventing their 
government’s embargo by exporting through Canada were both noted with approval and 
supported by Cabinet.561  However, as the Cuban government’s shift towards 
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Communism grew more pronounced, divisions in the Cabinet began to appear between 
those who believed that Canada should maintain normalized relations with Cuba and 
those who felt Canada should begin to distance itself from Castro’s government.562  
Diefenbaker and Howard Green were among the former and the Minister of National 
Defense, Douglas Harkness was among the latter.563  These divisions grew particularly 
acute during the Cuban Missile Crisis and will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Diefenbaker’s response to the Cuban Revolution was to try to find a middle 
ground between maintaining cordial relations with Cuba while not endorsing or offering 
support to the Castro government.  Initially, Diefenbaker had felt little need to change the 
pre-existing relationship with Cuba, but as it became apparent that the Cuban Revolution 
was becoming communist, he offered little more support than the bare minimum of 
continued recognition.  There were no aid packages or personal visits and when Castro 
traveled to Canada as a guest of a number of Montreal bankers, Diefenbaker refused to 
invite him to Ottawa, even though Castro offered to pay his own way.564   
Diefenbaker’s reaction to Castro’s overtures was affected by his staunch anti-
communist attitudes.565  He gave little response when, in the heady days of the 
revolution, there were stories of the massive violation of the civil liberties of Cuban 
citizens.566 Thanks to embassy reports and the accounts of Canadian businessmen in 
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Cuba, Diefenbaker was well aware of both problems around civil liberties and the slide 
towards communism. 
He could be very pragmatic, particularly when it came to promoting Canadian 
interests abroad.  There was little reason for him to turn his back on Cuba and plenty of 
reasons to keep the lines of communication and trade open.  The Cuban Revolution may 
have resulted in the violation of civil liberties but its record in that area was hardly worse 
than Batista’s.567  The Revolution may have led to a centralized communist economic 
system but it did not nationalize Canadian businesses.  In fact, the opposite occurred with 
the Cuban government actively courting Canadian trade.   
Diefenbaker’s policies towards Cuba are almost always examined in a vacuum, 
with little consideration given to their place in any wider context.  If, however, they are 
put into the larger context of his Latin American policy and Diefenbaker’s desire for 
greater autonomy for Canada in foreign affairs, then the underlying goal of his foreign 
policy becomes apparent.  For he sought to promote a particular concept of Canada’s 
national interest, one that involved both cooperation with, and at times a distance from, 
the US.  His concept of Canada’s national interest was based on Canada having 
autonomy from the US, while being closely allied with it.  At the same time, he attempted 
to find new areas for Canadian economic and commercial expansion in Latin America, 
which he hoped would mitigate the enormous influence of the US.  In Canada’s 
relationship and response to revolutionary Cuba, Diefenbaker stayed remarkably true to 
his foreign policy goals. 
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 CHAPTER 8 
DIEFENBAKER AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 
 
On October 25th, 1959, US President John F. Kennedy appeared before the world 
via a live televised broadcast and announced that the Soviet Union had placed nuclear 
missiles in Cuba.  The US Navy, he said, would enforce a complete blockade of Cuba 
until the missiles were removed.  The Soviet Union sent its own ships towards the island 
and a nuclear confrontation loomed.  Though the US government hoped for support from 
its European allies, it expected the Canada government to follow its lead during the 
Crisis.  Specifically, when US leaders proposed that the Canadian forces of NORAD be 
placed on heightened alert, they expected that the Canadian government would respond at 
once. In the event, Diefenbaker waited two days before authorizing such an alert.  
Diefenbaker’s decision to wait two days before agreeing to the heightened alert 
has been a source of unending controversy.  The decision was influenced, in large part, 
by his determination that Canada should respond to the crisis on its own terms, that is, on 
the basis of the Canadian government’s own assessment of the threat and how it might 
best be handled and a catastrophe averted.  Diefenbaker’s response to the crisis reflected 
his characteristic personal intervention in the situation for the purpose of guiding policy. 
The manner in which he intervened and his proposals for policy implementation reflected 
his own personal interpretation of the reasons for Kennedy’s actions, his own perception 
of the Soviet threat; and his expectations of Kennedy, given his knowledge of the man 
and experience dealing with him. He was also influenced by domestic considerations, 
including a deep division within his Cabinet and public perceptions of the crisis. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis originated from the new dynamic that the Cuban 
Revolution created in the Cold War.  A confluence of factors – a new US President, a 
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Soviet Premier who saw much to gain in a risky foreign adventure, and a Cuban leader 
looking for a deterrent against possible US aggression – all combined to lead the world 
closer to nuclear war than it had ever been. 
In 1961, Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower as President of the US and inherited a 
bold plan from his predecessor to arm a group of anti-Castro Cubans to invade Cuba.  
Kennedy found himself forced to allow the invasion to go forward because he feared that 
if he stopped it the news of the decision would leak and portray him as weak and 
indecisive.568  With substantial US support, the Cuban exiles invaded their former home 
with the intention of overthrowing the new government.  They landed at the Bay of Pigs 
(Playa Girón) but were quickly defeated by forces loyal to Castro. 
The invasion had an important effect on Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who 
had a strong sentimental attachment to Castro and the Cuban Revolution.  He began to 
look for a way to protect Cuba from US aggression and eventually proposed the 
emplacement of Soviet nuclear weapons there.  Nuclear weapons in Cuba offered a 
number of benefits besides ensuring the safety of the Cuban Revolution, including 
distracting the West from Berlin, countering US missiles in Turkey, preventing another 
US invasion, and achieving success in a bold foreign policy move to counter growing 
domestic unrest in the Soviet Union.569  On May 29th, 1962, he sent an emissary to Cuban 
with his proposal.570  Castro quickly accepted and shortly thereafter, nuclear 
infrastructure was sent to Cuba. 
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One month later, in July, 1962, the US Central Intelligence Agency detected an 
increased level of Soviet activity in Cuba and warned Kennedy.571  Shortly thereafter, US 
spy planes confirmed that construction had begun on ballistic nuclear missile bases in 
Cuba.  This discovery sent Kennedy and a small group of officials searching for an 
appropriate response.  They decided on a full military blockade of Cuba. 
Throughout their deliberations on how to handle the emerging threat in Cuba, the 
US government did not, at any time, inform the Canadian government about the growing 
nuclear threat that the island represented.  It was not until mere hours before he publicly 
addressed the US public that Kennedy sent an emissary to Diefenbaker to inform him of 
US plans. Subsequently a request came from Washington that Canadian forces in 
NORAD be placed on a heightened state of alert.  The expectation was that the Canadian 
government would comply at once, but Diefenbaker refused to do so. Two days went by 
while Cabinet engaged in a very divisive deliberation over what position the Canadian 
government should take.  
Diefenbaker’s delay raised two important questions: was it justified? and why the 
delay in the first place?  For Diefenbaker’s detractors, the answers were easy. The delay 
constituted in effect a refusal to support one’s ally, which could not be justified at a time 
of nuclear confrontation on any grounds. Why the delay? It was the regrettable and 
unacceptable result of Diefenbaker’s anti-Americanism and his indecisiveness.572 
Neither accusation is accurate.  The claim that Diefenbaker was indecisive does 
not stand up to scrutiny.  Regardless of whether or not his actions were justified, they 
were clearly decisive.  He decided that it would be unwise to rush into offering support to 
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the US.573  There was not, at any time, any wavering on this position.574  The charge that 
Diefenbaker’s decision was the product of his anti-Americanism is not supported by the 
historical record, as will be shown below. There appears to have been no single factor 
that moved Diefenbaker to take the position that he did, but rather a variety of influences 
that determined his approach and actions. 
One of these influences was Diefenbaker’s perception of the origins of the crisis.  
With his abiding interest in international affairs, Diefenbaker watched as the tensions 
between Cuba and the US slowly became part of the escalating Cold War conflict.  He 
laid a substantial portion of the blame for this turn of events at the feet of the Kennedy 
Administration. He believed that the roots of the Cuban Missile Crisis were to be found 
in the Bay of Pigs invasion.  He had viewed this earlier adventure as risky and it led him 
to question the judgment of Kennedy and his advisors.575  These people had been all too 
willing to take risks but obviously had not thought through the potential consequences of 
their plans.  It was this combination of risk-taking and lack of foresight that Diefenbaker 
feared would lead the world to nuclear war.  The Bay of Pigs invasion also told 
Diefenbaker that he had been correct to maintain Canada’s trading relationship with 
Cuba.  Castro, he believed, was not going anywhere and US actions against the Cuban 
government continued to produce unfortunate outcomes –– notably pushing Cuba into the 
arms of the Soviet Bloc, and then turning  Castro into a hero for standing up to the US. 
Diefenbaker believed that the US defeat at the Bay of Pigs also hurt US pride and 
public standing.  He worried that the event had sent Kennedy and other government 
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officials looking for a confrontation to regain both.576  The sting of the failure had been 
that much more painful for the US coming as it did mere days after the Soviet Union had 
successfully put the first man, Yuri Gagarin, in space.  It appeared that the Soviet Union 
had gained the upper hand in space at the same time as a small island had repulsed US 
efforts to interfere in its internal politics. 
When US government officials learned of the emplacement of nuclear weapons in 
Cuba, Diefenbaker believed, they had decided that the only response was to confront 
Khrushchev.  Diefenbaker was very doubtful about the wisdom of this strategy.  He had 
told Kennedy in a previous conversation: “I do not think the USSR will go to war over 
Cuba.”577  In his memoirs, he would maintain that the approach taken by Khrushchev was 
to create a “moderate and reasonable image.”578  It was US leaders, still smarting from 
the Bay of Pigs invasion, that had brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.   
Diefenbaker’s hesitation in agreeing to a move Canada to a heightened alert status 
was clearly prompted by his desire to avoid encouraging the Kennedy leadership in its 
confrontation with the Soviet Union.  He believed that the correct action for Canada was 
to calm a situation that was being aggravated by US actions.  For Diefenbaker, it was US 
insecurities that were driving the confrontation, not Soviet ambitions. 
From his perspective, the confrontation could and should have been dealt with by 
negotiations.  He had initially hoped that the UN could play a role in resolving the 
conflict and proposed that it be dealt with by an international inspection team.579  He was 
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emphatic that the Canadian government must not “do or say anything that could add to 
the seriousness of the Crisis.”580  Since it was the US government which had aggravated 
the situation, it made no sense for Canada to come to its support. His hope was to defuse 
the crisis.  Thus, he delayed agreeing to a heightened alert. Only when it became obvious 
that the crisis had moved beyond the UN, and that the Soviet Union was not going to 
back down did he decide that Canada should stand with the US in the crisis. At this point 
he came to believe that there was a genuine threat to the security of Canada and its 
people.  
Diefenbaker’s experience dealing with Kennedy told him that the root of the 
confrontation over Cuba lay with the US.  Much has been written on the strains of the 
Diefenbaker-Kennedy relationship caused by their incompatible personalities.581  This 
certainly played a role in the crisis, as the two leaders undeniably had a loathing for each 
other.582  A deeper source of the tension between them, however, was political, rather 
than personal. It had to do with their respective perceptions of the relationship that 
existed between the two countries. A comment by Diefenbaker near the end of the first 
meeting in Washington between the two leaders provides clarity on his view of the 
relationship: “We must”, he said, “ live together in friendship and cooperation.  Neither 
of us can survive without the other.”583  In short, Diefenbaker believed that Canada and 
the United States were independent partners who needed each other. The problem with 
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the Kennedy White House was that it did not view Canada as a partner, nor the US as a 
country needing Canada’s support.584   
Kennedy and Diefenbaker were basing their policy assumptions on very different 
conceptions of the Canada-US relationship. The reality was that Canada’s position in the 
world had changed since the end of the Second World War, when its military and 
economic capabilities had been substantial compared to the devastated countries in 
Europe and Asia. By 1960, the recovery of these countries, particularly those in Europe, 
had greatly diminished Canada’s influence in the world.585  Diefenbaker understood this 
but he continued to view Canada as an integral part of the western alliance and an 
important defence partner of the US.  The NORAD Agreement was a concrete expression 
of that partnership –– with its requirement that there be advance consultation and 
agreement by the partners before any military action could be taken against a perceived 
threat.  Kennedy, however, took a different view, considering Canada a less than equal 
partner, required to follow and support the US lead. 
The success of the Canada-US relationship had always been based on good will. 
Where Eisenhower had viewed it as important to cultivate the Canadian Prime Minister 
through small gestures such as consultation and personal diplomacy, Kennedy saw little 
value in this.  From the moment of his delay in responding to Diefenbaker’s 
congratulatory message on his presidential victory, Kennedy acted in a manner that was 
hardly designed, or likely, to win over Diefenbaker. Indeed the record shows that 
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Kennedy did not make strong efforts to win anyone over to his foreign policy 
positions.586  
The deteriorating Diefenbaker-Kennedy relationship was hardly helped by the 
fact that by 1961 Diefenbaker was exhausted and fighting for his political life.  The 
strains of governing, caused in part by his lack of trust and inability to delegate 
effectively, had begun to take their toll.587  One of the results of this, as Basil Robinson 
reported, was a tendency to focus on trivialities.588  Unfortunately, Kennedy soon gave 
Diefenbaker plenty of reasons to focus on the trivial –– for example, when he 
mispronounced Diefenbaker’s name in February of 1961, calling him his old friend, 
Prime Minister “Diefenbawker.”589 
The turning point in Diefenbaker’s judgment of Kennedy had been the Bay of 
Pigs. For Diefenbaker, this misadventure revealed a couple of things about Kennedy.  
First, it reinforced his initial observation that the President was brash and willing to take 
foolish risks.  Second, it demonstrated that Kennedy was not bothered by “the growing 
authority and capacity of the CIA.  On the contrary, he seemed quite proud of it.”590 
Diefenbaker was led to wonder about the quality of security intelligence that the 
President was getting. By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Diefenbaker had grave 
reservations about Kennedy’s reliability and that of his policy advisers.  
At an April 1961 meeting between Kennedy and Diefenbaker, at which they 
discussed the Bay of Pigs, Diefenbaker was assured by the President that he would be 
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consulted before the US took any further steps to intervene militarily in Cuba.591  Perhaps 
Kennedy forgot his promise while he considered ordering a military blockade of Cuba. It 
is quite certain that Diefenbaker did not forget,592 providing a further reason why he was 
so angry at not being consulted over the new Cuban crisis.  
On October 25th, 1962, Kennedy sent the former US Ambassador to Canada, 
Livingston Merchant, as a special emissary to see Diefenbaker and inform him that 
Soviet missiles were being installed in Cuba and that he planned to announce a military 
blockade of the island until they were removed.593  US leaders indicated shortly after this 
that they wanted Canada to raise the alert level for its NORAD forces. Their expectation 
was that the Canadian government would.  Diefenbaker refused. 
His refusal has often been explained by his anti-Americanism.594  It would be 
more accurate to argue that it was a distrust of Kennedy that drove his actions.  In his 
memoirs, he would say that he believed Kennedy “was perfectly capable of taking the 
world to the brink of thermal-nuclear destruction to prove himself a man for our times, a 
courageous champion of Western democracy.”595  To Diefenbaker, it was not fear of the 
US that drove Canada’s approach during the Cuban Missile Crisis; it was fear of 
Kennedy. 
While it is arguable that Diefenbaker was too sensitive to personal slights and let 
his feelings about Kennedy get in the way of the possibility of an effective response to a 
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serious international crisis, Kennedy must shoulder at least some of the blame for the 
stand-off between the Canadian and US governments. What Kennedy was seeking in fact 
was political support. But his judgment was poor if he was assuming that he could get 
such support from a man with whom he had never bothered to develop a positive 
relationship.   
 Yet Diefenbaker’s approach to the crisis was determined ultimately not by 
personalities but rather by considerations relating to Canada’s national interests. The 
priorities that drove Diefenbaker were the same ones that underlay his more general 
position on Canada-Latin America relations–– the desire to achieve greater autonomy for 
Canada in foreign affairs, and the expansion of Canadian influence in the Latin American 
region.  
 Nor was Diefenbaker’s approach to this crisis that much different from the 
approach that had been taken by previous Liberal governments, which favoured having 
international conflicts referred to, and if possible settled by, multilateral organizations. 
Diefenbaker’s attempt to have the crisis dealt with by the UN was very much in keeping 
with the Canadian tradition of middle power internationalism, 596 as was his effort to 
lower the temperature of the international system caused by the escalating conflict by the 
US and the Soviets over Cuba. In the event, the US was not prepared under any 
circumstances to allow the UN to deal with the crisis and expressed considerable 
displeasure with the Canadian idea of a UN inspection team. 
 The same disrespect that was shown by Kennedy for Diefenbaker was also 
demonstrated by the messenger who was sent to brief Ottawa on the crisis, former US 
Ambassador to Canada, Livingston Merchant.  In a conversation with Basil Robinson a 
                                                 
596 Diefenbaker, One Canada: The Tumultuous Years, 1962 to 1967, 88. 
 195
few months after the crisis, Merchant made clear his own views regarding the necessity 
of consultation with America’s NORAD partner.  In response to Robinson’s comments 
that he felt sorry for Diefenbaker because of the position in which he had been placed by 
the lack of consultation, Merchant replied, 
I personally didn’t feel a tenth as sorry for the PM as I had for Harold 
Macmillan who had comparably short advance notice.  I didn’t think Canada 
had earned, by its actions and by certain non-actions, the right to extreme 
intimacy of relations which had existed in years past.597 
 
The problem with Merchant’s viewpoint is that Canada did not have to earn the right to 
consultation; NORAD required it.  
Merchant’s successor as Ambassador to Canada, William Butterworth, did little to 
renew the cordial relations between Canada and the US that had existed before 
Kennedy’s election. He reported after his first meeting with Diefenbaker that he thought 
perhaps the Prime Minister had palsy or Parkinson’s disease.598  Diefenbaker’s concern 
that the United States did not accord proper respect to its northern neighbor and defence 
partner was borne out by the statements of both Merchant and Butterworth. 
 In addition to Diefenbaker’s perception of the origins of the crisis and his 
relationship with Kennedy, he was also influenced by his personal assessment of the 
threat posed by the Soviet Union.  The placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba was not 
seen as a Cuban action but rather a Soviet one and he therefore placed it in the context of 
the Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the US.  Furthermore, he 
believed that “Khrushchev had been caught fishing in American waters” but that he had 
“no interest in a major confrontation with the United States except where the vital 
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security interests of the USSR are at stake.”599  In the end, Diefenbaker assessed the 
Soviet threat in the context of Canada’s national interest which led him to state in his 
memoirs, “Certainly we wanted the Soviet missiles removed from Cuba: but not if there 
was an alternative, at the price of global destruction.”600 
Diefenbaker’s assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis was that it was not really a 
military confrontation but rather a dangerous international situation made worse by the 
actions of a US President who was determined to confront the communist enemy 
militarily. Diefenbaker determined that Kennedy’s concern, from the beginning, was to 
appear strong to Khrushchev and the Soviet Union. He had decided that once Soviet 
nuclear weapons were present in the western hemisphere it would be impossible to 
dislodge them. Diefenbaker by contrast believed that removing the missiles was possible 
through negotiation.601 
Once it became apparent that the crisis could not be settled by negotiations and 
that a nuclear confrontation was inevitable, Diefenbaker took the position that the time 
had come to prepare Canada for an attack by those who posed a direct threat to Canada’s 
territory and the lives of its citizens. Rising in the House of Commons, he stated: 
I think Canadians are in general agreement that these offensive weapons, 
located so contiguously to our continent are a direct and immediate menace to 
Canada.  Furthermore they are a serious menace to the deterrent strength of 
the whole western alliance on which our security is founded.602 
 
Canadian forces would be placed on high alert.  
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600 Ibid., 88. 
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 It is of interest that Diefenbaker’s initial perceptions of the crisis and the key 
players in it proved to be correct.  Khrushchev was more cautious than Kennedy and he 
did eventually back down.603  Kennedy was brash and willing to escalate the situation in 
order to get the missiles removed from Cuba.  The matter of the accuracy of 
Diefenbaker’s instincts has often been lost in the everlasting debate concerning what 
actions Diefenbaker should have taken.  The fact is that the US had a far greater nuclear 
capacity than the Soviet Union in 1962 and this likely meant that the latter would not start 
a nuclear confrontation.604  Diefenbaker sensed that it was Kennedy who was the more 
dangerous of the two leaders and who was more liable to cause a confrontation. 
 This was not only Diefenbaker’s assumption but that of most of NATO’s leaders 
at the time.  Both Harold Macmillan and Charles de Gaulle had serious concerns about 
Kennedy’s actions and refused to mobilize their forces because they believed it would be 
viewed as a provocation.605  And it was not just the French and English who were 
concerned.  Macmillan noted in his diary, “the Germans were very frightened though 
pretending to want firmness, the Italians windy; the Scandinavians rather sour.”606  
Diefenbaker’s views on the dangers of US escalation and the threat of the Soviet 
Union were echoed by Macmillan during a telephone conversation between the two.  He 
recommended a cautious approach to Diefenbaker and told him that Britain would not be 
placing its forces on alert.607  De Gaulle shared Diefenbaker’s concerns over escalation, 
and he shared Diefenbaker’s anger at “being informed but not consulted.”608  In short, 
                                                 
603 Diefenbaker, One Canada: The Tumultuous Years, 1962 to 1967,82. 
604 Haydon, 194. 
605 Ibid., 195. 
606 Alistair Horne, Harold Macmillan: Volume 2, 1957-1986 (London: MacMillan London,, 1989), 380. 
607 Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, “Canada, the United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis” Pacific Historical 
Review. 48, no. 2, (1979): 174. 
608 Gloin, 11. 
 198
Kennedy’s actions during the crisis did not meet with the approval of the majority of the 
western allies.  
Besides the external pressures, Diefenbaker’s decisions during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis were also influenced by domestic considerations, particularly divisions within his 
Cabinet, and an engaged public. About half the Cabinet was not sure what Canada should 
do. The other half was split into two groups.  The first group, which included Alvin 
Hamilton, J. Waldo Monteith, Richard Bell, Howard Green and Diefenbaker, believed 
that Canada needed to demonstrate restraint.609 The second group was composed of those 
who supported the assertion of Douglas Harkness, the Minister of National Defense, that 
Canada needed to offer complete, immediate and full military support to the US.610  
The crisis put Canadian military officials in a difficult situation. Although the 
Canadian and US Air Forces were integrated, the authority to place the Canadian forces 
on heightened alert rested with the Prime Minister and Cabinet, not with the military.611  
Harkness, however, firmly believed that the NORAD agreement meant that Canada had 
to follow the US lead immediately. Harkness and his allies in cabinet argued strongly for 
this, and were no more prepared to change their minds than those like Green who were 
opposed.612 
The influence that Diefenbaker had on his Cabinet, and that the Cabinet had on 
Diefenbaker, remains a contentious issue. Peyton Lyon has argued that had Diefenbaker 
strongly favoured going on heightened alert then the rest of the Cabinet would have fallen 
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in line, and the division in Cabinet would have been averted.613  Yet Jocelyn Maynard 
Ghent maintains that the problem was caused by the divisions in the Cabinet: had the 
entire Cabinet been unified in supporting a heightened alert then Diefenbaker would 
likely have accepted that and given Canada’s support..614  
 The point is that the Cabinet divisions were deep and reflected differences in the 
personal views of Ministers about what was the appropriate action for Canada to take in 
relation to the crisis. 615 So strongly convinced was the Minister of National Defence that 
Canada should be supporting the US that, after a frustrating discussion in Cabinet in 
which no decision was taken about the heightened alert, he went ahead and authorized the 
alert on his own, without Diefenbaker’s knowledge. 616  This was a serious matter, even 
though technically Harkness did not actually violate the rules governing the authorization 
of the alert, and would lead to the alienation of Harkness from Diefenbaker and 
ultimately his resignation from the Cabinet over the nuclear issue the following year.  As 
for Green, he was also impassioned but more influential than Harkness, believing that the 
US, by its actions, was leading the world toward a nuclear war..617  He summarized his 
own viewpoint a decade later in an interview when he was asked about the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.  “My God” he replied, “it would have been utter folly to rush in and try to urge the 
Americans on.  Kennedy himself was having his troubles holding his own people back 
without being pushed by others.”618   
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 It is important not to overstate Green’s influence during the crisis. Newman has 
argued that it was an impassioned plea from Green during a Cabinet debate that changed 
most of the Cabinet Ministers’ minds, including Diefenbaker, from supporting the US 
position to opposing it.  Green stated that, “if we go along with the Americans then we’ll 
be their vassals forever.”619  In fact Green was only stating what Diefenbaker and a large 
percentage of cabinet already believed.620  He served to reinforce, not change, the 
prevailing attitudes.  
But as much as Green, Harkness and Diefenbaker figured prominently in 
Canada’s reaction to the crisis, they were expressing at the highest official level deep 
differences among Canadians over a variety of matters including the emplacement of 
nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, the desirability of following or opposing US foreign 
policy, the merits of disarmament and arms control, and the best way to conduct the Cold 
War. It was genuine and profound differences over these issues, and not simply the 
personal views of Cabinet Ministers that caused the Cabinet difficulty in dealing with the 
crisis.  
 Diefenbaker was faced with a sharply divided Canadian public. Many Canadians 
felt that their government should offer its full support to the US in the fight against the 
communists.  Others were worried about the possibility of nuclear war, while others, 
because of a strong sense of Canadian nationalism, believed strongly that Canada should 
decide its own position instead of blindly following the US..621  As with the divisions in 
his Cabinet, the divisions in public opinion had the practical effect of creating genuine 
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uncertainty in Diefenbaker’s mind and an unwillingness to make a decision until it was 
clearer what Canadians wanted the government to do. Had the public been unified or its 
preferences clearer, it is likely that this would have an important effect on Diefenbaker’s 
handling of the crisis. 
  What is clear is that Diefenbaker’s decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
reflected his personal conviction that Canada’s foreign policy should serve the country’s 
national interests.. His refusal to offer immediate and unconditional support for the 
Kennedy Administration in confronting Khruschev was a product of his belief that such 
action would make the crisis worse, heightening instability in a way that could only 
threaten trade and other interests of Canada in and beyond the region. Canadians simply 
saw Cuba through a different lens than the Americans. For Canada, Cuba represented 
trade and new opportunities to build commercial and other ties. For the US, it represented 
a potential security threat off the coast of the state of Florida. It became a security issue 
for Canada only when the Kennedy Administration made it one. In the event, Canada 
went further than any other allied country in its support for the US, but this was 
insufficient for the Kennedy Administration which thought that verbal and political 
support should have been forthcoming from Ottawa at once,  
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CONCLUSION 
John Diefenbaker’s Latin American policy was based on his vision of Canada’s 
national interest, which for him, along with security, economic prosperity, domestic 
unity, meant a strong emphasis on the achievement of greater autonomy in foreign policy 
for Canada vis-à-vis the US and the expansion of Canadian exports to the region. For 
Diefenbaker, an enhanced relationship with Latin America had the potential to lessen 
Canada’s dependency on the US, while giving Latin American countries an outlet for 
their trade, commercial and financial relations other than the US. This new approach 
implied that Canada would formulate and implement policy that focused more on 
Canadian political interests and goals. It was not a matter of charting a totally 
independent policy for Canada in Latin America –– true policy independence was 
impossible to achieve.  Nor was it the case that Canada would necessarily set itself in 
opposition to the US when it disagreed with its policies. For Diefenbaker the goal was to 
pursue a foreign policy that was aligned with, but not subservient to, the US.   
The policy, in its broad essentials, would not be that different from that pursued 
by previous Liberal governments under King and St. Laurent. Canadian governments, 
whether Conservative or Liberal, believed in the promotion of Canadian trade, 
commercial and financial interests in Latin America, and their foreign policies were 
similarly shaped by the context of the post-war world, and in particular the Cold War.  
The key difference with the Diefenbaker government lay in Diefenbaker’s focus on the 
political aspects of the Canada-US-Latin America relationship. In addition to building 
economic, financial and commercial ties with the Latin America region, Diefenbaker 
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sought to increase the presence of Canada there to diversify its relations away from the 
US.  
 But it was not only the policy goals that distinguished Diefenbaker’s approach to 
Latin America – it was the manner in which he formulated and implemented foreign 
policy. Throughout his six years as Prime Minister he took a personal interest in foreign 
policy issues, and frequently intervened in the processes of policy development and 
policy implementation.  
At times these personal interventions were effective, for example in cases where 
he took the initiative to meet and forge personal connections with leaders in Latin 
America.  He also used the opportunities presented by visits to Canada by these leaders to 
further these connections – for the larger purpose of promoting Canadian interests.  But 
this approach had drawbacks – for example, in the cases of Argentina and Brazil when 
the presidents with whom Diefenbaker had been cultivating a close relationship, 
Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira and Dr. Arturo Frondizi, were replaced; much of the 
basis for the improving relationship with Brazil and Argentina was then lost. The way to 
build a lasting and effective  relationship with the countries of Latin America –– through 
the negotiation of formal treaties or trade agreements –– was not pursued.   
 This was a major flaw in how Diefenbaker pursued his policy priorities.  He 
lacked the patience for lengthy negotiations and often had little time for government 
officials. It was, of course, these officials who, by virtue of their expertise, knowledge 
and contacts, could have laid the foundations for long term trade and commercial 
agreements with Latin America.  Despite the increase in trade and commerce between 
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Canada and the region during the Diefenbaker years, no new agreements were signed 
with any Latin American country.  
 Rather than promoting and expediting trade agreements, Diefenbaker intervened 
in Cabinet discussions to support discrete commercial, financial and other initiatives that 
furthered the development of ties between Canada and Latin America.  His government 
provided credit insurance for private business deals or sought to expedite initiatives in 
politically sensitive areas, such as the sale of ships to the pre-revolutionary Cuban 
government.  He championed the sale of numerous Canadian goods, such as tractors, 
locomotives and ships, to Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, the West Indies and Cuba.  In the 
meantime, in travelling to Canada leaders from various Latin American countries 
attempted to convince Diefenbaker and his Cabinet colleagues that there was room for 
Canada to play a more active role in pan-American affairs.  They hoped that Canada 
could be an important trade  partner, while acting act as a moderating influence on the 
US. 
 Diefenbaker was influenced undoubtedly by the interest taken by these Latin 
American leaders in Canada. But there were other influences guiding his approach to the 
region.  His respect for Cabinet opinion has been well documented: he always listened 
closely to his Cabinet, to the point where even his strongest supporters were worried that 
he was too concerned about its opinion.622 The backing of Cabinet ministers such as 
Gordon Churchill, George Hees, Sidney Smith, Pierre Sevigny and Howard Green 
reinforced many of his thoughts concerning the opportunities that existed in Latin 
America, including those posed by a Canadian membership in the OAS. However, there 
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were moments, such as during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Cabinet was deeply 
divided and created problems for him.   
 Diefenbaker’s Latin American policy was also influenced by the position that was 
taken by the major countries of Latin America toward Canada, including Mexico, 
Argentina, Brazil, the Federation of the West Indies, and Cuba. They all actively sought 
to bring Canada deeper into the pan-American system because they saw in Canada a 
potential to moderate US influence in the region.  When Diefenbaker or representatives 
of his government visited Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, they were met with a warm 
welcome by the host country that left a positive impression on them.  Diefenbaker’s 
Mexico trip, in particular, convinced him that Canada was missing an opportunity to 
expand its trade and influence in Latin America, and it was at this point that he 
contemplated reversing his position on membership in the OAS. 
 Both larger and smaller Latin American nations, from Brazil to Venezuela, 
favoured Canadian membership in the OAS, as did the Eisenhower Administration. But 
the change in US leadership from Eisenhower to Kennedy led Diefenbaker to change his 
mind on the question.  He came to believe, as Canadian leaders had before him, that 
membership in the organization would place Canada in an uncomfortable and difficult 
position between the US and the Latin American countries. 
 Obviously, a major influence on Diefenbaker’s Latin American policies was his 
relationships with the two US presidents during his period in office. The impact of those 
relationships was felt particularly in relation to questions surrounding Cuba. That 
Diefenbaker was centrally involved in discussions relating to Cuba was understandable, 
given that, for Canada this was a matter of high policy that involved the Prime Minister. 
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What is striking is that it was Diefenbaker’s personal reaction to the policy positions of 
the two US presidents that influenced Canadian policy. He responded at a personal level 
to Eisenhower’s invitation to speak his mind on Cuba, evidently viewing it as an 
expression of confidence by Eisenhower in his judgment, and respect for Canada. His 
response to Kennedy’s public suggestion that Canada join the OAS was anything but 
positive; viewing it as discourteous and perhaps even contemptuous to him and his 
government. He reacted in the same way to Kennedy’s failure to consult him before 
confronting the Soviet Union over Cuba.  
 In conclusion, Diefenbaker’s policies towards countries such as Cuba, Mexico, 
the Federation of the West Indies, Argentina and Brazil were somewhat successful in 
expanding Canadian trade and comercial activity beyond the United States, and in 
establishing a stronger political relationship between Canada and the Latin American 
region.  The policies were remarkably consistent, reflecting Diefenbaker’s desire to 
increase Canada’s autonomy vis-a-vis the US, and differentiated by his personal 
involvement in initiating policy at the Cabinet level and in building and cultivating 
relationships with Latin American leaders; the goal was to further Canadian economic 
and political interests in the region. Though there were possibilities for greater expansion 
and connections with Latin America that were missed, Diefenbaker’s Latin American 
policy would be built upon and continued by successive Liberal and Conservative 
governments once he left office. 
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